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# Formal Specification and Runtime Verification of Parallel Systems using Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)

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PhD Thesis

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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# **Declaration of Authorship**

I declare that the work described in this thesis is original work undertaken by me for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Software Technology Research Laboratory (STRL), at De Montfort University, United Kingdom.

No part of the material described in this thesis has been submitted for any award of any other degree or qualification in this or any other university or college of advanced education. This thesis is written by me and produced using L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X.

*To my mother's soul, Helalah bint Hujailan Alshammari (April 21<sup>st</sup>, 2016).*

*May she rest in peace ...*

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# Abstract

Runtime Verification (RV) is the discipline that allows monitoring systems at runtime in order to check the satisfaction or violation of a given correctness property. Parallel systems are more complicated than sequential systems. Therefore, systems that run in parallel need a parallel runtime verification framework to monitor their behaviour and guarantee correctness properties. Parallel systems have correctness properties different from correctness properties of sequential systems. For instance, as a correctness property of parallel systems, absence of deadlock has to be guaranteed and mutual exclusion mechanism has to be applied in case a resource is shared between more than one system and the parallelism form is true concurrency. Therefore, sequential runtime verification framework can not handle systems that run in parallel due to the singularity issue of this kind of framework as they are built to handle a single system at a time, whereas for parallel systems a framework has to handle many systems at a time. AnaTempura is a runtime verification tool which can handle single systems at a time. To solve this problem, I evolved AnaTempura to be able to handle parallel systems. In this thesis, I propose a Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) that can handle systems which use architectures of parallelism in their design such as multi-core processor architecture. The proposed model can check system behaviour at runtime in order to either guarantee satisfaction or detect violations of correctness properties. My technique is based on Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and its executable subset Tempura to verify properties at runtime using the AnaTempura tool.

I use, as a demonstration, the case study of private L2 cache memory of multi-core processor architecture. My objectives are to *i)* design MSI protocol compliant with cache memory

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coherence and *ii*) fulfil main memory consistency model at runtime. I achieve this via a formal Tempura specification of the cache controller which is then verified at runtime against my objectives for memory consistency and cache coherence using AnaTempura. The presented specifications allow to extend it allow to extend it to not only capture correctness but also monitor the performance of a cache memory controller. The case study is then evaluated via integrating AnaTempura with MATLAB in order to check correctness properties such as memory consistency and cache coherence.

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# List of Abbreviation

ITL	Interval Temporal Logic
LTL	Linear Temporal Logic
CTL	Computational Tree Logic
PTL	Projection Temporal Logic
TM	Transactional Memory
ACID	Atomicity Consistency Isolation Durability
Mutex	Mutual Exclusion
PRVF	Parallel Runtime Verification Framework
TAM	Temporal Agent Model
wtr	willing to read
wtw	willing to write
Var	Variable
Val	Value
Addr	Address
RW	Read Write
Pid	Processor identification

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RAM	Random Access Machine
PRAM	Parallel Random Access Machine
EREW	Exclusive Read Exclusive Write
CREW	Concurrent Read Exclusive Write
CRCW	Concurrent Read Concurrent Write
RMI	Remote Method Invocation
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
L2 Cache	Level 2 Cache
MSI	Modified Shared Invalid
MESI	Modified Exclusive Shared Invalid
MOESI	Modified Owned Exclusive Shared Invalid
Sys	System
fin	final
As/Co	Assumption/Commitment
DCS	Distributed Control Systems
OREDA	Offshore and Onshore Reliability Data



# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### *Objectives:*

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- To set a background for the conducted research
  - To identify the problem statement and research motivation
  - To raise the research questions
  - To provide the research methodology
  - To highlight the success criteria
  - To provide the thesis outline
-

### 1.1 Background

Parallel computing includes computer architecture, operating systems, programming languages, applications, and algorithms. The design and the implementation of these instances have to consider parallelism in order to deliver highly efficient parallel computations. The main goals of parallel computations are improving the speed needed to accomplish tasks and easing the functionality of the tasks being computed. These goals are sometimes difficult to achieve due to hardware or software issues. The key driver of hardware parallelism is the performance of computer systems, while the key drivers of software parallelism are performance and application functionality [211].

Parallel programming is an important factor towards effective parallel computing. The major purpose of parallel programming is the efficient execution of codes in order to save the time needed to execute applications. The efficient execution of codes enables parallel programming to scale well with the problem size, which, consequently, leads to solving larger problems efficiently. This efficient performance of parallel programming is due to providing concurrency which allows simultaneous performing of multiple tasks [210].

Parallel programming goes beyond the limits caused by sequential computing such as physical and practical factors that limit the ability of constructing faster sequential computers [210]. For instance, sequential computers speed is subjected to the speed of data which moves through the hardware. A bandwidth of such medium restricts the transmission through a physical medium (e.g. the speed of light or the transmission limit of copper wire). The technology of semiconductors and evolutionary advancement allow a single chip to have a larger number of transistors; however, reducing the size of such transistors to a molecular or atomic level eventually reaches a limit. Another physical factor which limits sequential computing from being efficient is the processor heat caused by the amount of the consumed power; thus, dissipating processor heat by conventional way is hard. The development of a faster processor to solve a single computational

problem is increasingly expensive. Therefore, using large number of processors to solve such computational problem is less expensive. The development of parallel systems architecture such as multi-core technology overcomes these kind of problems.

Another reason for developing parallel programs is the use of several computer memory resources instead of using only one computer resource which might be scarce or costly to manage [210]. This advantage of parallel computing, in general, overcomes the limitation of the scarcity of memory resources. The improvement in parallel systems approaches such as multi-core technology has been obtaining continuous gains.

These remarkable benefits make parallel computing the base of future computing systems. As parallel computing systems are becoming ubiquitous in everyday life [142], careful attention has to be paid to the satisfaction of their correctness property.

Verification techniques have to be taken into account during the development of parallel computing systems in order to deliver remarkable benefits of parallel computing. Verification techniques assure a correctness property of parallel computing systems with respect to their specifications. Correctness property is a milestone in systems design and development process. Thus, my research considers verification techniques as a mandatory approach to the correctness of parallel computing systems. Correctness criteria is a preliminary step towards high performance and efficient functionality. In other words, to gain performance it has to pain correctness first.

### **1.2 Problem Statement and Research Motivation**

In this section I will shed light on the research problems. Subsequently, the research gap is addressed and a solution will be proposed. After that, the research motivation is highlighted. I believe the following problems are real research problems and they should be addressed in order to provide suitable solutions which will eventually enhance parallel computing models algorithms and design. The problems are:

- The correctness of parallel programs is harder to determine than for sequential programs [142]. Fixing parallel programs bugs at the software level such as data race, atomicity violation, deadlock are much harder than fixing sequential program ones. On the other hand, at the hardware level a non-determinism execution is a major problem due to the out-of-sync clocks of large systems which cause slight timing variations of a given program. Even though the clock is synced, different interactions with operating systems or other applications could lead to non-deterministic execution of a program each time it runs. The non-deterministic problem makes capturing errors kind of impossible.
- Some parallel programs use synchronisation points to coordinate the work of the overall computations and to ensure that all the parallel operations are synchronised and the data is being used is consistent. Some parallel programs use message-passing approach to exchange data and ensure synchronisation of data being used within the parallel operations of such programs. The latter approach is commonly used in distributed memory machines. However, software developers who use this approach find the correctness of such programs difficult due to the variety of inputs that might be given to these programs. Also, the fact that multiple software developers may share work on a given portion of a program is another difficulty.
- Some parallel programs may use what is so-called critical section (or atomic region) to prevent any access attempt to a shared resource at a time for more than one processor. This mechanism is used to ensure a concurrency characteristic called atomicity. Atomicity violation is considered a concurrency bug. Lock-based algorithm is used to ensure the atomic execution of the critical section (or atomic region) for concurrency sake. Undesired behaviour might occur due to the use of locks which is deadlock problem where two processors are waiting for each other permanently which eventually leads to delay the computation or halt the two processors.

A unified generic model that can handle these concurrency issues with the consideration of different parallel computation model aspects such as concurrency, communication and execution is needed. Therefore, I present in this PhD thesis a unified generic model for parallel computing models considering aspects such as concurrency, communication and execution. Such model will benefit hardware computer systems and software performance and application functionality. Parallel algorithms and analysis is intended to be delivered for the sake of design enhancements and correctness verification at the same time. This model is formal method-based approach which aims to establish an accurate and unambiguous semantics in order to deliver effective description of every phase of parallel systems behaviour in order to fulfil correctness properties such as safety and liveness.

Therefore, correctness of parallel computing is a mandatory need towards achieving the best of parallelism with respect to performance and functionality. Runtime verification plays a major role within verification techniques due to a number of reasons. Some of the most important reasons for using runtime verification over other verification techniques are that it is a lightweight tool, and because it guarantees the absence of states explosion caused by modelling all possible states of system under scrutiny. My approach, runtime verification of parallel computing systems, contributes to move forward the parallelism at hardware design level and software performance and functionality level via the discovery of the behaviour of hardware/software during runtime. In other words, there are states that can not be discovered but at runtime. The monitoring of either satisfaction or violation of correctness criteria is the main task of runtime verification and via this task hardware design and software performance evaluation can be measured accurately. According to Muller [199] the evaluation of verification techniques focuses on the following criteria: Soundness, Completeness, Modularity, Automation, and Efficiency. In my approach I consider these criteria carefully as my aim is to deliver a generic model in order to verify correctness property for parallel systems at runtime.

### 1.3 Research Questions

The major question of my research is:

- How to infer the correctness of global property from the correctness of a set of local properties for computer systems using parallel architectures?

Out of the raised major research question, a set of research questions are intended to tackle different aspects of the encountered issues. These are:

1. How to construct a global state out of local states of parallel systems?
2. How to compose/decompose a global property out of/into a set of local properties?
3. How to handle different forms of concurrency, communication models, and execution modes of parallel systems?
4. How to verify local/global properties at the local/global level?

### 1.4 Research Methodology

The research methodology I adopt follows a constructive research approach. My research contributes to knowledge being developed as a new solution for the identified problem. Therefore, I constructed new algorithms, a computational model, and an architecture framework. The construction of this approach consists of the following phases:

- **Background Review and Related Work:**

This phase sets a comprehensive background of the involved research topics and reviews the literature of the field of my research. The justification of my choice of the technique I adopt to conduct this research is made. The discussion of the related work addresses the gap and shows how our approach is going to serve the purpose of this study. My motivation towards the selection of the case study is presented at the end of this phase and linked to the related work.

- **Computational Model:**

As the proposed approach is formal-method based, this phase provides an abstract formalisation for the proposed model. I use Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and its executable subset Tempura as a formal framework for specification and verification to model the behaviour of parallel systems using the runtime verifier, AnaTempura.

- **Architecture Framework:**

In this phase I describe the design and the components of the framework. I define each component and describe their functions to be able to link the whole framework and make it integrated. I also introduce different concurrency mechanisms, communication models, and execution modes of parallel computing systems. In addition, this phase presents algorithmic descriptions of all possible approaches that might have been encountered during my design of the proposed framework.

- **Implementation:**

This phase implements the proposed framework using the programming temporal language Tempura to model the framework components and their functions. Assertion points mechanism is also implemented and a set of practical improvements has been made to enable our framework to handle receiving multiple assertion data sent from local programs simultaneously to compose a global property out of local properties. Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) framework is implemented as a demonstration of the robustness of my proposed framework and its capability to implement various parallel systems architectures.

- **Case Study:**

As my approach is formal-methods based, this phase provides an abstract formalisation of the case study which is cache controller. I use Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) as the formal framework for the specification and verification to model the behaviour of cache controller. The cache controller modelled using Tempura and the runtime verifier AnaTempura. A set

of formal ITL specifications transformed into an executable code in Tempura to be checked against a set of temporal properties.

- **Evaluation:**

The evaluation illustrates the effectiveness of the framework by producing a runtime verification of the cache controller. The correctness is the success measurement of my approach. Correctness of the framework shows consistency of the implemented system.

### 1.5 Success Criteria

The success criteria of my approach, in addition to answering the research questions, are reflected in the ability of achieving the following outcomes:

1. Compositional requirements from several sources which handle local and global systems correctness. The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of the question number **1**.
2. Compositional collection of assertion data from several sources to handle True/Interleaving Concurrency associated with Shared-Variable approach. The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of question number **3**.
3. Compositional collection of assertion data from several sources to handle Synchronous/Asynchronous Communication links, which are *Channels/Shunts*, associated with Message-Passing approach. The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of question number **3**.
4. The ability to execute agents concurrently and the introduction of resource allocation agents, and Delay and Timeout agents to model delay and timeout behaviour. The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of question number **3**.
5. The use of lock-based technique to enforce Mutual Exclusion to deliver synchronisation. The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of questions number **1 & 3**.



6. Checking the correctness property of local systems at local/global levels. The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of questions number **2 & 4**.
7. The inference of the correctness of global property from the correctness of a set of local properties of global systems. The fulfilment of this success criteria is the answer of the raised major question.

### 1.6 Thesis Outline

This thesis is composed of five chapters which are organized as follows:

- **Chapter 2** introduces the basic concepts of the relevant topics of verification techniques, runtime verification, the monitor, syntax and semantics of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and its executable subset Tempura as a temporal programming language used to model my framework. Also, the justification of my choice of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is to serve as a formal-method base of the proposed approach.
- **Chapter 3** introduces the proposed framework and its components and a comprehensive description of the components and their functions. Also, it introduces different concurrency mechanisms, communication models, and execution modes of parallel computing systems. This chapter presents algorithmic descriptions of all possible approaches that were encountered during the design of the proposed framework.
- **Chapter 4** introduces the implementation of the proposed framework and explains in details how to implement the framework components and their communication with each other. Also this chapter implements other parallel computing architectures.
- **Chapter 5** provides the evaluation of the implemented proposed framework. Cache Controller case study is modelled and implemented to evaluate my framework concerning correctness property of cache controller. In addition to the raw data analysis, a formal

specification in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) of all the components of cache controller system is given. Demonstration of the implemented case study is given in screen-shots as the monitoring system of AnaTempura has an animation window to simulate the system behaviour visually.

- **Chapter 6** provides random and independent evaluation techniques using MATLAB. AnaTempura has been linked to MATLAB in order to exchange assertion data. These assertion data can be used within MATLAB for manipulation, analysis and making unbiased judgement of the proposed model.
- **Chapter 7** summarises the proposed approach and highlights the significance of the delivered contributions and draws a comparison with related work. It also discusses the limitations of my approach, the directions of the future work, and the impact on academic and industrial perspectives.

## Chapter 2

# Verification Techniques for Parallel Systems: a Review

### *Objectives:*

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- To highlight basic Concepts and Related Topics
  - To give an overview of Runtime Verification
  - To discuss major challenges in Runtime Verification for Parallel Programs
  - To investigate relevant Formal Approaches
  - To highlight the Related Work, Memory Models, and recent challenges in the field
-

## 2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present a comprehensive background of the research topic. I present verification techniques which are used in this field and a trade-off between these techniques. I focus mainly on runtime verification to serve the proposed approach due to specific reasons. Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) serves as a formal-method based framework for my approach due to various reasons. I shed light on related work concerning memory models in addition to hardware vulnerabilities, namely, Meltdown and Spectre.

## 2.2 Basic Concepts and Related Topics

In this section, a brief review of some essential technical aspects are covered such as the difference between concurrency and parallelism, parallel and concurrent models in Java programming language, modern Central Processing Units (CPUs) and Petri Net.

### 2.2.1 Concurrency versus Parallelism

As in this research parallel systems are intended to be studied in order to deliver correctness properties, I have to clarify the confusion between the terminology of concurrency and parallelism. These terminologies are often debated among computer science communities. The ambiguity in the difference between them is confusing which might lead to misconception in views. Navarro et al. [205] realised this misunderstanding between the two terminologies; hence, they give the following definitions:

**Definition 1** “*Concurrency is a property of a program (at design level) where two or more tasks can be in progress simultaneously.*”

**Definition 2** “*Parallelism is a runtime property where two or more tasks are being executed simultaneously.*”

According to Navarro et al. [205] it is totally different being in progress (concurrency) from being in execution (parallelism). Let  $C$  and  $P$  denote concurrency and parallelism respectively,

the relationship between them can be expressed formally as:  $P \subset C$ , which means  $P$  is a subset of  $C$  and subsequently  $C$  is a superset of  $P$ . In simple words, parallelism is concurrency's dependent while concurrency is independent of parallelism. Now the difference is even more clearer which invites the definition of a very essential terminology in this research, which is parallel computing:

**Definition 3** “*Parallel Computing is the act of solving a problem of size  $n$  by dividing its domain into  $k \geq 2$  (with  $k \in N$ ) parts and solving them with  $p$  physical processors, simultaneously.*”

where  $k$  represents the least number of processors which is 2. The problem of size  $n$  is used to divide the tasks on the available processors in order to achieve the parallel computing consistently and quickly.

### 2.2.2 Parallel-Concurrent Programming Models in Java

Java programming language has considered concurrency since the release of Java 5 by adding the concurrent utilities or alternatively referred to as the concurrent API, where API stands for Application Programming Interface. The concurrency utilities provide powerful features in order to achieve concurrent programs, features and mechanisms such as semaphore, cyclic barriers, countdown latches, thread pools, execution managers and locks.

Java continues to support concurrent programming models such as the introduction of Fork/Join framework to Java 7 release. Fork/Join framework is an implementation of the ***ExecutorService*** interface that helps to take advantage of multiple processors. The mechanism followed in this Fork/Join framework breaks down the task into smaller pieces recursively and then reassembles them once the task is done. This mechanism enhances the performance of the application via using all available processors.

According to Schildt [234], there are two ways in which Fork/Join enhances multithreaded programming. The first one is the creation of multiple threads, which makes it simple, and the second one is the use of multiple processors, which makes it automatic. However, subdividing or

partitioning the problems with Fork/Join framework must be done by the programmer. The application of operations aggregation by Java runtime performs this task instead of the programmer and puts together the solutions.

The use of the collections mechanism leads to a situation called non-thread-safe which makes the implementation of parallelism difficult. Consequently, thread interference or memory consistency errors are encountered as a result of the incapability of threads manipulating a collection. In order to overcome these errors, synchronisation wrappers provided by the Collection Framework adds automatic synchronisation to collection and makes it thread-safe. Nevertheless, synchronisation wrappers cause thread contention which does affect the parallel execution. In order to implement parallelism with non-thread-safe collections, aggregate operations and parallel streams are used. Executing streams in parallel has been introduced in Java 8. This mechanism allows streams to be executed in serial or parallel. In case streams are executed in parallel, the streams are partitioned by the Java runtime. Aggregate operations iterate over and the results are combined after processing these substreams in parallel.

The latest Java version is Java 12 which was released on 19 March 2019. Java 12 provides concurrency and parallelism utilities such as *java.util.concurrent*, *java.util.concurrent.atomic* and *java.util.concurrent.locks*. The first utility provides concurrent programming. The second utility is a small toolkit of classes that supports lock-free and thread-safe programming on shared memory model. Atomic package provides atomic region which prevents interference of a shared memory being executed within this region in order to guarantee shared memory consistency. The third utility is a set of interfaces and classes that provides a framework for the application of locks mechanism. Locks are responsible for keeping the shared variable protected from multiple modifications at a single clock in order to provide consistent parallel computation. No other processors or threads are permitted to modify the locked shared variable until the lock is released.

### 2.2.3 Modern Central Processing Units (CPUs)

According to Oak Ridge National Laboratory at the U.S. Department of Energy, June 8, 2018, Summit is the world's most powerful and smartest scientific supercomputer. Summit can perform up to 200,000 trillion calculations per second or alternatively 200 petaflops. Up until June 2019, Summit supercomputer kept being the first on the list of supercomputers ever since its release with a total number of 2,414,592 processors [1]. IBM developed Summit or OLCF-4 supercomputer for use at Oak Ridge National Laboratory for scientific research.

National Supercomputing Center in Wuxi, China has developed a supercomputer called Sunway TaihuLight and it is ranked third on the list of supercomputers although it has 10,649,600 processors [1]. More numbers of processors does not always mean better performance. Therefore, Sunway TaihuLight supercomputer has the maximum number of processors in the 500 list available in [1].

While the maximum number of parallel processors for modern CPUs at the personal usage level such as PCs or Laptops is 18 processors as Table 2.1 illustrates:

Table 2.1: Intel vs AMD Processors

	No. Processors	Release Date	Generation
Intel Core i9-9980XE	18	Q4'18	9 <sup>th</sup>
AMD Ryzen 7 3800X	8	Q3'19	7 <sup>th</sup>

Intel Core i9-9980XE processor is a 9<sup>th</sup> generation processor and has been released in the forth quarter of 2018 [4]. Ryzan [3] is a 7<sup>th</sup> generation processor manufactured by Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). The maximum number of processors of AMD Ryzen 7 3800X is 8. Ryzen 7 3800X has been released in the third quarter of 2019.

### 2.2.4 Petri Net

A Petri Net is a graphical and mathematical modelling tool used to describe and study information processing systems of various types [200, 223, 102]. In 1962, Carl Adam Petri presented this approach as a PhD dissertation entitled "Communication with Automata" in the faculty of Mathematics and Physics at the Technical University of Darmstadt in West Germany. The tool can be used in mathematical branches such as algebraic equations and state equations. Moreover, computer science and communication systems such as logical systems can be modelled and analysed using Petri Nets. Parallel computing has been significantly advanced by Petri's work. Additionally, modern studies of complex systems have been boosted by Petri Nets approach.

There are a number of different scenarios and applications where Petri Nets are particularly useful in modelling such as state machine, formal languages, multiprocessor systems, dataflow computation, communication protocols, synchronisation control and producers-consumers system with priority [200]. For instance, parallelism can be modelled using Petri Nets as Figure 2.1 illustrates.




Figure 2.1: Modelling Parallelism using Petri Net [200]



The model considers a parallel system that does a certain computation and at some point the parallel system divides the computation into two execution paths. Each execution path is assigned to a single thread and works independently. Once these two executions are done, at some point they get combined together as one system as they were before the split. This parallel behaviour model helps to enhance the process of designing algorithms and analysis for parallel computing systems.

### 2.2.5 Global State Construction

Parallel and distributed systems concern the consistency of their composed global states out of local states information as they have multiple subsystems running in parallel. This issue has been considered in [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 167, 274]. Automatic collections of the information is produced from parallel systems in order to construct global state of the whole system.

Borkowski et al. [34, 35, 36, 37] proposed a methodology of organising execution control in parallel and distributed systems which monitor system global states. Automatic collection of information from parallel systems about their local states and subsequently global states are constructed and composed. The global state can then be evaluated and measured in order to fulfil a desired correctness property of parallel and distributed systems. Borkowski [32, 33] sheds light on the importance and effectiveness of parallel and distributed systems by underlying Consistent Global State (CGS) and Strongly Consistent Global State (SCGS) monitoring mechanisms.

Mattern et al. [167] argue that a structure of linear order of time is not always adequate for a distributed system. Subsequently, a generalised non-standard model of time which consists of vectors is proposed. Timestamps and simple clock update mechanism are used to represent a global time consistently. In order to compute a consistent global snapshot of distributed systems, a new algorithm is proposed in this in their work.

Tudruj et al. [274] propose a control infrastructure which is based on synchronisers organised at the processors and threads levels in order to collect local states information for evaluation sake

and produce a consistency model of global state for parallel and distributed systems.

The construction of global state of a system out of local states of subsystems which run in parallel or in distributed model is significant and it enhances the verification process of such systems. Correctness properties of subsystems can be fulfilled and generalised using construction mechanism of global states. The global state's correctness property of the parallel/distributed systems  $Prop$  can be constructed from the set of the correctness properties of their subsystems  $Prop_i$ . This assertion can be expressed formally as follows:

$$\bigwedge_{i=0}^{i=n} Prop_i \supset Prop$$

where  $i$  represents the identification number  $id$  of processors or threads assigned to execute subsystems run in parallel or in distributed model. The local correctness property of processor or thread  $i = 0$  is  $Prop_0$  and  $i = n$  is  $Prop_n$ , while the global correctness property is  $Prop$ .

It can be seen theoretically so far that a construction of global state out of local states for parallel and distributed systems is possible. Therefore, local states correctness properties can infer the correctness property of global state. A practical demonstration of this assertion will be presented later in this thesis.

### 2.2.6 Parallel Programming Models

The difference between parallel computing models and parallel programming models is that the former concerns designing parallel algorithms and analysing technical aspects, for instance, computing time complexity. Some commonly used parallel computing models for such purposes are PRAM [94], (U)PMH [9], BSP [277] and LogP [67]. These prior parallel computing models will be discussed later in this research. While parallel programming models concern the communication aspects of parallel processors and how they should be programmed. The most important Parallel programming models are Shared Memory and Message Passing due to their wide use

and implementation by modern Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).

### 2.2.6.1 Shared Memory

Reading and writing to a shared memory using this programming model is asynchronous. Shared memory model is natively useful for multicore systems. Non-deterministic behaviour of parallel processors have to be managed using parallel algorithms for this sake in order to maintain shared memory consistency model. Read and write operations on the same shared memory are possible at any time, and an explicit synchronisation and control mechanisms have to be applied such as monitors, semaphores, atomic operations and mutual exclusion (*mutex*). These synchronisation solutions and shared resources control mechanism enable processors to lock a shared memory in order to get a consistent copy. Once the shared memory is locked, no other processors are allowed to interfere. Constraints on shared memory can be applied in order to guarantee shared memory consistency model [89]:

- All processors/threads must see exactly the same values for a shared memory;
- All processors/threads must see updates to the memory at the same time;
- Only one processor/thread is allowed to write to the shared memory at any given time.

### 2.2.6.2 Message Passing

Message passing programming model allows processors to communicate asynchronously or synchronously. Processors can send and receive messages containing words of data. Messages might arrive *i*) very quickly, *ii*) within a fixed period of time, *iii*) at some point of time in the future, or *iv*) possibly never in case errors are encountered. There are various forms where processors can communicate; the most common three mechanisms are:

- Point-to-Point, where the communication occurs only between two processors, the sender and the receiver;

- Broadcast, where the sender sends the message without a certain destination;
- Multicast, where messages can get delivered to subsystems with some restrictions.

Message Passing Interface (MPI) is the standard interface for message passing model. MPI can be used to distribute the work and handle communication in CPU distributed applications.

### 2.2.6.3 Shared Memory versus Message Passing

It can be seen that the implementation of shared memory is practically less complicated, less time consuming and can be done automatically. On the other hand, the implementation of message passing model is more complicated, time consuming, and has to be done manually by the programmer. Parallel programming models community believes in the fact that shared memory model has superiority over message passing model. Therefore, I will omit the implementation of message passing model in my proposed model for communication aspects. Alternatively, shared memory model will be implemented only.

## 2.3 Verification Techniques

Verification is a process of checking whether a system under scrutiny is acting accordingly to the contract which has been signed between that system and a set of desired properties to guarantee the correctness criteria. Mainly, the verification process has different techniques such as theorem proving [30], model checking [63], testing [40, 202], and runtime verification [150, 151] as Figure 2.2 illustrates.

Theorem proving is a correctness of programs using mathematics proof to deliver correctness of a theorem, and it is primarily applied manually. Model checking is an automatic verification, and it checks all the possible states of finite systems which lead to states explosion. Testing can be classified as incomplete verification techniques for checking correctness. However, runtime verification complements between some of these verification techniques such as model checking and testing. Runtime verification monitors system behaviour only at runtime which avoids

having state explosion.

These verification techniques are subject to some factors such as the availability of formal model for model checking and confidence strength or weakness in favour for theorem proving over testing. In comparison, runtime verification technique is considered a lightweight verification technique. Verification techniques such as model checking and testing can get complemented by runtime verification. Due to the nature of such verification technique, it occurs at runtime and only explores states which are being executed. This characteristic merits runtime verification over model checking and testing throughout the absence of states explosion of model checking and incompleteness of testing technique.




Figure 2.2: Verification Techniques

### 2.4 Runtime Verification

Static verification techniques assume that designed models are completely explorable in order to deliver correctness of these models. The assumption of the ability to access and explore such models is not reasonable. Therefore, verification techniques must offer runtime verification techniques. The states of systems under scrutiny are then generated and collected in order to do the

analysis of their behaviour and make the judgement accordingly. Runtime verification technique complements static verification techniques [177]. The term correctness is defined as follows [29]:

**Definition 4** “*In computing systems, correctness refers to the assertion that a system satisfies its specification.*”

Runtime verification checks whether the execution of a system complies with the correctness criteria involved within the process of system design to meet a set of desired properties such as safety, liveness, and projected time.

Runtime verification has the ability to handle inadequacy of information being executed because it is intended to observe the executed information only and provides a property check against the correctness specification that is already prescribed formally and internally within the runtime verifier. A runtime verifier should not infer the execution of what is being executed so far; in other words, it should not enforce an execution of a certain instance of a system under scrutiny if it is not yet reached. Alternatively, it only detects the violation of the correctness criteria and checks whether the prescription of the system is being respected especially for on-the-fly applications [177].

When a variation between the required behaviour and the observed behaviour of the system under scrutiny occurs, it is called a system failure. In case the expected behaviour and the current behaviour of a system under scrutiny are not matched, it is called fault. When a human makes a mistake, it is called an error. Potentially, a failure can be caused due to a fault; similarly, a fault can be caused due to a mistake.

According to IEEE [2], verification concerns the techniques which are intended to show a system satisfaction with its specification. Verification techniques such as theorem proving [30], model checking [63], and testing [40, 202] are considered traditional verification techniques. Runtime verification is introduced as a new direction within the field of verification techniques.

**Definition 5** “*Runtime Verification is the discipline of computer science that deals with the study, development, and application of those verification techniques that allow checking whether a run of a system under scrutiny satisfies or violates a given correctness property [151].*”

Runtime verification [65, 216, 103] uses a device called monitor which checks at runtime the satisfaction or the violation of the execution of system under scrutiny against a correctness temporal property. The traditional verification techniques such as theorem proving, model checking, and testing are complemented by runtime verification.

Runtime verification does not influence or interfere with the execution of a system under scrutiny in case a correctness property is violated; instead, it only deals with the detection of either violation or satisfaction of correctness property.

### 2.4.1 Monitors

The only concern for runtime verification is whether the run of a system  $Sys$  is satisfied against a correctness property  $\varphi$ . A monitor is intended to check whether the execution of a system  $Sys$  satisfies a correctness property  $\varphi$ . When a correctness property  $\varphi$  is met, a truth value is dispatched. Formally, a set of valid executions  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$  is given by property  $\varphi$ , and runtime verification checks whether the execution of  $Sys$  belongs to a set of valid executions  $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$  [151].

**Definition 6** “*Monitor is a device that reads a finite trace and yields a certain verdict [151].*”

A verdict being yield is a truth value which belongs to a truth domain  $\mathbb{B} = \llbracket true, false \rrbracket$  or alternatively it might have this form  $\mathbb{B} = \llbracket 0, 1 \rrbracket$ . The truth value  $true$  or 1 denotes that a correctness property  $\varphi$  is satisfied; otherwise, a correctness property  $\varphi$  is violated [151].

### 2.4.2 Taxonomy

Runtime verification has brought different contributions into the verification techniques field. Aspects of runtime verification are systematically presented as Figure 2.3 illustrates. The aspects are Trace, Monitoring, Stage, Integration, Interference, Steering, and Application Area [151].



Figure 2.3: Taxonomy of Runtime Verification [151]



**TRACE:** Runtime verification has the ability to work on *i*) finite (terminated), *ii*) finite but continuously expanding, or *iii*) on prefixes of infinite traces. In regards to finite but continuously expanding and infinite traces, impartiality and anticipation should be taken into the monitor's account. Impartiality implies that judgement should not be made of a finite trace in case there is an infinite continuation trace which might lead to a different verdict. Anticipation implies that a judgement should be made if an infinite continuation of a finite trace has the same verdict value.

**MONITORING:** Runtime verification has different interests or concerns in terms of what is being monitored. For instance, a system may get checked in terms of the input or output behaviour. Moreover, a system may get checked in terms of sequence of states, or in terms of sequence of events being executed.

**STAGE:** Online monitoring occurs when a current execution of a system is being checked by a monitor. Offline monitoring occurs when the execution of a system being checked is recorded.

**INTEGRATION:** Inline monitoring occurs when a monitoring code is interwoven with the code of a program to check. If the monitoring code is used to externally check a program under inspection, then the monitoring is outlined.

**INTERFERENCE:** Invasive monitoring interferes with the system being checked, while non-invasive monitoring does not interfere with the system being checked.

**STEERING:** When a monitor only observes the program execution and reports program failures, then it is called passive monitoring. When the monitor is used to steer the program execution, it is called active monitoring.

**APPLICATION AREA:** Runtime verification serves different application and purposes. It might be used to check safety or security conditions. It can also be used to collect information of the system being executed for performance evaluation purposes.

### 2.4.3 Runtime Verification versus Model Checking

Model checking determines whether all computations of a given model  $\mathcal{M}$  satisfies a correctness property  $\varphi$ . Model checking can be considered an automatic verification technique which can handle finite state systems. In automata theoretic approach [279], a transformation of correctness property  $\varphi$  to an automaton  $\mathcal{M}_{\neg\varphi}$  which accepts a violation of a correctness property  $\varphi$ . The automaton  $\mathcal{M}_{\neg\varphi}$  is run in parallel to a model  $\mathcal{M}$  in order to check whether  $\mathcal{M}$  is violating a correctness property  $\varphi$ . Similarly, runtime verification has to generate the monitor as the model checking has to generate an automaton. However, there are differences between them:

- Model checking examines all possible executions of a given model of a system  $\mathcal{M}$  whether the executions of the model  $\mathcal{M}$  satisfies a correctness property  $\varphi$ . However, runtime checks only the execution of a model  $\mathcal{M}$  at runtime whether this runtime execution satisfies a correctness property  $\varphi$ .
- Model checking considers infinite traces, while in runtime verification only finite executions are considered.
- As a consequence of considering infinite traces by model checking, the state explosion problem is encountered. On the other hand, a single run of a system does not cause this problem.

### 2.4.4 Runtime Verification versus Testing

As stated above, runtime verification does not check the whole possible execution of a system under scrutiny; instead, it just checks the single execution of a system. This characteristic makes runtime verification and testing both incomplete verification techniques.

Testing receives finite input-output sequences which form what is called test suite [217]. Then the checking process takes place whether the actual output and the expected ones are met or not. Another form of testing which is relatively closer to runtime verification is called oracle-

based testing. The difference between this test and the former one is that the test suite is only formed by input sequences. Then an oracle-based test has to be designed and attached to the system being tested to make sure that the output is anticipated. Runtime verification can be seen from this angle; however, there are differences between these verification techniques:

- In testing, more precisely oracle-based test, an oracle is defined directly rather than getting it from a generation of high-level specification.
- In testing, in order to test a system exhaustively, input sequences have to be provided. In contrary, this is considered internally within a domain of runtime verification.

Therefore, runtime verification can be considered a passive form of testing in addition to the fact that runtime verification tests forever which makes it complete.

### 2.4.5 The Use of Runtime Verification

The model checking and theorem proving reflect the most important aspects of the implementation via a model check and analysis to make sure the implementation meets the correctness property. However, the implementation, due to the environment surrounding the system under scrutiny, might behave differently from what is being predicted by the model. Runtime verification is then used to overcome this obstacle via a runtime check of the actual execution of a system under scrutiny and find out whether a correctness property is satisfied. Therefore, runtime verification in this case can be considered as a partner to model checking and theorem proving [151].

There are cases where some information of a system under scrutiny can only be available at runtime and can not be explored using other verification techniques. The information of a system is not only available at runtime. However, this information is checked out at runtime because it is more convenient than checking it using different verification techniques, due to the nature of the system under scrutiny [151].

The environment influences the behaviour of a system being executing; therefore, the environment of a system under scrutiny matters. Model checking and theorem proving make assumptions on the the behaviour of a system within a certain environment. However, the assumptions made by model checking or theorem proving is inadequate. Therefore, runtime verification performs a formal correctness of these assumptions [151].

For critical systems security and safety aspects, it might be beneficial to monitor a system which has already been checked to make sure it adheres to the correctness property that is already met. In this case, runtime verification can be considered as a partner to model checking, theorem proving, and testing [151].

Due to the critical role of runtime verification and its partnership with other verification techniques, runtime verification is worthy to be considered a major verification techniques and be a fundamental component of the architecture of system designs.

### 2.4.6 Existing Runtime Verification Frameworks

Martin Leucker visited in [150] the considered existing runtime verification frameworks. Some of these frameworks are considered major players in the field such as EAGLE, J-LO, Larva, LogScope and LoLa.

#### 2.4.6.1 EAGLE

EAGLE [23] is a rule-based framework intended to define and implement finite trace monitoring logics, such as future and past time temporal logic, extended regular expressions, real-time logics, interval logics, and forms of quantified temporal logics. EAGLE's novel techniques for rule definition, manipulation and execution are implemented as a Java library. Monitoring mechanism follows a state-by-state basis, without storing a trace of the execution.

#### 2.4.6.2 J-LO

J-LO [263] is a runtime verification framework for Java programs. The specification of properties can be formally expressed in Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) over AspectJ pointcuts. The

automaton-based approach where transitions can be triggered via aspects is used to check these properties expressed in LTL at runtime. As AspectJ is working on the bytecode level, Java source code is unnecessary.

### 2.4.6.3 LARVA

LARVA [66] is a runtime verification framework and is considered a lightweight approach to guarantee properties of Java programs including real-time properties. LARVA enables properties to be expressed in formal notations such as timed-automated, Lustre and a subset of the duration calculus. The tool has been used as a case study for industrial systems, and it has been successfully working. At the analysis level of real-time properties, LARVA performs as well as calculates memory and temporal overheads caused by monitoring process. The tool is also used in order to assess the consequences caused by the process of monitoring such as slowing down a system in order to satisfy the desired properties of a system.

### 2.4.6.4 LogScope

LogScope [25] is a Python framework that allows to check logs for conformance to a specification and to learn patterns from logs. LogScope architecture divides its functionality into LogMaker tool and a core LogScope module. The latter checks logs and learns specifications. LogScope is developed by and dedicated to NASA's Mars Science Laboratory Mission (MSL). A list of events is generated by LogMaker and after a communication channel is opened to MSL's SQL-based ground software. LogScope receives two arguments *i*) a log generated by LogMaker, and *ii*) a specification. The specification language offers an expressive rule-based language, which supports state machine, a higher-level pattern language, which is then translated into a more expressive rule-based language in order to perform the monitoring process. Logging systems events can be used as a basis for automated evaluation of log files against requirements.

### 2.4.6.5 LoLa

LoLa [69] is a specification language and algorithms for online and offline monitoring of synchronous systems such as circuits and embedded systems. Despite the simplicity of the specification language, it is elegantly expressive. It can be used to not only describe correctness property but also detect failure by using assertions, so a measurement of interesting statistics can be used for system profiling and coverage analysis. The language has been used for monitoring industrial systems such as Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus protocol and memory controller. The outcomes prove that the specification language is sufficiently expressive in such systems and applications.

## 2.5 Formal Methods-Based Tools for Parallel Systems

Verification techniques for parallel systems require formal-methods based tools which use mathematical concepts such as formal semantics, formal specification, and formal verification to check the desired correctness property of such systems. The most common correctness properties of the execution of parallel systems is concurrency errors such as data races, deadlocks, livelocks, atomicity violation. Formal-methods based techniques are applied such as deductive verification (theorem proving), model checking, static program analysis, and runtime verification. As I discussed in the previous sections, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, & 2.4.6, that runtime verification complements other verification techniques such as theorem proving, model checking, and testing; thus, my interest in this research is a runtime verification due to the discussion above and the reasons listed in the previous sections.

The evaluation of my approach, runtime verification of parallel systems, focuses on the following criteria: [199]

- **SOUNDNESS:** A verification technique is considered sound when the check results are valid with respect to the semantics of the programming language, or simply when none of the errors of an execution of a system is missed.

- **COMPLETENESS:** A verification technique is considered complete when it omits the production of false positives because each detected error requires an investigation which implies a human intervention.
- **MODULARITY:** A verification technique is considered modular when it has the ability to deduce the correctness of the whole system from the correctness of its independent components. Modularity allows to analyse and check parallel systems.
- **AUTOMATION:** A verification technique is considered automatic when it requires no human intervention. A verification technique might be considered highly automatic if it requires little human intervention. Human intervention includes, for instance, providing system specification to be checked.
- **EFFICIENCY:** A verification technique is considered efficient when it has the ability to check large systems in short amount of time and space.

### 2.6 Temporal Logic

According to Konur [139], Temporal logics are formal frameworks which describe statements whose truth values change over time. In comparison with classical logics, temporal logics characterise the change of states over time where classical logics do not include time constraints. The introduction of time characteristics in temporal logics makes it richer than classical logics.

Temporal logics have been widely used for more than two decades in the field of various systems specifications, such as real-time systems and control systems (sequential or parallel manners). Temporal logics use mathematical notation in order to deliver formal analysis and model for systems. Temporal logics have been applied in industrial application and academic disciplines [139].

Temporal logics are introduced in order to solve specific problems that cannot be completely solved using different logics either due to the expressiveness or complexity issues. Expressive-

ness and complexity are the main trade-off concerning temporal logics. The use of temporal logics is subjected to these trade-offs; some applications prefer expressiveness over complexity, while other applications prefer the complex over expressiveness [28].

The classification of temporal logics can be based on various dimensions such as propositional versus first-order logic, point-based versus interval-based, linear versus branching, and discrete versus continues [28, 83, 281]. In the next section, I discuss why interval-based temporal logics is more expressive than point-based temporal logics. I omit the discussion of other dimensions which temporal logics can be based on due to the fact that I adopt Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) [51] as a formal methods-based framework for my research; therefore, I discuss only this dimension to justify my selection of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) over other temporal logics.

### 2.6.1 Point-Based versus Interval-Based Structure of Temporal Logics

Modelling time in temporal logics has two structures, either point-based structure or interval-based structure. Different modal operators are used to describe different temporal relationships. Some temporal logics use modal operators to express quantification over time. However, point-based temporal logics tend to be difficult to express relationships between intervals [86].

Point-based temporal logics such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [214], Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [62, 84, 145] are used formulas to specify desired properties. These logics are suitable to model computation states and their relationships. however, they are not suitable to model a computation stretches such as actions with durations, accomplishment, and temporal aggregations. Interval-based logics can overcome these limitations of point-based logics via the consideration of time as intervals not points [178].

Interval Temporal Logics (ITLs) are temporal logics which are intended to reason about periods of time (intervals). The representation formalisms of time as intervals are more expressive than formalisms as points. Interval-based logics enrich representation formalisms more than



point-based logics. This enrichment allows interval-based logics to be used to model real-time systems behaviour [139].

Expressiveness of interval temporal logics enables them to express a relationship between events modelled using intervals. The syntax of interval temporal logics [237, 238, 193, 144, 169, 221, 110] is simpler and neater than point-based logics. The syntax of interval temporal logics enables them to provide high level abstraction in order to model systems. Therefore, interval temporal logics formulas are more comprehensive than point-based logic formulas.

Table 2.2: LTL vs CTL vs ITL

Logic	Logic Order	Fund. Entity	Temporal Structure
LTL	Propositional	Point	Linear
CTL	Propositional	Point	Branching
ITL	First-order	Interval	Linear

Table 2.2 compares point-based logics such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [214] and Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [62, 84, 145] with interval-based logics such as Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) [193]. The main criteria of comparison is the representation of time in either points or intervals form.

### 2.6.2 Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)

Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is a flexible notation for both propositional and first-order reasoning about periods of time found in descriptions of hardware and software systems [51]. Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) can handle sequential and parallel compositions, and it has a powerful and extensible specification and proof techniques in order to reason about properties such as safety, liveness and projected time [194]. ITL has the ability to express timing constraints and most imperative programming constructs as well can be expressed as formulas in an executable modified version of ITL called Tempura [47]. Tempura is an executable subset of ITL, and it provides an execution framework for ITL specifications to shift a system from abstract specification to

concrete implementation. In addition, ITL and its mature executable subset Tempura [182] have been extensively used to specify and model the properties of real-time systems where the primitive circuits are directly represented by a set of temporal formulae. Tempura has been applied variously to simulate hardware design and other areas where timing is crucially important.

### 2.6.2.1 Syntax

The key notion of ITL is an *interval*. An interval  $\sigma$  is considered to be a (in)finite sequence of states  $\sigma_0, \sigma_1 \dots$ , where a state  $\sigma_i$  is a mapping from the set of variables  $Var$  to the set of values  $Val$ . The length  $|\sigma|$  of an interval  $\sigma_0 \dots \sigma_n$  is equal to  $n$  (one less than the number of states in the interval (this has always been a convention in ITL), for instance, a one state interval has length zero [51]). The syntax of ITL is defined in Table 2.3, where:

$z$  is an integer value,

$a$  is a static integer variable (doesn't change within an interval),

$A$  is a state integer variable (can change within an interval),

$v$  a static or state integer variable,

$g$  is a integer function symbol,

$q$  is a static Boolean variable (doesn't change within an interval),

$Q$  is a state Boolean variable (can change within an interval),

$h$  is a predicate symbol.

Table 2.3: Syntax of ITL

<i>Expressions</i>	
$e ::=$	$z \mid a \mid A \mid g(e_1, \dots, e_n) \mid \bigcirc A \mid \text{fin } A$
<i>Formulae</i>	
$f ::=$	$\text{true} \mid q \mid Q \mid h(e_1, \dots, e_n) \mid \neg f \mid f_1 \wedge f_2 \mid \forall v \cdot f \mid$ $\text{skip} \mid f_1 ; f_2 \mid f^*$

### 2.6.2.2 Informal Semantics

The informal semantics of the most interesting constructs are as follows: [51]

- $\bigcirc A$ : if interval is non-empty then the value of  $A$  in the next state of that interval else an arbitrary value.
- $\text{fin } A$ : if interval is finite, then the value of  $A$  in the last state of that interval else an arbitrary value.
- skip unit interval (length 1).

skip;X=1	●	●	●	●	
(O X=1) X:	2	1	2	4	
finite;X≠1	●	●	●	●	●
(◇X≠1) X:	1	1	4	1	1
¬(finite;X≠1)	●	●	●	●	
(□X=1) X:	1	1	1	1	

Figure 2.4: Some Sample of ITL Formulae [51]

- $f_1 ; f_2$  holds if the interval can be decomposed (“chopped”) into a prefix and suffix interval, such that  $f_1$  holds over the prefix and  $f_2$  over the suffix, or if the interval is infinite and  $f_1$  holds for that interval.




Figure 2.5: Chop

- $f^*$  holds if the interval is decomposable into a finite number of intervals such that for each of them  $f$  holds, or the interval is infinite and can be decomposed into an infinite number of finite intervals for which  $f$  holds.




Figure 2.6: Chop Star

### 2.6.2.3 Justification for Choosing Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)

The characteristics of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) induced its choice. These characteristics are presented as follows [299]:

- ITL is a flexible notation for both propositional and first-order reasoning about periods of time found in descriptions of hardware and software systems.
- Unlike most temporal logics, ITL can handle both sequential and parallel composition and offer powerful and extensible specification and proof techniques for reasoning about properties involving safety, liveness and time.
- Tempura, the executable subset of ITL, provides an executable framework for developing, analysing and experimenting with suitable ITL specifications [182].
- Modular and reusable tempura test suites can be developed.
- Several specifications can be compared over a range of test data.
- The use of specialised theorem provers and model checkers can be postponed until after a preliminary runtime consistency check of candidate specifications and proofs.
- In contrast to model checking, execution can be used to check theorems that are not decidable.

- ITL and Tempura both improve through the increased feedback between theory and practice. Particular benefits are:
  - The discovery of further executable assumptions and commitments specifications
  - The development of more and better compositional proof techniques
- Interval Temporal Logic serves as the single unifying logical and computational formalisation at all stages of analysis.
- ITL has a complete axiomatic system [197].
- In addition, Cau and Zedan [47] have provided a refinement calculus for ITL that can “translate” an ITL formula into an executable code.

## 2.7 Related Work

A review of the literature has led to a drawback of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) which is the lack of memory model. Therefore, related suggested memory models such as Framing Variable and Transactional Memory (TM) are investigated in this section in order to diagnose the situation and avoid being trapped by such a limitation.

### 2.7.1 Memory Models for Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)

One of the most critical issues within the field of parallelism and concurrency of real-time systems is the access to the common shared resource (memory). Due to the importance of this issue, I review some of related work approaches which have been done in order to overcome obstacles which might be encountered in this field. More precisely, approaches such as Framing Variables, and Transactional Memory.

#### 2.7.1.1 Framing Variables

Framed variables remain unchanged at a state, or over an interval, when no assignment is encountered at that state, or over the interval. Framing Variables is defined as follows [295]:

**Definition 7** “Framing a variable  $x$  means that the variable  $x$  always keeps its old value over an interval if no assignment to  $x$  is encountered.”

In temporal logics, no value inherited from a previous state. Alternatively, if a value is needed to be inherited, a repeated assignment of the value should take place at every state. To inherit a value during an interval, I use a formula for each relevant variable such as *stable*( $x$ ). The repeatability of such assignments affects the efficiency of the program and makes it tedious [190, 295]. The application of such a mechanism [196] makes the specification implicit and neat.

The study of framing variables in ITL [190] is initiated by Hale [107]. An investigation of framing variables has also been done by Duan [295]. Projection Temporal Logic (PTL) is an ITL extension with operators for temporal granularities and framing [78, 295]. Subsequently, an executable subset of PTL called Framed Tempura is introduced [295]. Framed Tempura has new operations such as projection operator *prj*, synchronous communication *await*, and framing operator *frame* [295].

However, there are cases where an explicit statement has to be made upon a variable that does not change. Whenever a memory cell has to be updated, it will be a very costly operation. This is called the framing problem. As a solution to this problem is an increase of the speed of the simulator. Instead of updating  $m$  memory cells  $m$  times, only one statement is needed [49].

### 2.7.1.2 Transactional Memory

There four attributes which define the transaction notion are Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability or what is known for short as ACID. Transactional Memory (TM) is defined as follows [82]:

**Definition 8** “Transactional Memory (TM) is a promising lock-free technique that enables parts of a program to execute with atomicity and isolation, without regard to other concurrently executing tasks. TM allows programs to read and modify disparate primary memory locations atomically as a single operation.”

Atomicity ensures either a commitment of the operations in a transaction completely or abortion of all the operations and leaving no evidence behind [82].

Consistency ensures that the data in the memory is consistent with its corresponding state. Only successful transactions commit their data and permanently store them; otherwise, the old data is restored. Isolation ensures that an execution of a transaction does not affect other concurrent transactions. In other words, the result of these concurrent executions has to be equivalent like they were executed sequentially. Durability ensures storing the modified data of a successful transaction on a durable media such as a disk.

Transactional Memory (TM) is relatively easy to use, and it does not need locks, as it is lock-free which avoids the occurrence of deadlocks scenario. The performance is boosted due to the increase of parallelism level. However, its application is limited and the debugging is difficult to place a breakpoint within the transaction.

El-kustaban [82] [80] has formalised Transactional Memory (TM) in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and verified it using Tempura/AnaTempura. There are still aspects such as nested transactions and mechanisms of updating the memory which should be imported to provable abstract TM.

It is challenging to control parallel systems accessing shared resource in order to guarantee correctness property such as consistency of shared resource. In order to avoid having access conflicts, a synchronisation mechanism has to be applied. Techniques have been used to apply synchronisation mechanism such as lock-based, lock-free and wait-free.

Lock-free and wait-free avoid using locks which could cause deadlock. However, they are complex to implement. More precisely, as Transactional Memory (TM) is a lock-free technique, it avoids lock-based problems and offers high-level abstract parallel programming models. However, even though the claim made by Transactional Memory (TM) research community that programming with Transactional Memory (TM) is easier than alternatives such as locks, but evidence is scant [228]. A study was made [228] in which 147 undergraduate students in an op-

erating systems course implemented the same programs using coarse-grain and fine-grain locks, monitors, and Transactional Memory. A survey was made on the students after the assignment and their code was examined to determine the types and frequency of the programming errors for each synchronisation technique. The evaluation shows that students found Transactional Memory (TM) harder to use than coarse-grain locks, but slightly easier to use than fine-grained locks.

More reasons why Transactional Memory (TM) is not sufficient enough are space overhead and latency. Transactional Memory (TM) requires significant amounts of global and per-thread meta-data. Transactional Memory (TM) has high single-thread latency, usually two times compared to lock-based technique [68]. Generally speaking, Mutual Exclusion (*mutex*) locks limit concurrency but offers single-thread latency, whereas, Transactional Memory (TM) has higher latency but scales well [68].

### 2.7.2 Meltdown and Spectre

Meltdown [156] and Spectre [138] are hardware vulnerabilities in modern computers leak passwords and sensitive data. Meltdown and Spectre take advantage of modern processors critical vulnerabilities. As a consequent of these hardware vulnerabilities, programs get permissions to steal data that has been processed on the computer. Although reading data of programs from other programs is not permitted, a malicious program takes advantage of Meltdown and Spectre to get hold of sensitive personal information stored in the memory of other running programs. Stolen information might be passwords, personal photos, emails, bank card details, etc. Meltdown and Spectre might hit personal computers, mobile devices, and cloud servers. Hitting cloud providers' infrastructure might cause a steal of data from other customers.

Meltdown breaks the most fundamental isolation between user applications and the operating system. Consequently, programs are allowed to access the memory of other programs and the operating system. Spectre breaks the isolation between different applications. Consequently, error-free programs get tricked by an attacker to leak their secrets. Spectre is harder to exploit



than Meltdown, but it is also harder to mitigate. For more information about Meltdown and Spectre, I refer the reader to [156, 138].

These hardware vulnerabilities, Meltdown and Spectre, are my motive of choosing a case study of cache controller of cache memory and its implication on the main memory with respect to their correctness. The case study demonstrates a correctness of such critical systems and parallel architectures such as multicore architecture to deliver modular, sound, complete, automatic, and an efficient model of the proposed computational model.

### 2.8 Summary

In this chapter a comprehensive background about the research topic is given. Verification techniques is presented and a trade-offs between these techniques is discussed. Runtime verification has been chosen to serve the proposed approach due to specific reasons which have been presented as well. Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) has been chosen to be a formal methods-based framework for the approach due to various reasons. Related works concerning memory models are discussed in addition to hardware vulnerabilities, namely, Meltdown and Spectre.

## Chapter 3

# Computational Model

### *Objectives:*

---

- To introduce the Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) Model
  - To highlight the Communication Mechanisms, Concurrency Forms, and Execution Modes
  - To produce Novel Algorithms and establish a Theoretical Ground
  - To describe the Components of the Model
  - To demonstrate the Capabilities of the Model
-

### 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the computational model, namely, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) is introduced. A comprehensive description of the main components of PRVF and their functions is given. The framework has two levels which are global level and locals level; and it has three phases which are Generation Phase, Locals Verification & Assertion Phase, and Global Verification Phase. I describe the possible communication models and concurrency forms that the proposed framework is intended to handle. Then a description of these levels and phases of the proposed framework is given. Novel algorithms are invented, described, validated, and implemented in order to establish a theoretical ground for Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) model.

### 3.2 Computational Model

Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) is a generic model which is intended to handle several parallel computing characteristics such as concurrency forms, communication models, and execution modes. Concurrency forms might be true or interleaving. Communication models might use shared-variable or message-passing based approach. Execution modes might follow either synchronous or asynchronous mechanism. Therefore, I introduce a framework that can handle both concurrency forms, true concurrency and interleaving concurrency, associated with either shared-variable or message-passing based approach for (a)synchronous communication links. Synchronous communication links are called ***Channels***, while asynchronous communication links are called ***Shunts*** [47]. Later in this chapter, a comprehensive description of ***Channels*** and ***Shunts*** constructs is given.

#### 3.2.1 Message-Passing based Communication

Message-passing based is a model of communication between parallel systems via sending and receiving to/from other systems. Predicates such as ***send*** and ***receive*** are used to perform com-

munication between systems. A message being sent may either arrive or never arrive due to system failure. In case a system fails, there shall be a *timeout* option to avoid waiting forever. There are forms of message-passing communication in terms of the sender and the receiver such as the following:

- **Point-to-Point:** It is where a message is sent from one sender to one receiver.
- **Broadcast:** It is where a sender dispatches the message without knowing information about the receivers, such as names and addresses of the recipients.
- **Multicast:** It is where a sender is allowed to broadcast not only to receivers, but also to subset of all possible receivers without knowing the names or addresses of the receivers and their subsets.

### 3.2.1.1 Related Work

Cau and Zedan [47] extended Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) to include modularity, resources, and explicit communications. This extension [47] allows synchronous, asynchronous and shared-variable concurrency to be explicitly expressed. The developed model in [47] uses the shared-variable approach to model message-passing in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL). The constructs Channels and Shunts are modelled. *Channels* are synchronous communication links, while *Shunts* are asynchronous communication links.

The proposed computational model in [47] is closely related to a wide-spectrum language called Temporal Agent Model (TAM) [236]. Temporal Agent Model (TAM) can express both functional and timing properties in either abstract or concrete levels. However, Cau and Zedan [47] introduced timed-communication, timeout, and resource allocation constructs in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) semantics because the original TAM semantics is not accessible enough. In addition to *Channels* and *Shunts* constructs, timing constraints, such as *delay* and *timeout*, resource allocation, and shunts' multiplexer called *Funnel* are modelled in Cau and Zedan computational model [47].

### 3.2.1.2 Execution Modes

To discover *Channels* and *Shunts* constructs, modes of execution, such as (a)synchronous, have to be illustrated first. *Synchronous* execution enforces parallel systems to start and finish their execution at the same clock as Figure 3.1 illustrates, while *asynchronous* execution allows systems run in parallel to start and finish their execution at different clocks as Figure 3.2 illustrates where  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$  represent any system running in parallel;  $\sigma_n$  represents the state number.




Figure 3.1: Synchronous Execution of Parallel Systems  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$




Figure 3.2: Asynchronous Execution of Parallel Systems  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$

### 3.2.1.3 Channel Communication

The variables  $C \in Chan$  are the representation of channels whose values are triples  $(wtr, wtw, v)$  where:

- $wtr$  is a boolean value and its value indicates whether the system is willing to accept(read) a message from that channel.

- $wtr$  is a boolean value and its value indicates whether the system is willing to send(write) a message to that channel.
- When  $wtr$  and  $wtw$  are both true,  $v$  stands for the value currently in channel  $C$ .

To introduce a channel  $C$ , **channel**  $C \in P$  is used. To send a value of expression  $e$  over the channel  $C$  and denotes an output which has been sent we use  $C!e$ . To receive a value over the channel  $C$  and store it in  $x$  and denotes it as an input we use  $C?x$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{channel } C \text{ in } P &\hat{=} \exists C . P \\
 C? &\hat{=} \Pi_1(C) = true \\
 C! &\hat{=} \Pi_2(C) = true \\
 C.x &\hat{=} \Pi_3(C) = x \wedge C? \wedge C! \\
 C!e &\hat{=} (\neg C? \wedge C! \wedge \text{stable}(C); \text{skip}) \vee \text{empty}; C.e \\
 C?x &\hat{=} (\neg C! \wedge C? \wedge \text{stable}(C); \text{skip}) \vee \text{empty}; C.x
 \end{aligned}$$

The projection function  $\Pi_1$  gives the "willing to read" value, while the projection function  $\Pi_2$  gives the "willing to write" value. The projection function  $\Pi_3$  has the actual value in the channel. The notations  $C!_de$  ( $C?_dx$ ) formally describes that an agent is willing to perform the communication at time  $d$  where  $d \in TIME$ . However, in case the environment fails to react promptly, the system will be on hold forever:

$$\begin{aligned}
 C!_de &\hat{=} C!e \wedge (\text{finite} \supset len = d) \\
 C?_de &\hat{=} C!x \wedge (\text{finite} \supset len = d)
 \end{aligned}$$

### 3.2.1.4 Shunt Communication

The tuples  $(t, v)$  represent the values of the shunt  $s$  variables, where  $t$  is a stamp and  $v$  is the written value. To introduce a shunt  $s$ , **shunt**  $s$  in  $P$  is used. To denote the written value  $v$  to shunt  $s$ , I used **write** $(v, s)$ . To read the stored value in shunt  $s$ , I used **read** $(s)$ . To give the stamp of shunt  $s$ , I used  $\sqrt{s}$ :

$$\begin{aligned}\sqrt{s} &\hat{=} \Pi_1(s) \\ \mathbf{shunt} \ s \ \mathbf{in} \ P &\hat{=} \exists s . \sqrt{s} = 0 \wedge P \\ \mathbf{write}(v, s) &\hat{=} \mathbf{skip} \wedge \bigcirc s = (\sqrt{s} + 1, v) \\ \mathbf{read}(s) &\hat{=} \Pi_2(s)\end{aligned}$$

The projection function  $\Pi_1$  gives the stamp while the projection function  $\Pi_2$  gives the value stored in shunt  $s$ . The notation **write** $_d(v, s)$  formally describes an agent that writes to shunt  $s$  the value  $v$  at time  $d$  where  $d \in Time - \{0\}$ :

$$\mathbf{write}_d(v, s) \hat{=} len = 1 - 1 ; \mathbf{skip} \wedge \bigcirc s = (\sqrt{s} + 1, v)$$

In case the agent **write** $_d(v, s)$  is required to stay stable except of the last state of the interval, the agent **pwrite** $_d(v, s)$  takes over as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{pwrite}_d(v, s) &\hat{=} \mathbf{write}_d(v, s) \wedge \mathbf{padded}(s) \\ \mathbf{padded}(s) &\hat{=} (\mathbf{stable}(s) ; \mathbf{skip}) \vee \mathbf{empty}\end{aligned}$$

where **padded** $(s)$  is a padded expression, and it has been formally defined in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) as shown the above formula.

### 3.2.1.5 Delay and Timeout

The notation  $\mathbf{delay}_d$  formally describes an agent that sets on hold at first for  $d$  time units, where  $d \in TIME \cup \{\infty\}$ , and then it gets terminated without updating the global variables:

$$\mathbf{delay}_d \hat{=} len = d$$

The notation  $P \trianglelefteq_d Q$  formally describes an agent behaviour such as  $P$  if  $P$  is executed within  $d$  time units, otherwise agent  $Q$  takes over the execution:

$$P \trianglelefteq_d Q \hat{=} \mathbf{if} (P \supset \mathbf{finite} \wedge len \leq d) \mathbf{then} P \mathbf{else} Q$$

### 3.2.1.6 Resource Allocation

The  $v$  units of resource  $res$  can be requested via the agent  $\mathbf{request}(v, res)$ . The agent waits for  $v$  units in case they are not available [47]. The agent  $\mathbf{release}(v, res)$  is used to release  $v$  units of the resource  $res$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{request}(v, s) &\hat{=} \mathbf{if} \, res \geq v \mathbf{then} \, res := res - v \mathbf{else} \, \bigcirc(\mathbf{request}(v, res)) \\ \mathbf{release}(v, s) &\hat{=} \bigcirc res = res + v \end{aligned}$$

### 3.2.1.7 The Funnel

A restricted form of multiplexing on shunts can be performed using the agent called funnel. The syntax of the agent funnel is  $s_i \rightsquigarrow_I s_{out}$  describes the connection of shunts  $s_i$ , which is indexed by  $i$ , to the shunts  $s_{out}$ . When a write operation occurs in shunts  $s_j$  where  $j \in I$  then shunts  $s_{out}$  must have a write operation at the same time. Shunts  $s_i$  and  $s_{out}$  stay stable if no write operation



occurs. The funnel becomes false when two different values are written to shunts  $s_i$  and  $s_j$  at the same time:

$$\begin{aligned}
 s_i \rightsquigarrow_I s_v &\hat{=} (\bigwedge_{i \in I} \mathbf{stable}(s_i) \wedge \mathbf{stable}(s_{out})) \vee \\
 &((\bigvee_{i \in I} \mathbf{stable}(s_i); \mathbf{skip} \wedge \sqrt{s_i} := \sqrt{s_i} + 1) \wedge \\
 &\exists v, t. \text{len} = t \wedge \\
 &((\bigwedge_{i \in I} \mathbf{stable}(s_i); \mathbf{skip} \wedge \sqrt{s_i} := \sqrt{s_i} + 1 \supset \mathbf{fin}(\mathbf{read}(s_i)) = v) \wedge \\
 &\mathbf{pwrite}_t(v, s_{out}))
 \end{aligned}$$

According to Cau and Zedan [47], the funnel allows to execute agents concurrently to the same shunt with making the assumption of no conflict is occurring. As an agent may perform reading and writing to shunts, it requires at least two time units to update the stamp.

### 3.2.2 Shared-Variable based Communication

Shared-variable is a model of communication between parallel systems that share a variable. All systems can read and write to the variable whenever they need to. There are constraints on shared-variable model to ensure consistency of the value of shared variable among all systems that share it:

- All parallel systems can read the consistent value of the shared variable at the same time (Concurrent Read CR).
- Only one system can write to the shared variable at a time (Exclusive Write EW). Mutual Exclusion mechanism is applied to ensure this constraint. For instance, if  $Sys_1$  needs to write to a shared variable  $Data$ , a lock-based solution is used to enforce a Mutual Exclusion synchronisation mechanism on a shared variable as the following:

$\mathbf{Lock}(Data); Data = x; \mathbf{Unlock}(Data);$

Only one system, for instance  $Sys_1$ , is allowed to write the value  $x$  to a shared variable  $Data$  at a time. The above two constraints use one model of the Parallel Random Access Machine (PRAM) models, which is a Concurrent Read Exclusive Write (CREW) [275].

### 3.2.3 True Concurrency

True concurrency form allows the parallel systems to be independently executed at the same time. If parallel systems share a variable, then a synchronisation mechanism such as mutual exclusion has to be applied to ensure a consistent value of a shared variable. Figure 3.3 illustrates this form of concurrency where  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$  represent any system running in parallel, and  $\sigma_n$  represents the state number. A global state construction for parallel systems which run in true concurrency is defined in Definition 9 and illustrated in Figure 3.4.




Figure 3.3: Parallel Composition of  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$  (True Concurrency)

**Definition 9 Global State Construction (True Concurrency):** The locals state numbers  $i$  and  $j$  of parallel systems,  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$ , which run by the local processors  $n$  and  $m$  respectively are equivalent, while the global state number of the composed systems,  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$ , which run by the global processor  $g$  is  $k$ ;  $k$  is the sum of the locals state numbers divided by  $x$ , the number of available processors, as follows:

$$\sigma_i^n \parallel_T \sigma_j^m \equiv \sigma_{k=(i+j)/x}^g$$

where:

$\parallel_T$  is the parallel (true concurrency) operator symbol,

$\sigma_i^n$ : state number  $i$  of processor  $n$ ,

$\sigma_j^m$ : state number  $j$  of processor  $m$ ,

$g$ : global processor,

$k$ : global state number.




Figure 3.4: Global State Construction (True Concurrency)

### 3.2.4 Interleaving Concurrency

Interleaving concurrency allows only one system to be executed at a time. When one system is running, the other parallel systems are idle. Synchronisation mechanism is not required in this form because there is no concurrent writes to a shared variable and any change gets committed at every state, which allows the other parallel systems to see the updates in the next state. Figure 3.5 illustrates this form of concurrency where  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$  represent any system running in parallel, and  $\sigma_n$  represents the state number.




Figure 3.5: Parallel Composition of  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$  (Interleaving Concurrency)

A global state construction for parallel systems which run in interleaving concurrency is defined in Definition 10 and illustrated in Figure 3.6.

**Definition 10 Global State Construction (Interleaving Concurrency):** *The locals state numbers  $i$  and  $j$  of parallel systems,  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$ , which run by the local processors  $n$  and  $m$  respectively are inequivalent, while the global state number of the composed systems,  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$ , which run by the global processor  $g$  is  $k$ ;  $k$  is the sum of the active processor's local state number and the stuttered processors state numbers as follows:*

$$\sigma_i^n \parallel_I \sigma_j^m \equiv \sigma_{k=i+j}^g$$

where:

$\parallel_I$ : parallel (interleaving concurrency) operator symbol,

$\sigma_i^n$ : state number  $i$  of processor  $n$ ,

$\sigma_j^m$ : state number  $j$  of processor  $m$ ,

$g$ : global processor,

$k$ : global state number.




Figure 3.6: Global State Construction (Interleaving Concurrency)

### 3.3 Architecture Framework

As stated in section 3.1, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) has different levels and phases. The levels are global and locals, while the phases are generation phase, local verification & assertion phase, and global verification phase. The global level includes the generation phase in the beginning and the global verification phase in the end of the architecture of the framework. The locals level includes the locals verification & assertion phase in the middle of the architecture of the framework. These levels and phases are illustrated in Figures 3.7 to 3.10.

#### 3.3.1 Generation Phase

This phase lies within the global level of a framework where the global level is intended to generate processor identification ***Pid***, global data ***Data***, communication model ***Communication***, concurrency form ***Concurrency***, and execution mode ***Execution***. The generation of ***Pids*** occurs randomly via the modulo operation where a random number gets modulo over the available number of the processors that run in parallel. Data is generated according to the nature of the

system under scrutiny.

### 3.3.1.1 Communication Models

The value of **Communication** determines the mechanism of the communication between parallel systems. When the value is **0**, then the mechanism of the communication is *shared-variable*. When the value is **1**, then the mechanism of the communication is *message-passing*.

### 3.3.1.2 Concurrency Forms

The value of **Concurrency** is assigned to indicate the concurrency form which is either interleaving or true concurrency (**0** for interleaving, **1** for true concurrency). The execution value determines the execution mode of systems running parallel in terms of communication.

### 3.3.1.3 Execution Modes

The execution mode is either synchronous (the value **0** is set) or asynchronous (the value **1** is set). For synchronous execution of the communication, I used *Channels*, while for asynchronous execution of the communication, I used *Shunts*.

These generated data then get broadcast to all local parallel systems with **Pid** = **0** to **K – 1**, where **K** is the number of available processors that are intended to run systems in parallel with all possible paths which might be encountered.

Algorithm 1 defines the mechanism that is used in PRVF model to generate **Pid** and **Data** randomly, and set values for a communication mechanism, concurrency form, and execution mode. The communication value determines which mechanism is being used. For instance, the **Communication**'s value **0** sets the mechanism to shared-variable, while the **Communication**'s value **1** sets the mechanism to message-passing. Within each communication mechanism there are varieties of concurrency forms. When the value of **Concurrency** is **0**, then concurrency is interleaving. At every single cycle, one local candidate wins the assignment to be the active processor, while the others set to be idle. When the value of **Concurrency** is **1**, then the concurrency is true concurrency which means that at every single cycle all locals become active. The execu-

---

**Algorithm 1:** Generation Phase

---

```
1 Generate(Pid,Data,Concurrency,Execution);  
   Input : Communication, Concurrency, Execution  
   Output: Pid, Data  
2 for  $i \leftarrow 0$  to  $n$  do  
3    $Pid = \text{Random} \bmod K$ ;  $\triangleright K$  IS THE NUMBER OF PROCESSORS.  
4    $Data = \text{Random} \bmod N$ ;  $\triangleright N$  IS ANY NATURAL NUMBER.  
5    $Communication = \text{Random} \bmod 2$ ;  $\triangleright$  COMMUNICATION IS EITHER 0 TO SET  
   IT TO SHARED-VARIABLE, OR 1 TO  
   SET IT TO MESSAGE-PASSING.  
6   if  $Communication = 0$  then  
7      $Concurrency = \text{Random} \bmod 2$ ;  $\triangleright$  CONCURRENCY IS EITHER 0 TO SET  
   IT TO INTERLEAVING, OR 1 TO  
   SET IT TO TRUE CONCURRENCY.  
8   else  
9      $Execution = \text{Random} \bmod 2$ ;  $\triangleright$  EXECUTION IS EITHER 0 TO SET  
   IT TO SYNCHRONOUS, OR 1 TO SET  
   IT TO ASYNCHRONOUS.  
10  end  
11  foreach  $j \leftarrow 0$  to  $K - 1$  do  
12    if  $Communication = 0$  then  
13      Send( $j, Pid, Data, Concurrency$ );  
14    else  
15      Send( $j, Pid, Data, Execution$ );  
16    end  
17  end  
18 end
```

---

tion mode has two values, either **0** or **1**. When the value of *Execution* is **0**, then the execution mode is synchronous; otherwise, it is asynchronous.

Shared-variable based communication is associated with the concurrency forms such as interleaving or true concurrency. However, the association between execution modes and shared-variable based communication is omitted. On the other hand, message-passing based communication is associated with the execution modes such as synchronous or asynchronous. However, the association between concurrency forms and message-passing based communication is also omitted. The reason for these two omissions is because the proposed model demonstrates all the

possibilities of communication versus all the possibilities of concurrency of parallel systems. In other words, the applicability of these approaches can be tailored accordingly.

### 3.3.2 Locals Verification & Assertion Phase

Locals Verification & Assertion phase lies within the locals level of the framework. The Locals level is intended to synchronise the execution of parallel systems according to the data that are sent from the global level. Shared-variable communication mechanism is determined via the assignment of communication value. Algorithm 1 describes and models all the possibilities that the proposed framework might encounter.

#### 3.3.2.1 Interleaving Concurrency and Shared-Variable

I assume that the value of *Communication* is **0** which means that the communication mechanism is shared-variable. When the value of *Concurrency* is **0**, all locals receive these data and compare the received *Pid* from the global level with their local *Pids*. If a local matches its *Pid* with the received *Pid* from the global, it precedes; otherwise, a local sets itself to idle. Then, the received global data gets assigned to local data *Data<sub>L</sub>* to be locally checked against a property of interest *Prop<sub>i</sub>*.

---

**Algorithm 2:** Locals Verification & Assertion Phase of Processor *i* (Interleaving)

---

```

1 Assert(Propi);
   Input : Pid, Data, Concurrency
   Output: Propi
2 if Communication = 0  $\wedge$  Concurrency = 0 then
3   if Pid = i then
4     DataL = Data;
5     Check(Propi);
6     Assert(i, Propi);
7   else
8     Print "Local i is Idle";
9   end
10 else
11   Exit();
12 end

```

---






Figure 3.7: Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (Shared-Variable Interleaving Concurrency)

After that, the local property  $\mathbf{Prop}_i$  is asserted to be sent to the global level and the global verification phase (see Algorithm 2 & Figure 3.7).

### 3.3.2.2 True Concurrency and Shared-Variable

I assume that the value of  $\mathbf{Communication}$  is  $\mathbf{0}$  which means that the communication mechanism is shared-variable. When the value of  $\mathbf{Concurrency}$  is  $\mathbf{1}$ , the fastest local system locks the received data  $\mathbf{Data}$  to be able to exclusively write to it.

Once the write operation is done,  $\mathbf{Data}$  gets unlocked and synchronised with all the locals to enforce data consistency of shared variable  $\mathbf{Data}$ . Then, a property  $\mathbf{Prop}_i$  is checked locally against a set of specifications within all locals system that are interested in the shared variable  $\mathbf{Data}$ . After that, the locals' properties  $\mathbf{Prop}_i$  and  $\mathbf{Prop}_j$  are asserted to be sent to the global level and the global verification phase. Algorithm 3 describes this model.

---

**Algorithm 3:** Locals Verification & Assertion Phase of Processor  $i$  (True Concurrency)

---

```

1 Assert( $\mathbf{Prop}_i$ );
   Input :  $\mathbf{Pid}, \mathbf{Data}, \mathbf{Concurrency}$ 
   Output:  $\mathbf{Prop}_i$ 
2 if  $\mathbf{Communication} = 0 \wedge \mathbf{Concurrency} = 1$  then
3   | Lock( $\mathbf{Data}$ );
4   |  $\mathbf{Data}_L = \mathbf{Data}$ ;
5   | Unlock( $\mathbf{Data}$ );
6   | Sync( $\mathbf{Data}$ );
7   | Check( $\mathbf{Prop}_i$ );
8   | Assert( $i, \mathbf{Prop}_i$ );
9 else
10  | Exit();
11 end

```

---

Figure 3.8 illustrates the components of this model including levels and phases. The Levels are global and locals, while the phases are generation, assertions and locals verification, and global verification. The flowchart visually describes the flow of the data within this model. Flowcharts components such as process and decision are primarily used to describe this version of the model.




Figure 3.8: Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (Shared-Variable True Concurrency)

### 3.3.2.3 Synchronous Execution and Message-Passing (Channels)

The message-passing communication mechanism is encountered when the value of *Communication* is 1. When a communication mechanism is shared-variable, only a concurrency form has to be set and sent to locals level. On the contrary, when a communication mechanism is message-passing, only an execution mode has to be set and sent to locals level. Being within message-passing communication mechanism implies that the value of *Communication* is 1. Figure 3.9 & Algorithm 4 illustrate this model. The first decision process is encountered within

---

**Algorithm 4:** Locals Verification & Assertion Phase of Processor  $i$  (Synchronous Message-Passing (*Channels*))

---

```

1 Assert( $Prop_i$ );
   Input :  $Pid, Data, Concurrency$ 
   Output:  $Prop_i$ 
2 if  $Communication = 1 \wedge Execution = 0$  then
3   if  $wtr = true$  then
4     read $_i(C)$ ;
5     Check( $Prop_i$ );
6     Assert( $i, Prop_i$ );
7   else
8     Print "Local  $i$  is not willing to read through Channel  $C$ ";
9   end
10  if  $wtw = true$  then
11    write $_i(C, v)$ ;
12    Check( $Prop_i$ );
13    Assert( $i, Prop_i$ );
14  else
15    Print "Local  $i$  is not willing to write through Channel  $C$ ";
16  end
17 else
18   Exit();
19 end

```

---

locals level for the selected path is the execution mode. There are two execution modes which are either synchronous or asynchronous. Synchronous execution of message-passing communication mechanism is modelled using a construct called *Channel* communication.




Figure 3.9: Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (Synchronous Message-Passing)

Channel construct has triple of these values  $wtr$ ,  $wtw$ , and  $v$ . The first one,  $wtr$ , is a boolean value, and its value indicates whether the system is willing to accept (read) a message from that channel. The second one,  $wtw$ , is a boolean value, and its value indicates whether the system is willing to send (write) a message to that channel. The third one,  $v$ , stands for the value currently in channel  $C$  when  $wtr$  and  $wtw$  are both true.

When  $wtr$  is true,  $Local_i$  reads what is being passed through the channel  $C$  at time  $d$ . When  $wtw$  is also true,  $Local_i$  writes the value  $v$  to the channel  $C$  at time  $d$ . Once the write operation is done, the written value  $v$  is checked to determine whether it is satisfying the desired property  $Prop_i$  of  $local_i$ . Then, a local property  $Prop_i$  is asserted to be delivered to the global verification phase.

#### 3.3.2.4 Asynchronous Execution and Message-Passing (Shunts)

Back to the first decision process encountered within locals level for the selected path which is an execution mode, the second execution mode is asynchronous execution of message-passing communication mechanism which is modelled using a construct called **Shunt** communication. Algorithm 5 illustrate this model.

Shunt construct has tuple of these values  $t$ , and  $v$ , where  $t$  is a stamp and  $v$  is the written value. The construct shunt  $s_i$  belongs to  $Local_i$  uses the write agent  $\mathbf{write}_d(v, s_i)$  to denote that at time  $d$ , shunt  $s_i$  has the value  $v$  written to it. The read agent  $\mathbf{read}_d(s_i)$  denotes the value stored in shunt  $s_i$ . The stamp agent  $\sqrt{s}$  denotes the stamp of the shunt  $s_i$ .

The funnel allows agents to write concurrently at the same time to the same shunt  $s$ . When shunt  $s$  has different values written to it via different agents e.g.  $i$  and  $j$  at the same time  $d$ , the funnel becomes false. When the agents  $i$  and  $j$  write the same value at the same time  $d$ , the write operation occurs instantly in  $s_{out}$ . The written value is then checked against a desired property. After that, the local  $Prop_i$  gets asserted to be sent to the global verification phase.

---

**Algorithm 5:** Locals Verification & Assertion Phase of Processor  $i$  (Asynchronous Message-Passing (*Shunts*))

---

```

1  Assert( $Prop_i$ );
   Input :  $Pid, Data, Concurrency$ 
   Output:  $Prop_i$ 
2  if  $Communication = 1 \wedge Execution = 1$  then
3      write $d$ ( $v, s_i$ );
4      read $d$ ( $s_i$ );
5      stamp( $s_i$ );
6      Send( $j, s_i$ );
7      Receive( $j, s_j$ );
8      if  $s_i = s_j$  then
9           $s_{out} = s_i$ ;
10         Check( $Prop_i$ );
11         Assert( $i, Prop_i$ );
12     else
13         Print "The Funnel is false because shunts  $i$  &  $j$  wrote different values at the
            same time";
14     end
15 else
16     Exit();
17 end

```

---

Figure 3.10 illustrates the components of this model including levels and phases. The Levels are global and locals, while the phases are generation, assertions and locals verification, and global verification.




Figure 3.10: Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (Asynchronous Message-Passing)



### 3.3.3 Global Verification Phase

This phase lies within a global level. At this phase locals' properties are received from the locals assertion phase. The global verification phase gets locals' properties in order to compose a global property out of the received locals' properties as Algorithm 6 illustrates. When the concurrency

---

**Algorithm 6:** Global Verification Phase

---

```

1 Check( $Pid, Data_L$ );
   Input :  $Prop_{Pids}$ 
   Output: Set of Locals Properties
2 Receive( $Prop_i$ );
3 if  $Concurrency = 0$  then
4   | Get( $Prop_i$ );
5 else
6   | foreach  $i \leftarrow 0$  to  $K - 1$  do
7     |    $Pid = i$ ;
8     |   Get( $Prop_{Pid}$ );
9   | end
10 end

```

---

form is interleaving concurrency, **Concurrency** is **0**, then only one local property is gotten due to the concurrency form. The property of the active local is received. When the concurrency form is true concurrency, **Concurrency** is **1**, then all locals properties are gotten due to the concurrency form. The properties of interest of all locals are received.

Message-passing communication models can be handled according to the concurrency form being used. I omit the concurrency forms for message-passing due to fact that my interest is to show all the possible models without redundancy, for instance, true and interleaving concurrency are demonstrated in association with shared-variable communication mechanism; therefore, no need to demonstrate it in association with message-passing communication mechanism. The same idea applies to (a)synchronous execution modes.

$$Local_i \preceq_d Local_j \hat{=} \text{if } (Local_i \supset finite \wedge len \leq d) \text{ then } Local_i \text{ else } Local_j$$

*Timeout* agent deals with locals which do not behave in a time manner. For instance, **Local<sub>i</sub>** is expected to do its task within  $d$  time units. **Local<sub>j</sub>** takes over, otherwise.

### 3.4 Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) Model

Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) model allows the collection of requirements from several sources to handle local and global correctness properties. The model also allows sending and receiving assertion data from several sources to handle true/interleaving concurrency associated with shared-variable based communication approach. In addition, the model enables the application of *mutual exclusion* synchronisation mechanism and the use of lock-based technique in order to guarantee synchronised and consistent shared variables.

Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) model allows handling synchronous/asynchronous communication links such as *Shunts/Channels* associated with message-passing based communication approach. The model offers the ability to execute agents concurrently via the funnel besides the introduction of resource allocation agents **request** and **release**.

Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) model introduces Delay (**Delay**) and Timeout ( $P \trianglelefteq_d Q$ ) agents which play an important role in managing such a behaviour. It also offers checking the correctness properties of local systems at the locals and global levels. Consequently, inference of the correctness global property can be derived from the correctness of a set of local properties of global systems. These new capabilities are demonstrated in the next chapter, Chapter 4.

### 3.5 Summary

In this chapter, the computational model, namely, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) is introduced. Communication mechanisms such as shared-variable and message-passing are identified. Concurrency forms such as true concurrency and interleaving concurrency are identified as they are intended to be used in the proposed model. Additionally, PRVF can handle synchronous execution of message-passing via a construct called *channel* and asynchronous

## CHAPTER 3. COMPUTATIONAL MODEL

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execution of message-passing via a construct called *shunt*. A comprehensive description of the components and capabilities of PRVF is given. In the next chapter, the implementation of PRVF model is demonstrated.

## Chapter 4

# Design and Implementation of a Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF)

### *Objectives:*

---

- To review the current version of AnaTempura
  - To describe the Development of Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) model
  - To show the Implementation of PRVF model using Java, Tempura, and AnaTempura
  - To highlight the Impact of PRVF model on AnaTempura Evolution Aspects
  - To demonstrate Benchmarking Applications using PRVF model
-

## 4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the computational model, namely, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) is designed and implemented. The proposed model is an extension of a runtime verifier tool called AnaTempura. First, a description of the current model of AnaTempura is reviewed in order to address the drawbacks of AnaTempura model. After that, the proposed model of a Parallel AnaTempura is represented and a demonstration is given to show how it bridges the gaps for parallel systems. Benchmarking applications such as Producer-Consumer and Dining Philosophers Problem are implemented using the proposed model.

## 4.2 (Ana)Tempura

AnaTempura is a runtime verifier of systems using Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and its executable subset Tempura. It uses assertion points as a technique at runtime verification to check system satisfaction or violation of a property of interest such as timing, safety, security which are formally expressed in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL).




Figure 4.1: General System Architecture of AnaTempura [301]

The assertion points get inserted in the source code of a system under scrutiny and subsequently a sequence of information such as variables' names and their values, timestamps values are generated. The generated data then get checked against the expected values that match a property of interest.

A property is an expected behaviour of a system over a sequence of states (interval). The property gets expressed in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and then modelled in Tempura language to get it executed and checked against that property. AnaTempura does this membership test as it has Tempura interpreter and the monitor [52, 54]. The main components of AnaTempura are illustrated in Figure 4.1. A description of AnaTempura's main components including Assertion Points, The Monitor, and Tempura Interpreter is given in the next sections.

AnaTempura is a semi-automatic tool which means a human intervention is unavoidable due to the complexity to understand systems automatically. The integration between Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and its executable subset Tempura allows AnaTempura to offer:

- Formal specification
- Validation and verification of a formal specification throughout simulation and runtime checks




Figure 4.2: The Analysis Process [301]

The analysis process as illustrated in Figure 4.2 checks the system's source code in addition to the assertion points within it against the desired properties modelled and written in Tempura language. The source code of a system could be written in C, C#, Java, Scala, Verilog, or Tempura.

### 4.2.1 Assertion Points

Assertion points is a mechanism that enables systems engineer/analyst to gather information within a source code of these systems to analyse their behaviour over time. Assertion points get asserted after every state which is a mapping between variables and their values. A set of variables which is used to express the property of interest has to be determined. After that, the assertion points get inserted directly after the value assignment to these variables. Figure 4.3 illustrates assertion points general mechanism where  $B_1$  and  $B_2$  are the assertion points to reflect the change of code chunk of  $C_1$ .




Figure 4.3: Assertion Points and Chunks [301]

Assertion points generate data which reveal information at runtime about a system under scrutiny. This information includes States and Time Stamps:

- States information maps between the variables that express a property and their values.

This mapping technique has the format  $\langle Var, Val \rangle$ , for instance:

$$\langle Pid, 1 \rangle \langle RW, 0 \rangle \langle Addr, 3 \rangle$$

where three variables  $\langle Pid, RW, Addr \rangle$  and their values  $\langle 1, 0, 3 \rangle$  are inserted respectively. The inserted variables represent a processor identification  $Pid$ , Read or Write operation  $RW$ , Memory Address  $Addr$ . These variables are part of the cache controller case study which is intended to be studied in Chapter 5. The above assertion point reveals that a cache controller system creates a request to read ( $RW=0$  read,  $RW=1$  write) a memory address

**Memory**[*Addr*] and this request is assigned to a processor which has a *Pids* value **1**. This generation of information can then reveal and check whether a system's behaviour is either satisfying or violating a certain property which has to be met.

- Time Stamps information maps between different assertion points where variables and their values within these assertion points are changed and to record at what time a change has occurred. A system's clock is used to obtain time stamps. In addition to variable and values parameters, a time stamp parameter is included to form sets of triples instead of pairs. The triple format is  $\langle \text{Var}, \text{Val}, \text{Time Stamp} \rangle$ , for instance:

$$\langle \text{Pid}, 1, 8 \rangle \langle \text{RW}, 0, 8 \rangle \langle \text{Addr}, 3, 8 \rangle$$

..... *Code Chunk* .....

$$\langle \text{Pid}, 1, 9 \rangle \langle \text{RW}, 0, 9 \rangle \langle \text{Addr}, 3, 9 \rangle$$

where the assertion points add a time stamp value to show a change of the asserted data between time unit **8** and **9**. Time stamps could be in microseconds, seconds, minutes, hours etc. When a memory address, **Memory**[**3**], has changed its value within these time stamps, then a judgement in regards of a property of interest can be made.

The determination of a location and number of assertion points within a source code is still manual and relies on systems engineer/analyst's understanding of a system under scrutiny [300]. The mechanism of capturing and interpreting assertion points is illustrated in Figure 4.4. There are two components which are intended to receive assertion data generated by assertion points within a source code of a system, and then split them accordingly into three groups.

The groups as the figure illustrates are variable name, value, and time stamps. The first component is Data Capture, and it captures the assertion data as strings and then forwards them






Figure 4.4: Processing Assertion Points [301]

to Data Interpret component. The string has the following format:

```
!PROG: assert variable name: value: time stamp: !
```

The above clause has a set of markers. Each marker has a meaning as follows:

“**!PROG**” This marker indicates that assertion data are generated from a program.

“**assert**” indicates the data being asserted.

“**:**” The colon symbol separates the asserted data.

“**!**” The exclamation symbols terminates the assertion data clause.

Based on these markers, a Data Interpret component divides the strings into three groups which are variable name, value, and time stamps. Then these assertion data are sent to Tem-

pura interpreter in order to execute them and then send the corresponding output to the monitor.

Listing 4.1 illustrates how assertion points look like within a Java external program.

### Listing 4.1: Generating Assertion Points within Java Program

```
1 class AssertionPoints {
2     public static void main(String[] args) {
3         int Pid,RW,Addr,Timestamp;
4         Pid=1;RW=0;Addr=3;Timestamp=9;
5         System.out.println("!PROG: assert Pid:"+Pid+": "+Timestamp+":!");
6         System.out.println("!PROG: assert RW:"+RW+": "+Timestamp+":!");
7         System.out.println("!PROG: assert Addr:"+Addr+": "+Timestamp+":!");    }
8 }
```

The assertion points in line 5, 6, and 7 within Listing 4.1 inserts three variables names and their values in addition to the time stamp's value. The variable set is  $\langle \textit{Pid}, \textit{RW}, \textit{Addr} \rangle$ , while the value set of these variables is  $\langle 1, 0, 3 \rangle$  respectively to their variables names in addition to the time stamp value which is 9. The external Java program represents a system to analyse. AnaTempura allows systems to be plugged-in with Tempura interpreter via a monitor. To associate an external program with a Tempura file, line 3 within Listing 4.2 has to be placed here. Figure 4.5 illustrates a successful compilation of an external Java program via AnaTempura which is plugged in to a Tempura program. Once a Java external program is executed, a string of assertion data is sent to




Figure 4.5: COMPILING EXTERNAL JAVA PROGRAM

Tempura program after they get captured and interpreted accordingly. Tempura has a mechanism that allows the assertion data to be assigned to a list of variables within the Tempura program intended to be checked via specific functions. These functions are listed in lines 4, 5 and 6 within Listing 4.2. The function in line 4 is intended to pass variable names. The function in line 5 is intended to pass values of those variables, while the functions in line 6 are intended to pass the time stamps in seconds. These functions allow us to pass the assertion data through them and assign the received values to internal variables to be deployed internally.

Listing 4.2: Collecting Assertion Data within Tempura Program

```

1  load "../library/conversion".
2  load "../library/exprog".
3  /* java AssertionPoints 0 */
4  define avar(X) = {X[0]}.
5  define aval(X) = {X[1]}.
6  define atime(X) = {strint(X[2])}.
7  set print_states = true.
8  define get_var(Variable,Value,Timestamp) = {
9      exists T : {
10          get2(T) and
11              Variable = avar(T) and
12              Value = strint(aval(T)) and
13              Timestamp = atime(T) and
14          format("Assertion data <%s, %d, %d> are received!\n",Variable,Value,Timestamp)
15      }
16  }.
17  /* run */ define Test() = {
18      exists Variable,Value,Timestamp: {
19          {get_var(Variable,Value,Timestamp) and len(0)}; skip;
20          {get_var(Variable,Value,Timestamp) and len(0)}; skip;
21          {get_var(Variable,Value,Timestamp) and len(0)}
22      }
23  }.

```

Once Tempura runs a test in line 17 within Listing 4.2, the monitor shows the assertion data imported to the test. The assertion data, which has been asserted within an external Java program, are successfully printed out within the monitor as Figure 4.6 illustrates.




Figure 4.6: RUNNING TEMPURA PROGRAM

### 4.2.2 The Monitor

The monitor is a user-friendly interface which has been built to be an interactive system by allowing system engineers/analysts to insert inputs during the runtime in order to be able to analyse the time-critical systems. The monitor is responsible for capturing and analysing the assertion data which is generated by assertion points. Based on a set of criteria set by system engineers/analysts, the monitor can make a judgement on a system behaviour against properties such as safety, liveness, and projected time. The monitor has a textual interface and graphical interface. The Tcl/Tk [288] and Expect [155] were initially used to build the tool. Tcl/ Tk graphical user interface no longer depend on Expect, this has been the case since the release of version 3.3 of AnaTempura. The latest release of an up-to-date AnaTempura is version 3.4. [54].

When the run of a system initialised within the monitor, the assertion points which are placed within a source code of a system under scrutiny send their assertion data to the monitor. The monitor then receives these assertion data accordingly and send them to Tempura interpreter. The Tempura interpreter then checks the executable specifications written in Tempura file against the received assertion data and after that a judgement of pass or fail is made accordingly. The

Tempura interpreter indicates to the failure's location and explains why the failure occurred. This information is displayed via the monitor.

### 4.2.3 Tempura Interpreter

Tempura interpreter is an interpreter of executable Interval Temporal Logic formulae. The current Tempura interpreter is programmed in C language and denoted as C-Tempura. The C-Tempura interpreter was originally developed by Roger Hale in 1985 at Cambridge University, and now it is maintained by Antonio Cau and Ben Moszkowski. However, Ben Moszkowski developed the first Tempura interpreter, and it was programmed in Prolog in December 1983. In March 1984, Ben Moszkowski rewrote the interpreter in Lisp [54]. I refer the reader to Moszkowski's book [182] for more details.

## 4.3 Evolutionary Improvements of AnaTempura

A single vending machine can serve one person at a time. When there are ten people queuing to be served in order to get hot beverages and while each beverage consumes 10 seconds to be delivered, the total needed time to serve ten people is 100 seconds. But when there is another vending machine, half of the load on the first machine is transferred to the second machine, which means five people would be queuing at each vending machine. The existence of the other vending machine reduces the load to the half and consequently the consumed time is as well reduced to 50 seconds to serve all the ten people. This significant reduction of the consumed time is due to the speed increment with the assumption of having 100% parallel portion (100% = 1, 50% = 0.50) and two vending machines. Amdhal's Law [115] is used to perform the calculation of the speed for parallel computation. Amdhal's Law is defined as the following:

$$Speedup(N) = \frac{1}{(1-P) + \frac{P}{N}} \quad (4.1)$$

where  $P$  is a parallel portion of a system in percentage;  $N$  is the number any kind of objects that are intended to perform parallel tasks, for instance vending machines. The application of Amdahl's Law assumes that the speed is exponentially incremented in accordance with the number of available parallel processes in execution which consequently leads to significant improvement in performance. Applying Amdahl's Law on vending machines' example produces the following result:

$$Speedup(2) = \frac{1}{(1-1)+\frac{1}{2}} = \frac{1}{0.50} = 2 \text{ times}$$

The speed is doubled which means only half of the time is needed to perform the task. Instead of consuming 100 seconds at one vending machine, only 50 seconds are needed when there are two vending machines. Amdahl's Law defines the incremental relationship between the number of processors and the performance as illustrated in Figure 4.7.




Figure 4.7: AMDAHL'S LAW [115]

Dividing the ten people into two groups, and with each group consisting of five people to be served by only one machine in interleaving concurrency form of parallelism does not change the fact that serving them sequentially as one group of ten leads to the same result of serving them in

interleaving concurrency form of parallelism. Therefore, practically, sequential and interleaving concurrency mechanisms are alike in terms of performance. Performance increases significantly by applying true concurrency form of parallelism. True concurrency form needs parallel software/hardware components and a channel of communications in case of shared resources.




Figure 4.8: RUNTIME VERIFICATION

The current version of AnaTempura can not handle parallel systems at a time because the current framework as illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.8 has single components such as The Monitor (The Server) and Tempura Interpreter. The single monitor can only monitor one system at time; also, the single Tempura Interpreter can execute only one Tempura program at a time and this is the same for the rest of the components. Therefore, multiple components are needed to handle parallel systems at a time. The proposed model has tackled this issue by deploying and introducing the principles of parallelism to AnaTempura to enable it to handle all forms of parallelism at a time and architectures such as Multi-cores/processors, Parallel Random Access Memory (PRAM), and Remote Method Invocation (RMI).

### 4.3.1 Realisation of Assertion Points Techniques

In this section, a set of realisation of assertion points techniques of the proposed model, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), are introduced and explained in details.

- The variety of source of the requirements that handle local and global properties implies the collection of assertion data from several sources, at a time, to handle concurrency. In addition to the multiple assertion points within several sources, the assertion points clause is extended in order to allow more variables and values to be asserted at a time. The extended format is as follows:

$$\langle \mathbf{Pid}_{var}, \mathbf{Pid}_{val}, \mathbf{Var}_n, \mathbf{Val}_n, \dots, \mathbf{Var}_m, \mathbf{Val}_m, \mathbf{Timestamp} \rangle$$

where  $\mathbf{Pid}_{var}$  could be program, process, or thread identification number,  $\mathbf{Pid}_{val}$  is the value of  $\mathbf{Pid}_{var}$ ,  $\mathbf{Var}_n$  is the  $n^{th}$  variable,  $\mathbf{Val}_n$  is the  $n^{th}$  value of  $n^{th}$  variable, and  $\mathbf{Timestamp}$  is a time stamp of the assertion points where time now can be in microseconds.

Listing 4.3 illustrates the extended assertion points in correspondence to the functions introduced in Listing 4.4 to allow more variables and values to be asserted at a time and collected at once.

Listing 4.3: Generating Assertion Points within Java Program

```

1  class ExtendedAssertionPoints {
2      public static void main(String[] args) {
3          int Pid,RW,Addr,Timestamp;
4          Pid=1;RW=0;Addr=3;Timestamp=9;
5          System.out.println("!PROG: assert ...
              Pid:"+Pid+":RW:"+RW+":Addr:"+Addr+":Timestamp+":!");
6      }
7  }
```



Figure 4.9 illustrates the compilation of the external Java program in Listing 4.3. The compilation occurs within AnaTempura.




Figure 4.9: GENERATING EXTENDED ASSERTION POINTS WITHIN EXTERNAL JAVA PROGRAM

The new functions in lines 4 to 9 Listing 4.4 are extensions of the previous ones in Listing 4.2. The function in line 4 and 5 always reserve the parameters  $\mathbf{X}[0]$  and  $\mathbf{X}[1]$  to  $Pid_{var}$  and  $Pid_{val}$  respectively. The rest of the functions in line 6 and 7 have new parameters  $a$  and  $b$  to enable their functions to assign corresponding variables to their values dynamically. The time stamp in microseconds is introduced in line 9.

### Listing 4.4: Collecting Assertion Data within Tempura Program

```

1  load "../library/conversion".
2  load "../library/exprog".
3  /* java ExtendedAssertionPoints 0 */
4  define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
5  define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
6  define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
7  define avail1(X,b) = {X[b]}.
8  define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
9  define atime_micro1(X,d) = {strint(X[d])}.
10 set print_states = true.
11 define get_var(Variable0,Value0,Variable1,Value1,Variable2,Value2,Timestamp) = {
12     exists T : {
13         get2(T) and
14         Variable0 = apidvar(T) and Value0 = strint(apidval(T)) and

```

```

15     Variable1 = avar1(T,2) and Value1 = strint(aval1(T,3)) and
16     Variable2 = avar1(T,4) and Value2 = strint(aval1(T,5)) and
17     Timestamp = atime_micro1(T,6) and
18     format("Assertion data <%s, %d, %s, %d, %s, %d, %d> are received\n",
19         Variable0,Value0,Variable1,Value1,Variable2,Value2,Timestamp)
20 }
21 }.
22 /* run */ define Test() = {
23     exists Variable0,Value0,Variable1,Value1,Variable2,Value2,Timestamp: {
24         get_var(Variable0,Value0,Variable1,Value1,Variable2,Value2,Timestamp) and len(0)
25     }
26 }.

```

Figure 4.10 illustrates the collection process of a generated assertion data sent from the external Java program. The assertion data get assigned to their functions accordingly as described earlier in this section.




Figure 4.10: COLLECTING EXTENDED ASSERTION POINTS TEMPURA PROGRAM

- The Tempura Interpreter can now be several instances to handle concurrency. This new capability allows us to generate as many Tempura Interpreters as needed. To run the Tempura Interpreter externally, a certain command has to be annotated within the main Tempura file that is intended to monitor other Tempura programs. For instance, Listing 4.5 is a global Tempura program which is intended to monitor two local Tempura programs illustrated in Listings 4.6 and 4.7. The global program in Listing 4.5 starts another AnaTempura system

via these commands in lines 3 and 4:

```
/* anatempura 0 */  
/* anatempura 1 */
```

A description of this new capability will be given where relevant in this section. In order to start several Tempura Interpreters instead, these commands are replaced by the new commands at the top of the Global Tempura program in line 3 and 4:

```
/* prog tempura_macosx 0 */  
/* prog tempura_macosx 1 */
```

These new commands start C-Tempura Interpreters as external programs within the main monitoring system, AnaTempura, in order to monitor local programs behaviour via generating assertion points and sending the assertion data to the global Tempura program.

- The ability of the Monitor to monitor global and local properties via collecting the assertion data that are sent from local programs. For instance, local programs in Listings 4.6 and 4.7 send their assertion data to global program in Listing 4.5. The output as illustrated in Figure 4.11 where the monitor at the top of the figure and *local*<sub>0</sub> and *local*<sub>1</sub> are at the middle and the bottom respectively.

### Listing 4.5: Collecting Assertion Data within Tempura Program

```
1 load "conversion".  
2 load "exprog".  
3 /* anatempura 0 */
```

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---

```
4  /* anatempura 1 */
5  define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
6  define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
7  define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
8  define avall(X,b) = {X[b]}.
9  define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
10 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {strint(X[d])}.
11 set print_states = true.
12 define get_var() = {
13     exists T : {
14         get2(T) and
15         format("Global is Receiving Assertion Data: %s=%20d from %s %d\n",
16             avar1(T,2),strint(avall(T,3)),apidvar(T),strint(apidval(T))) and empty
17     }
18 }.
19 /* run */ define test() = {
20     exists v : {
21         {prog_send1(0,"load 'Local0'.").} and
22         prog_send1(1,"load 'Local1'.").};skip;
23         {prog_send1(0,"run test_local0'.").} and
24         prog_send1(1,"run test_local1'.").};skip;
25         for v<2 do {
26             {get_var();skip}
27         };
28         {prog_send1(0,"exit'.").} and prog_send1(1,"exit'.").}
29     }
30 }
31 }.
```

- The possibility to monitor a Tempura Interpreter (or another AnaTempura system) so a hierarchy of monitors exist. A description of the process of monitoring another Tempura Interpreter is given earlier. The process of monitoring another monitoring system AnaTempura can be done via the annotation of a certain command:

```
/* anatempura 0 */
/* anatempura 1 */
```

For instance, the global program run within Listing 4.5 has this command in lines 3 and 4. This command runs AnaTempura and this task is assigned to process **0** such as in line 3, and process **1** in line 4. The global Tempura program runs two local Tempura programs independently in parallel to monitoring their behaviours in order to make a judgement according to a set of properties. The functions within a global program which are intended to load the local programs are:

```
prog_send(Pid, "load 'Program'.")
```

for instance,

```
prog_send1(0, "load 'Local0'.") and prog_send1(1, "load 'Local1'.")
```

The first parameter is a process **Pid** which is intended to load local program '**local0**'. The same steps are applied to the rest of local programs when they ever exist, while the functions which are intended to run functions within locals programs as follows:

```
prog_send(Pid, "run Function.")
```

for instance,

```
prog_send1(0, "run test_local0().") and prog_send1(1, "run test_local1().")
```

To run a certain function externally, the same value for the process **Pid** which has been used to load this function. The difference here is the use of "**run**" keyword instead of "**load**".

The Listing 4.6 illustrates local Tempura program. This program is loaded within the global Tempura program as explained above, and the function as well is run externally within the global Tempura program.

Listing 4.6: Generating Assertion Data within *local0* Tempura Program

```
1 load "conversion".
2 load "exprog".
3 set print_states = false.
4 define assert() = {
5     exists Local,Data : {
6         Local=0 and
7         Data=Random and
8         format("\n") and
9         format("Local %d is Sending %d to Global\n",Local,Data) and
10        format("!PROG: assert Local:%d:X:%d:!\n",Local, Data)
11    }
12 }.
13 /* run */ define test_local0() = {
14     skip and assert()
15 }.
```

The local Tempura programs in Listings 4.6 and 4.7 are alike except in variables *Local* and *Data*. The variable *Local*'s value is **0** in Listing 4.6 while it is **1** in Listing 4.7. The variable *Data* is generated randomly by assigning the random operator, *Random*, as a value to it.

Listing 4.7: Generating Assertion Data within *local1* Tempura Program

```
1 load "conversion".
2 load "exprog".
3 set print_states = false.
4 define assert() = {
5     exists Local,Data : {
6         Local=1 and
```

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---

```
7      Data=Random and
8      format("\n") and
9      format("Local %d is Sending %d to Global\n",Local,Data) and
10     format("!PROG: assert Local:%d:X:%d:!\n",Local, Data)
11 }
12 }.
13 /* run */ define test_local1() = {
14     skip and assert()
15 }.
```

The monitor then displays the assertion data which are generated by local Tempura programs and collected via a global Tempura program as illustrated in Figure 4.11




Figure 4.11: GLOBAL COLLECTS ASSERTION POINTS FROM LOCALS TEMPURA PROGRAM

- The integration between AnaTempura and Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) Framework. AnaTempura allows plug-ins, as external systems, systems which use Java RMI to

start a server implementation in order to serve clients systems run in parallel using multi-threads programming in Java language. The compilation of Java RMI programs is unlike other Java programs; it has different steps. The first step is to start a server and then run the independent clients upon a running server. These steps are now embedded within the Tempura Interpreter. In Listing 4.8 lines 3-6 are the commands which run Java RMI programs:

```
/*RMIREGISTRY 0*/  
  
/*RMISERVER . RmiServerIntf RmiServer 1*/  
  
/*RMICLIENT . RmiServerIntf RmiClient1 2*/  
  
/*RMICLIENT . RmiServerIntf RmiClient2 3*/
```

The creation of RMI registry is assigned to process **0**. The compilations of java programs RmiServer, RmiClient1, RmiClient2 are assigned to processes **1, 2, 3** respectively.

### Listing 4.8: Tempura RMI

```
1 load "conversion".  
2 load "exprog".  
3 /* rmiregistry 0 */  
4 /* rmiserver . RmiServerIntf RmiServer 1 */  
5 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient1 2 */  
6 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient2 3 */  
7 define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.  
8 define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.  
9 define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.  
10 define avall(X,b) = {X[b]}.  
11 define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.  
12 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {X[d]}.  
13 set print_states = true.  
14 define get_var() = {  
15     exists T,Client,Data,Timestamp : {  
16         get2(T) and  
17         Client=strint(apidval(T)) and
```



## CHAPTER 4. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A PARALLEL RUNTIME VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK (PRVF)

---

```
18     Data=strint(aval1(T,3))      and
19     Timestamp =atime_micro1(T,4) and
20     format("Server is Receiving Assertion Data: X=%12d from Client %d at timestamp ...
        %s\n",
21     Data,Client,Timestamp) and empty
22 }
23 }.
24 /* run */ define test() = {
25     exists v : {
26         for v<2 do {get_var();skip}
27     }
28 }.
```




Figure 4.12: IMPLEMENTATION JAVA RMI USING ANATEMPURA

Listing 4.8 runs Java programs associated with it in lines 4, 5, 6 as seen in Figure 4.12. The clients Java programs have assertion points and once these programs are run via AnaTempura, they send their assertion data to their corresponding Tempura programs to receive the assertion data accordingly and then forward these assertion data as assertion points to Tempura program in Listing 4.8. Then, the assertion data is received and displayed as seen in Figure 4.12. The clients Java programs assert a random data, time stamp in microseconds using a format of **HH-mm-ss-SSS** where **HH** stands for Hours, **mm** stands for minutes, **ss** stands for seconds, and **SSS** stands for milliseconds. The source code of these Java programs and their relevant Tempura programs can be found in Appendix D.

- The capability to implement parallel systems designed using multi-core processor architectures. The case study, Cache Controller, is a demonstration of this capability in the next chapter, Chapter 5.

### 4.4 Benchmarking Applications

In this section, some parallel/concurrent applications which can be applied using the proposed implemented framework are explored. Producer-Consumer and Dining Philosophers Problem are two common applications that demonstrate parallel/concurrent executions.

#### 4.4.1 Producer-Consumer

The Producer and Consumer are two separate, concurrent programs which run in parallel and share the same data. The access to shared data must be synchronised to deliver a consistent model. A producer puts (produces) a stream of data into a buffer, while a consumer gets (consumes) these produced data within a buffer as Figure 4.13 illustrates.




Figure 4.13: Producer-Consumer

## CHAPTER 4. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A PARALLEL RUNTIME VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK (PRVF)

A buffer in this example of Producer-Consumer can hold up to four elements. When the size of the buffer is full, it can not accept new produced elements by the producer. In such cases, the producer waits until the buffer empties a space for a new element. The implementation of Producer-Consumer using the proposed model in the runtime verifier AnaTempura is illustrated in Figure 4.14.

The implementation shows the assertion data being asserted within Java external programs that are intended to run a Producer-Consumer system in order to analyse its behaviour in order to check desired correctness properties of such programs. As seen in Figure 4.14, the assertion data are displayed in the monitor's window (left side) and in the simulation window as well (right side). Based on these data, a complete check of correctness properties can be achieved.




Figure 4.14: PRODUCER-CONSUMER EXECUTION IN TEMPURA/ANATEMPURA

## 4.4.2 Dining Philosophers Problem

The Dining Philosophers Problem is a classical example of parallel/concurrent programs. Five philosophers are sitting around a circular table. The five philosophers are either thinking or eating spaghetti. Eating spaghetti needs two chopsticks, but unfortunately only five chopsticks are available. Each philosopher has two chopsticks; they are to his/her immediate right and left. When a philosopher uses two chopsticks, it means his/her immediate neighbours can not eat because the chopsticks they need to pick up are taken and unavailable. The Dining Philosophers Problem demonstrates how to provide a synchronisation mechanism that ensures correctness properties in such cases. Figure 4.15 illustrates an implementation of this problem which runs in AnaTempura.




Figure 4.15: DEMO OF DINING PHILOSOPHERS PROBLEM

Figure 4.15 illustrates that there are five parallel/concurrent programs running simultaneously. Each program represents a philosopher that is assigned to *Pid*'s (0 to 4). A philosopher's

actions are thinking (default initial action), eating, picking up a (left/right) chopstick, and putting down a (left/right) chopstick. Chopsticks are numbered as well to identify them; they are numbered from 0 to 4 as Figure 4.15 illustrates..

Five external programs model these five philosophers and their actions. The most critical part is the use of chopsticks because they are shared. Two neighbour philosophers are not allowed to use the chopstick they share, e.g. *Philosopher 0* and *Philosopher 1* share *Chopstick 0* and so on.

The proposed model handles this problem perfectly, and it allows the five parallel programs to run and generate assertion data and displays these data in a table format within the monitor and in graphics using the simulation window. These features allow modelling such applications in order to validate their behaviour against correctness properties.

### 4.5 Summary

In this chapter, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) is designed and implemented. A review of the current status of the runtime verifier AnaTempura is given, and the drawbacks in this model with regards to handling parallel systems are addressed. Then, a mechanism of how to handle parallel systems natively using the proposed model is illustrated. Applications such as Producer-Consumer and Dining Philosophers Problem are implemented using this model.

## Chapter 5

### Case Study: Cache Controller

#### *Objectives:*

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- To present a Case Study: the Cache Controller
  - To review Cache Coherence and implement MSI Protocol
  - To produce a Formal Specification in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL)
  - To deliver a Runtime Verification using Tempura/AnaTempura
-

## 5.1 Cache Memory Controller: A Case Study

In this chapter, a case study of Private L2 Cache Memory Controller that will illustrate our compositional model is introduced. A comprehensive description of the operations and requests of Private L2 Cache Memory, Processor, Main Memory, and MSI Protocol is given.

## 5.2 The Basics of Cache Memory

According to Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language (Third College Edition 1988) a cache is “a safe place for hiding or storing things.”; to exemplify, consider a university library as the main memory, and the desk as the cache, the books are the things that must be found [213]. Ever since the first appearance of the caches in research computers in 1960s and then in computers production, they have been included in every built computer today [213].

Assigning the cache location based on the address of the word in the main memory is the simplest method to assign a location in the cache. The process of mapping in a direct way of each memory location to exactly one location in the cache is called direct-mapped cache. This mapping can be easily done by applying the modulo mathematical operation which always gives the remainder of the division operation of two operands. For instance, to find a block in direct-mapped cache, the following equation is used:

$$\text{Index} = X \text{ modulo } Y \quad (5.1)$$

where  $X$  is a decimal address, and  $Y$  is the number of blocks or entries in the cache, in the case it is a power of 2. To compute the length of the index, the low order is used. In Equation 5.2,  $S$  is a cache size in blocks and can be the exponential multiples of the base 2, such as 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128 etc.

$$\log_2(S) \quad (5.2)$$

## CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY: CACHE CONTROLLER

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Assuming that there are eight bits length for the requested address, the length of bits of cache's index can be found by computing the following:

$$\log_2(8) = 3 \text{ bits}$$

This means that there are eight blocks ( $2^3$ ) in the cache which are 000 , 001 , 010 , 011 , 100 , 101 , 110 , 111.

Suppose there are 10 as a decimal address requested by a processor, and the length of the block address is 8 bits, the requested address has to go through the following:

1. Convert the requested address into binary:  $10_{10} = 01010_2$
2. Determine the length of bits used for cache index:  $\log_2(8) = 3 \text{ bits}$
3. Modulo used to determine the cache index that will match this address:

$$10_{10} \bmod 8_{10} = 2_{10} \text{ or in binary format } 010_2$$

Therefore, the requested address  $10_{10}$  goes to index  $010_2$  and continues the computation. But, this index could be shared by other requested addresses such as  $18_{10}$ ,  $26_{10}$ ,  $34_{10}$  or any decimal number having  $2_{10}$ , or alternatively  $010_2$ , as a resultant of the modulo operation. To solve this conflict the tag field is introduced. Tags contain the upper portion of the address to distinguish this requested address from other addresses which have the same index block. For instance, consider previous example:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{address } 10_{10} : 10_{10} \bmod 8_{10} &= 2_{10} \text{ or } 010_2 \\ \text{address } 18_{10} : 18_{10} \bmod 8_{10} &= 2_{10} \text{ or } 010_2 \end{aligned}$$

Both addresses have the same index. Therefore, if the two upper portions are set of the binary



address as a tag field, then there will be different tags which are:

**address**  $10_{10}$  ( $01010_2$ ) *has*  $01_2$  *as a* **Tag field**  
**address**  $18_{10}$  ( $10010_2$ ) *has*  $10_2$  *as a* **Tag field**

Alternatively, the tag field can be determined using the division operation of the requested address over the the length of the cache index as Equation 5.3 illustrates:

$$\mathbf{Tag} = Addr \mathbf{div} S$$

(5.3)

where  $Addr$  is the requested address and  $S$  is the size of the cache. For instance, in case the size of the index is 8 and to determine the tag field of addresses 10, 18, Equation 5.3 is used as follows:

$10 \mathbf{div} 8 = 1_{10} \text{ or } 01_2$   
 $18 \mathbf{div} 8 = 2_{10} \text{ or } 10_2$

Therefore, the addresses from 0 to 7 have the tag 0, the addresses from 8 to 15 have the tag 1, and the addresses from 16 to 23 have the tag 2 and so on.

### 5.2.1 Description

The multi-core processor architecture has at least two independent cores, each core has its L1 cache, and they share L2 cache as illustrated in figure 5.1. Some architectures have different designs such as shared L2 cache; the dedicated or private L2 cache design is adopted to demonstrate the proposed approach. The main memory is connected to the L2 cache memory using a bus. The bus is a broadcast medium that transients the addresses and data requested by the processors between the caches or between the cache and main memory.




Figure 5.1: Dual Core Dual Processor System

A core or a processor requests either a read or a write operation. When a processor requests to read an address from the cache, the cache checks its index; if it is found, then the cache fetches the address to the processor. This case is called Read Hit. If the cache does not find the requested address within its index, the request gets transferred to the main memory and the main memory fetches the requested address to the processor, and it keeps this address in the cache for further requests by the processor. This case is called Read Miss.

When the request is write, it becomes more complicated. There are two types of write operation which are write-through and write-back. In write-through, the write operation updates both the cache and the main memory simultaneously, so the cache and the main memory are always consistent. In write-back when a write occurs, it updates the cache only, then writes the modified block of the cache to the main memory when the block is replaced [213].

In case of write-through, the processor requests to write data to a block in the cache; if the block is found, the data is then written to the block in the cache and at the same moment the main memory gets updated. This case is called Write Hit. If the requested cache block is not found then the request gets transferred to the main memory and performs the write operation upon the

requested address. Then the main memory keeps a copy of this updated block in the cache for further requests. This case is called Write Miss.

In case of write-back, a processor requests to write data to a cache block; if a cache block is found, then the write operation occurs without updating the main memory, which means that the cache block and the main memory are inconsistent. This case is called Write Hit. This scheme of writing improves the performance of the processor as the processor does not need to wait until the main memory becomes consistent with the cache. Instead, the processor continues performing other tasks. But whenever that cache block gets replaced by another request, the modified block gets written to the main memory. If the requested cache block is not found in the cache, then the main memory fetches the data of the requested address to the correspondent cache block. This case is called Write Miss[213]. Tables 5.1 to 5.7 illustrate the read-write/miss-hit of the

Table 5.1: 9-Memory References to 8-Blocks Cache

State	Decimal Address	Binary Address	Hit-Miss	Assigned Cache Block
0	22 <sub>10</sub>	10110 <sub>2</sub>	Miss	$(10110_2 \bmod 8) = 110_2$
1	26 <sub>10</sub>	11010 <sub>2</sub>	Miss	$(11010_2 \bmod 8) = 010_2$
2	22 <sub>10</sub>	10110 <sub>2</sub>	Hit	$(10110_2 \bmod 8) = 110_2$
3	26 <sub>10</sub>	11010 <sub>2</sub>	Hit	$(11010_2 \bmod 8) = 010_2$
4	16 <sub>10</sub>	10000 <sub>2</sub>	Miss	$(10000_2 \bmod 8) = 000_2$
5	3 <sub>10</sub>	00011 <sub>2</sub>	Miss	$(00011_2 \bmod 8) = 011_2$
6	16 <sub>10</sub>	10000 <sub>2</sub>	Hit	$(10000_2 \bmod 8) = 000_2$
7	18 <sub>10</sub>	10010 <sub>2</sub>	Miss	$(10010_2 \bmod 8) = 010_2$
8	16 <sub>10</sub>	10000 <sub>2</sub>	Hit	$(10000_2 \bmod 8) = 000_2$

addresses requested by a processor. Table 5.1 illustrates 9 requests by a processor of addresses **Memory**[22], **Memory**[26], **Memory**[16], **Memory**[3], and **Memory**[18]. Some of these addresses are requested twice which causes the occurrence of hits within the cache. For instance, at state 0, a processor requests address **Memory**[22] and because this address is not present within the cache, the request is transferred to the main memory to deliver it to the requester. The main memory of address 22, **Memory**[22], gets copied into the cache accordingly, and the requested data of this memory address is provided to the processor to continue the computation. The same

steps are taken at state 1 of address 26. The interesting part is that when one of the previous addresses gets requested again by a processor, it means that the requested address is already now in the cache after the fetch operation is performed by the main memory in the previous state. The request of the requested address gets hit as illustrated in table 5.1 at state 2 and 3 of addresses **Memory**[22] and **Memory**[26]. The same policy is applied on the remaining requests.

Tables 5.2 to 5.7 show the described policy of read-write/miss-hit step by step. The tables are designed according to the cache main components. The cache memory has Index, Valid, Tag, and Data fields. The index is a unique place to store the requested addresses with their data accordingly as illustrated in Equation 5.1. The tag determination is described in Equation 5.3. The valid bit is an indication of whether the cache block is empty or not. For instance, it might have 0 or N to indicate that the cache block is not valid because it is empty, whereas the values 1 or Y indicate that the cache block is valid.

Table 5.2: Empty 8-Blocks Cache

Index	V	Tag	Data
000	N		
001	N		
010	N		
011	N		
100	N		
101	N		
110	N		
111	N		

Table 5.4: Miss of Address [11010<sub>2</sub>]

Index	V	Tag	Data
000	N		
001	N		
010	Y	11 <sub>2</sub>	<b>Memory</b> [11010 <sub>2</sub> ]
011	N		
100	N		
101	N		
110	Y	10 <sub>2</sub>	<b>Memory</b> [10110 <sub>2</sub> ]
111	N		

Table 5.3: Miss of Address [10110<sub>2</sub>]

Index	V	Tag	Data
000	N		
001	N		
010	N		
011	N		
100	N		
101	N		
110	Y	10 <sub>2</sub>	<b>Memory</b> [10110 <sub>2</sub> ]
111	N		

Table 5.5: Miss of Address [10000<sub>2</sub>]

Index	V	Tag	Data
000	Y	10 <sub>2</sub>	<b>Memory</b> [10000 <sub>2</sub> ]
001	N		
010	Y	11 <sub>2</sub>	<b>Memory</b> [11010 <sub>2</sub> ]
011	N		
100	N		
101	N		
110	Y	10 <sub>2</sub>	<b>Memory</b> [10110 <sub>2</sub> ]
111	N		

Table 5.6: Miss of Address  $[00011_2]$ 

Index	V	Tag	Data
000	Y	$10_2$	Memory $[10000_2]$
001	N		
010	Y	$11_2$	Memory $[11010_2]$
011	Y	$00_2$	Memory $[00011_2]$
100	N		
101	N		
110	Y	$10_2$	Memory $[10110_2]$
111	N		

Table 5.7: Miss of Address  $[10010_2]$ 

Index	V	Tag	Data
000	Y	$10_2$	Memory $[10000_2]$
001	N		
010	Y	$10_2$	Memory $[10010_2]$
011	Y	$00_2$	Memory $[00011_2]$
100	N		
101	N		
110	Y	$10_2$	Memory $[10110_2]$
111	N		

### 5.2.2 MSI Protocol

To maintain cache coherence for multi-core architecture, the cache coherence protocols are implemented. Snooping protocol is the most popular cache coherence protocol. The key to implement these protocols is the track of the states of the caches's blocks. A cache block has different states, when the the block is shared by more than one processor, it is called the Shared state or is simply represented as S. The Modified state or M state is the state when the block is modified in the cache, and this block is not consistent with the main memory. When a cache block gets modified by a processor, any other processors with copies of this cache block has to invalidate their copies; it is represented as I state. These three states together form a protocol called MSI Protocol. There are other protocols with extended states such as MESI with the Exclusive state E, and another protocol is called MOESI with another state called Owned or O [213]. However, in this research, the simplest protocol which is MSI Protocol is adopted to demonstrate the proposed approach as these three states perfectly serve the case study.

This protocol is proposed to maintain coherence of the cache memory of one processor with another cache memory of a different processor. The Modified state occurs when a cache block is inconsistent with its correspondent in the main memory. The Shared state occurs when a cache block is consistent with another processor's same cache block or with its correspondent in the main memory or both. The Invalid state occurs when a cache block is not present in the cache

or updated in another cache block of another processor. Any two or more processors which have their private cache memory must meet the criteria of MSI Protocol in Table 6.1.

Table 5.8: MSI Protocol

	Modified	Shared	Invalid
Modified	✗	✗	✓
Shared	✗	✓	✓
Invalid	✓	✓	✓

The check mark means that any two or more cache blocks of different processors can have these states at the same time, while the cross mark means the occurrence of these states is not allowed at the same time.

### 5.2.3 Formal Description of Cache Controller

The basic operations and properties of Processor, Level 2 of Cache Memory (L2 Cache), Memory, and MSI Protocol are summarised as follows:

- Operations of the processor:
  1. Read from Address A (**0** indicates Read operation)
  2. Write Data B to Address A (**1** indicates Write operation)
- Status of the processor's request:
  1. Hit
  2. Miss
- Status of L2 Cache Index:
  1. Valid (**0** indicates Invalid, **1** indicates Valid), where Valid means that the cache block is not empty and it has a datum in it.

2. **Dirty** (**0** indicates Not Dirty, **1** indicates Dirty), where Dirty means that the cache block is not consistent with the main memory.

- MSI Status of L2 Cache Index:

1. **Modified** (If the index is inconsistent with its correspondent in the Main Memory.)
2. **Shared** (If the index is consistent with another processor's cache block or the main memory or both.)
3. **Invalid** (If the index is not present in the cache or updated in another cache.)

#### 5.2.4 Compositional Modelling

In this section, a compositional modelling of the behaviour of the components of Cache Memory Controller System using Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is given as follows:

1. **Processor** $[i]$  ( $0 \leq i < nprocessors$ ), where  $nprocessors = 3$
2. **L2CacheTag** $[i][j]$  ( $0 \leq i < nprocessors$ ), ( $0 \leq j < ncachelocations$ ), where  $ncachelocations = 8$
3. **L2CacheState** $[i][j]$  ( $0 \leq i < nprocessors$ ), ( $0 \leq j < ncachelocations$ )
4. **Valid** $[i][j]$  ( $0 \leq i < nprocessors$ ), ( $0 \leq j < ncachelocations$ )
5. **Dirty** $[i][j]$  ( $0 \leq i < nprocessors$ ), ( $0 \leq j < ncachelocations$ )
6. **L2CacheMemory** $[i][j]$  ( $0 \leq i < nprocessors$ ), ( $0 \leq j < ncachelocations$ )
7. **MainMemory** $[j]$  ( $0 \leq j < nmemorylocations$ ), where  $nmemorylocations = 16$

A formal description in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) [54] of the Cache Controller system is given. The possible transitions of the system are as follows:

**The Processor X request:** Let **Processor**[ $X$ ] be a state variable representing the state of Processor  $X$  with all possible values with regards to Read-Write/Hit-Miss. The specification expressed in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) is a formal description of Processor  $X$  Requests. The full specification of this behaviour is written in Tempura code in Appendix B. Tempura is an executable subset of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL). Refer to table 5.9, for more details. I refer the reader to [182]. The following are variables declarations and their descriptions:

**X** = *Random mod 3* : the case study has three processors

**Y** = (*Random* + 1) **mod 3**

**Z** = (*Random* + 2) **mod 3**

**RW** = *Random mod 2* : if  $RW = 0$  it is Read, if  $RW = 1$  it is Write

**Addr** = *Random mod 16* : Random generation of addresses between 0 and 15

**Tag** = *Addr div 8* : Tag used to distinguish the addresses which share the cache's index

**Data** = *Random mod 30* : Random generation of the data between 0 and 29

**Indexc** = *Addr mod 8* : The size of the cache is 8 blocks

**Indexm** = *Addr mod 16* : The size of the memory is 16 blocks

**Indexm'** = *Addr mod 16* : where  $\text{Indexm} \neq \text{Indexm}'$

**InitialValuec** = - 8 : The initial value for cache blocks is -8

**InitialValuem** = - 16 : The initial value for memory is -16

**tagx** = *L2CacheTag*[ $X$ ][*Indexc*] : Tag of cache block *indexc* of Processor  $X$

**tagy** = *L2CacheTag*[ $Y$ ][*Indexc*] : Tag of cache block *indexc* of Processor  $Y$

**tagz** = *L2CacheTag*[ $Z$ ][*Indexc*] : Tag of cache block *indexc* of Processor  $Z$

**ntagx** =  $\bigcirc$  (*L2CacheTag*[ $X$ ][*Indexc*]) : Next state Tag of cache block *indexc* of Processor  $X$

**ntagy** =  $\bigcirc$  (*L2CacheTag*[ $Y$ ][*Indexc*]) : Next state Tag of cache block *indexc* of Processor  $Y$

**ntagz** =  $\bigcirc$  (*L2CacheTag*[ $Z$ ][*Indexc*]) : Next state Tag of cache block *indexc* of Processor  $Z$

**csx** = *L2CacheState*[ $X$ ][*Indexc*] : State of cache block *indexc* of Processor  $X$



**csy** =  $L2CacheState[Y][Indexc]$  : State of cache block indexc of Processor Y

**csz** =  $L2CacheState[Z][Indexc]$  : State of cache block indexc of Processor Z

**ncsx** =  $\circ(L2CacheState[X][Indexc])$  : Next state of cache block indexc of Processor X

**ncsy** =  $\circ(L2CacheState[Y][Indexc])$  : Next state of cache block indexc of Processor Y

**ncsz** =  $\circ(L2CacheState[Z][Indexc])$  : Next state of cache block indexc of Processor Z

**stringx** = *Read Hit* : The address is found in the cache and read from the cache

**stringx** = *Read Miss* : The address is not found in the cache and read from the memory

**stringx** = *Write Hit* : The address is found in the cache and the data is written to the cache

**stringx** = *Write Miss* : The address is not found in the cache and data is written to the memory

**stringy** = *Read Hit* : The address is found in and read from the cache

**stringy** = *Read Miss* : The address is not found in the cache and read from the memory

**stringy** = *Write Hit* : The address is found in the cache and the data is written to the cache

**stringy** = *Write Miss* : The address is not found in the cache and data is written to the memory

**stringz** = *Read Hit* : The address is found in the cache and read from the cache

**stringz** = *Read Miss* : The address is not found in the cache and read from the memory

**stringz** = *Write Hit* : The address is found in the cache and the data is written to the cache

**stringz** = *Write Miss* : The address is not found in the cache and data is written to the memory

The main operations in the cache controller system are read and write. A formal expression of read and write operations in ITL is considered later in this section. The rest of the operations can be derived and expressed in ITL by referring to Table 5.9. The read operation occurs when the marker **RW**'s value is **0**. There are three processors which are **X**, **Y** and **Z**, where they individually check values of the relevant variables in order to deliver coherence cache states and consistent memory. The following specifications are modelling the read operation in ITL:

```

1  Processor_Request( $X, RW, Addr, Data$ )  $\hat{=}$  (
2  Skip  $\wedge$ 
3  if  $RW = 0$  then (
4  if  $Tag = Tagx \wedge$ 
5   $Stater = shared \vee$ 
6   $Stater = modified$  then (
7   $stringx := Read\ Hit \wedge$ 
8  stable( $Mem[Indxm]$ )  $\wedge$ 
9  stable( $L2Cache[X][Indxc]$ )  $\wedge$ 
10 stable( $Valid[X][Indxc]$ )  $\wedge$ 
11 if  $Stater = modified$  then (
12  $Dirty[X][Indxc] := 1 \wedge$ 
13  $Statey := invalid \wedge$ 
14  $Statez := invalid$ 
15 ) else (
16 stable( $Dirty[X][Indxc]$ )  $\wedge$ 
17 stable( $State[Y][Indxc]$ )  $\wedge$ 
18 stable( $State[Z][Indxc]$ )
19 )))
20 if  $Tag = Tagy \wedge$ 
21  $Statey = shared \vee$ 
22  $Statey = modified$  then ( $\dots$ )
23 if  $Tag = Tagz \wedge$ 
24  $Statez = shared \vee$ 
25  $Statez = modified$  then ( $\dots$ )

```

The case for the write operation is encountered when the marker **RW**'s value is **1**. The following specifications are modelling the write operation in ITL:

```

26 Processor_Request( $X, RW, Addr, Data$ )  $\hat{=}$  (
27 Skip  $\wedge$ 
28  $\cdot$ 
29  $\cdot$ 
30 else if  $RW = 1$  then (
31 if  $Tag = Tagx$  then (
32  $stringx := Write\ Hit \wedge$ 
33  $L2Cache[X][Indxc] := Data \wedge$ 
34 stable( $Mem[Indxm] \wedge$ 
35 stable( $Valid[X][Indxc]$ )  $\wedge$ 
36 if  $L2Cache[X][Indxc] \neq Mem[Indxm]$  then (
37  $Dirty[X][Indxc] := 1 \wedge$ 
38  $Statx := modified \wedge Staty := invalid \wedge Statz := invalid$ 
39 ) else (
40 stable( $Dirty[X][Indxc]$ )  $\wedge$  stable( $State[X][Indxc]$ )  $\wedge$ 
41 stable( $State[Y][Indxc]$ )  $\wedge$  stable( $State[Z][Indxc]$ )
42 ) else (
43  $stringx := Write\ Miss \wedge$ 
44  $Mem[Indxm] := Data \wedge$ 
45 if  $Dirty[X][Indxc] = 1$  then (
46  $Mem[Indxm'] := L2Cache[X][Indxc] \wedge$ 
47  $\bigcirc (L2Cache[X][Indxc] := Mem[Indxm]) \wedge$ 
48  $\bigcirc (Dirty[X][Indxc] := 0) \wedge \bigcirc (Statex := shared) \wedge$ 
49  $\bigcirc (Statey := invalid) \wedge \bigcirc (Statz := invalid) \wedge$ 

```

```

50  ○ (stable(Valid[X][Indxc]))
51  ) else (
52  L2Cache[X][Indxc] := Mem[Indxm] ∧
53  Valid[X][Indxc] := 1
54  ))))
55  if Tag = Tagy then (⋯)
56  ·
57  ·
58  if Tag = Tagz then (⋯)
59  ·
60  ·
61  )
    
```

For a complete ITL modelling for the cache controller case study, the Tempura code is listed in Appendix B where Table 5.9 can be used as a conversion from Tempura to ITL syntax.

Table 5.9: TEMPURA SYNTAX VERSUS ITL SYNTAX

<i>ITL</i>	<i>Tempura</i>
$f_1 \wedge f_2$	$f_1$ <b>and</b> $f_2$
$A := exp$	$A := exp$
$\diamond$	<b>sometimes</b>
$\square$	<b>always</b>
$\bigcirc$	<b>next</b>
<b>if</b> $b$ <b>then</b> $f_1$ <b>else</b> $f_2$	<b>if</b> $b$ <b>then</b> $f_1$ <b>else</b> $f_2$
<b>while</b> $b$ <b>do</b> $f$	<b>while</b> $b$ <b>do</b> $f$
<b>Repeat</b> $b$ <b>Until</b> $f$	<b>Repeat</b> $b$ <b>Until</b> $f$
procedures	<b>define</b> $p(e_1, \dots, e_n) = f$
functions	<b>define</b> $g(e_1, \dots, e_n) = e$

**Processor X Writes to Cache:** When a requested address is found in a cache, then a write operation occurs in the cache which belongs to Processor X. VBit changes its value to 1 to indicate that this cache block is valid. The tag of this cache block changes its value to the tag determined by applying Equation 5.3 on Processor X and the requested address.

```

62 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, X, M, V, tag, j)  $\hat{=}$  (
63   skip  $\wedge$ 
64   ( $\forall i < nprocessors \bullet$ 
65     ( $\forall j < ncachelocations \bullet$ 
66       if  $i = X \wedge j = M$  then(
67         if  $Vbit[i][j] = 1$  then (stable( $Vbit[i][j]$ )
68         ) else ( $Vbit[i][j] := 1$ )  $\wedge$ 
69          $L2CacheTag[i][j] := tag \wedge$ 
70          $L2CacheMemory[i][j] := V$ 
71       ) else (
72         stable( $Vbit[i][j]$ )  $\wedge$ 
73         stable( $L2CacheTag[i][j]$ )  $\wedge$ 
74         stable( $L2CacheMemory[i][j]$ )
75       )
76     )
77   )
78 )

```

**Processor X Writes to Memory:** When Processor X requests to write to the cache block and this cache block is already occupied by another address, the data of this address gets written to a memory and a new requested address writes its new data to this cache block and sets Dirty Bit to 1 to indicate that this cache block and its correspondent in the memory are inconsistent.

```

79 write_to_memory(MainMemory, X, M, V, Tick)  $\hat{=}$  (
80   skip  $\wedge$ 
81   ( $\forall j < nmemorylocations \bullet$  (
82     if  $j = M$  then (MainMemory[j] := V)
83     else (
84       stable(MainMemory[j])
85     )
86   )
87 )
88 )

```

**Memory is unchanged:** At every state, the memory either gets changed or unchanged. The cases when a memory is unchanged, is the case where a write-back occurs.

```

89 memory_unchanged(MainMemory)  $\hat{=}$  (
90   skip  $\wedge$ 
91   ( $\forall j < nmemorylocations \bullet$  (
92     stable(MainMemory[j])
93   )
94 )
95 )

```

**Cache is unchanged:** When a read hit occurs, then a cache stays unchanged. Otherwise, a cache gets changed.

```

96 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x)  $\hat{=}$  (
97   skip  $\wedge$ 
98   ( $\forall j < ncachelocations \bullet$  (

```

```

99      stable(Vbit[x][j]) ∧
100      stable(L2CacheTag[x][j]) ∧
101      stable(L2CacheMemory[x][j])
102    )
103  )
104 )

```

**Update MSI States:** The states of MSI Protocol has been discussed in section 5.2.2, and the criteria that manages these states is illustrated in table 6.1.

```

105 update_msi(i, B, L2CacheState, v) ≐ (
106   (∀ j < ncachelocations •
107     if j = B then (L2CacheState[i][j] = v)
108     else (
109       stable(L2CacheState[i][j])
110     )
111   )
112 )
113 )

```

### 5.3 Analysis and Discussion

In this section, data analysis of the collected data after the execution of Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) on the cache controller case study is given. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the final execution of the cache controller. In this case study, an assumption has been made in which there are three independent processors running in parallel in order to demonstrate the cache controller system's behaviour in order to check global correctness properties of such a system.




Figure 5.2: CACHE CONTROLLER



### 5.3.1 Global Program : Cache Controller

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the execution of the first state, state 0, of the cache controller. For all states execution (state 0 to state 9) of the case study, see appendix A. Figure 5.3 is the output of the run of a Tempura code of the cache controller at state 0, while Figure 5.4 is a graphical simulation of the cache controller written in Tcl/Tk language [288, 179, 155] of the same state number.

The output shows the details of the request which has been made by a random processor. The request is either a read or write request. Every request has the **ID** of a requester processor **X**, the read-write indicator **RW** (**0** for read, **1** for write), the requested address in the memory **Addr**, and the data **Data** which is written either to a cache memory or a main memory, or both.

In case the read-write indicator is **0**, which means read operation, the data field is used to store the requested value of the requested address either from the cache memory in case the request gets hit or from the main memory in case the request gets missed.

Therefore, at every state this information has to be shown in details. This information includes State number, Processor **ID**, Address in the memory, Read-Write indicator, and Data. Based on these data, expanded information is given within the table in figure 5.3. This information is illustrated in Table 5.10.

#### 5.3.1.1 Raw Data Description

The first column Table 5.10 is the state number, and this column has multi-row because all the three rows have the same state number. The second column *Pid* is the requester processor identification number in addition to the other idle processors IDs. The objective of displaying the other processors' information is to show the consistency and readability of information within the table at every state. The third column is the operation indicator *RW*. The fourth and forth columns are the requested address *Addr* in decimal format and binary format respectively.






Figure 5.4: ANATEMPURA SIMULATION AT STATE 0

The length of the binary address is subjected to the space in the implementation within the runtime verifier AnaTempura. As the addresses' values are generated randomly by using the modulo operation over 30, the highest value of the requested addresses is 29, which means that at least 5-bits length is adequate to represent the decimal addresses between 0 and 29 in binary format. The sixth column is the index of the cache. As explained earlier in Equation 5.2, the length of the index can determine the size of this index. For instance, in our case the length of the index bits is 3 which means  $2^3 = 8$  *Indexes*. The seventh column is the Valid bit field which is an indicator whether the cache block in a specific index is valid or invalid. If the cache block has a datum in it, then the value of the valid bit is 1 which means true. Otherwise, it is 0 which means false. The eighth field is the Dirty bit which is an indicator of the consistency between a specific cache block and its correspondent in the main memory. If they are consistent, then the dirty bit value is 1 which means true. Otherwise it is 0 which means false. The ninth column is the Tag field which is the upper five portions of the requested address as the lower three portions are used for the index. Alternatively, the Tag value can be determined as a result of the division of the requested address over the length of the cache index as explained in Equation 5.3. The tenth column is the Hit-Miss which is the result of the requested address. When the requested address is found within the cache, it is either Read Hit or Write Hit, depending on the second column operation *RW*'s value. The eleventh column is Data where the value of the cache block for all the processors within the cache show their values. I set all the cache blocks for all the processors to an initial value  $-8$  to avoid any execution error as I could not leave these cache blocks empty. They have to have integers number as values, as the language I used, Tempura, does not support null values. The twelfth column is the Coherence State; in other words it is the MSI Protocol criteria. For more about the MSI Protocol, refer to section 5.2.2. The thirteenth column is the value of the requested address within the main memory. Again, I set the integer number  $-16$  for all the memory addresses as initial values for the same reason I used  $-8$  as initial value for the cache blocks.

## CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY: CACHE CONTROLLER

Table 5.10: TEMPURA RUN OF INTERLEAVED PARALLEL LOCAL PROCESSORS 0, 1 & 2

State	Pid	Oper.	Addr <sub>10</sub>	Addr <sub>2</sub>	Cache[Index]	VBit	DBit	Tag	Hit-Miss	Data	MSI	Memory[Addr] = Data
0	0(0)	0	14	0001110	Cache[110]	1	0	1	Read Miss	-16	Shared[0]	Memory[0001110]=-16
	0(1)	0	14	0001110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0001110]=-16
	0(2)	0	14	0001110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0001110]=-16
1	2(2)	0	10	0001010	Cache[010]	1	0	1	Read Miss	-16	Shared[2]	Memory[0001010]=-16
	2(0)	0	10	0001010	Cache[010]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0001010]=-16
	2(1)	0	10	0001010	Cache[010]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0001010]=-16
2	0(0)	1	6	0000110	Cache[110]	1	1	0	Write Miss	13	Modified[0]	Memory[0000110]=-16
	0(1)	1	6	0000110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1	Write Miss	-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0000110]=-16
	0(2)	1	6	0000110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1	Write Miss	-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0000110]=-16
3	2(2)	0	4	0000100	Cache[100]	1	0	0	Read Miss	-16	Shared[2]	Memory[0000100]=-16
	2(0)	0	4	0000100	Cache[100]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000100]=-16
	2(1)	0	4	0000100	Cache[100]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0000100]=-16
4	1(1)	1	1	0000001	Cache[001]	1	1	0	Write Miss	14	Modified[1]	Memory[0000001]=-16
	1(2)	1	1	0000001	Cache[001]	0	0	-1	Write Miss	-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0000001]=-16
	1(0)	1	1	0000001	Cache[001]	0	0	-1	Write Miss	-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000001]=-16
5	0(0)	1	15	0001111	Cache[111]	1	1	1	Write Miss	19	Modified[0]	Memory[0001111]=-16
	0(1)	1	15	0001111	Cache[111]	0	0	-1	Write Miss	-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0001111]=-16
	0(2)	1	15	0001111	Cache[111]	0	0	-1	Write Miss	-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0001111]=-16
6	2(2)	1	3	0000011	Cache[011]	1	1	0	Write Miss	14	Modified[2]	Memory[0000011]=-16
	2(0)	1	3	0000011	Cache[011]	0	0	-1	Write Miss	-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000011]=-16
	2(1)	1	3	0000011	Cache[011]	0	0	-1	Write Miss	-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0000011]=-16
7	0(0)	1	9	0001001	Cache[001]	1	1	1	Write Miss	3	Modified[0]	Memory[0001001]=-16
	0(1)	1	9	0001001	Cache[001]	0	0	0	Write Miss	14	Invalid[1]	Memory[0001001]=-16
	0(2)	1	9	0001001	Cache[001]	0	0	-1	Write Miss	-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0001001]=-16
8	2(2)	0	4	0000100	Cache[100]	1	0	0	Read Hit	-16	Shared[2]	Memory[0000100]=-16
	2(0)	0	4	0000100	Cache[100]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000100]=-16
	2(1)	0	4	0000100	Cache[100]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0000100]=-16
9	0(0)	0	8	0001000	Cache[000]	1	0	1	Read Miss	-16	Shared[0]	Memory[0001000]=-16
	0(1)	0	8	0001000	Cache[000]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0001000]=-16
	0(2)	0	8	0001000	Cache[000]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0001000]=-16

### 5.3.1.2 External Programs : Local Processors

Figure 5.5 shows the external programs' outputs. These external programs are the processors which run randomly and independently. Each external program gets A Processor identification number *Pid* assigned to it within the cache controller program, for instance:

Listing 5.1: Pids Assignment to Local Programs

```
1      {{prog_send1(0,"load 'Processor_0_5'." ) and
2      prog_send1(1,"load 'Processor_1_5'." ) and
3      prog_send1(2,"load 'Processor_2_5'." )};skip;
4
5      {prog_send1(0,"run L2_Processor_0()." ) and
6      prog_send1(1,"run L2_Processor_1()." ) and
7      prog_send1(2,"run L2_Processor_2()." )};skip;
```

The lines in listing 5.1 are chunk of the global program written in Tempura language [182]. The global program loads the three local programs which respectively represent processor 0, 1, and 2. A function called **Prog\_send1()** is responsible for assigning the *Pid* to load a local program as external program. For instance, line 1 assigns *Pid*<sub>0</sub> to load a local program called **Processor\_0\_5**. This local program gets loaded by *Pid*<sub>0</sub> to accomplish its computation. In line 5, as *Pid*<sub>0</sub> was chosen to load **Processor\_0\_5**, the same *Pid*<sub>0</sub> requests to run a function within this local program, **Processor\_0\_5**, is called **L2\_Processor\_0()**. Within this function, the main memory address requests are created and then inserted as assertions data to the global program to fulfil each processor request. Once the assertion data is received by the global program, the cache controller deals with the data according to the criteria described earlier in the previous sections to meet a set of properties of interest such as memory consistency and cache coherence. These properties are discussed in details later in this chapter.

External Output 0

State 0: Processor 0 is sending Read request from Address: 14, and Data: 8, and Global State: 0

% Tock=?

[0,0,14,"0001110","110",0,1,0,0,1,-1,1,"Read Miss",-8,-16,"Invalid","Shared","0001110",-16,-16].

[0,0,14,"0001110","110",0,1,0,0,1,-1,1,"Read Miss",-8,-16,"Invalid","Shared","0001110",-16,-16].

Tock=[0,0,14,"0001110","110",0,1,0,0,1,-1,1,"Read Miss",-8,-16,"Invalid","Shared","0001110",-16,-16]

Pid	Operation	Addr	Binary Addr	Cache[Index]	Valid Bit	Dirty Bit	Tag	Hit-Miss	Data	Coherence State	Memory[..Addr..]	----> Data
0	0	14	0001110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0001110]	----> -16
0	0	14	0001110	Cache[110]	1	0	1	Read Miss	-16	Shared[0]	Memory[0001110]	----> -16

Property	PID	Result
Consistency Property Check	Shared[0]	Pass
Invalid State Check	Shared[0]	NA
Shared State Check	Shared[0]	Pass
Read Miss Check	"Read Miss"[0]	Pass

External Output 1

State 0: Processor 1 is idle

% Tock=?

[1,0,14,"0001110","110",0,0,0,0,1,-1,-1,"Read Miss",-8,-8,"Invalid","Invalid","0001110",-16,-16].

[1,0,14,"0001110","110",0,0,0,0,1,-1,-1,"Read Miss",-8,-8,"Invalid","Invalid","0001110",-16,-16].

Tock=[1,0,14,"0001110","110",0,0,0,0,1,-1,-1,"Read Miss",-8,-8,"Invalid","Invalid","0001110",-16,-16]

Pid	Operation	Addr	Binary Addr	Cache[Index]	Valid Bit	Dirty Bit	Tag	Hit-Miss	Data	Coherence State	Memory[..Addr..]	----> Data
1	0	14	0001110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0001110]	----> -16
1	0	14	0001110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0001110]	----> -16

Property	PID	Result
Consistency Property Check	Invalid[1]	NA
Invalid State Check	Invalid[1]	Pass
Shared State Check	Invalid[1]	NA
Read Miss Check	"Read Miss"[1]	Pass

External Output 2

State 0: Processor 2 is idle

% Tock=?

[2,0,14,"0001110","110",0,0,0,0,1,-1,-1,"Read Miss",-8,-8,"Invalid","Invalid","0001110",-16,-16].

[2,0,14,"0001110","110",0,0,0,0,1,-1,-1,"Read Miss",-8,-8,"Invalid","Invalid","0001110",-16,-16].

Tock=[2,0,14,"0001110","110",0,0,0,0,1,-1,-1,"Read Miss",-8,-8,"Invalid","Invalid","0001110",-16,-16]

Pid	Operation	Addr	Binary Addr	Cache[Index]	Valid Bit	Dirty Bit	Tag	Hit-Miss	Data	Coherence State	Memory[..Addr..]	----> Data
2	0	14	0001110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0001110]	----> -16
2	0	14	0001110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1	Read Miss	-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0001110]	----> -16

Property	PID	Result
Consistency Property Check	Invalid[2]	NA
Invalid State Check	Invalid[2]	Pass
Shared State Check	Invalid[2]	NA
Read Miss Check	"Read Miss"[2]	Pass

Figure 5.5: LOCAL STATES &amp; PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 0

In the first line of each processor's output window, it is noticeable that the status of the processor is either active or idle. When it is active, it shows the request information which is assigned to this processor. Otherwise, it shows that the processor is idle as illustrated In Figure 5.5.

### 5.3.1.3 Raw Data Analysis

The whole execution of a cache controller case study in Tempura/AnaTempura can be found in Appendix A. The raw data in Table 5.10 is identically copied from the execution in Appendix A. The number of columns in Table 5.10 is the same number in the execution plus a new column within the table. The new column is the state number column which is an indicator of the state number of the execution of cache controller. As Table 5.10 show, there are ten states, from 0 to 9. In each state, the data is displayed of the correspondent requested address within the cache of the three processors including the requester processor, or what is called the active processor, and the other idle processors. The purpose of displaying all information of processors is to increase the readability of the run and to show the validity of the MSI (or Coherence States) results. For instance, if the MSI column of processor **X** is **Modified**[X], then the the data stored in the Cache and Memory columns of the requested address has to be inconsistent. The purpose of this check is to guarantee the memory consistency property. Another purpose is to guarantee the cache coherence property. The latter property concerns the cache coherence which is a discipline that maintains multiple cache blocks which share the same resource. For instance, if the cache block has data which is shared by another cache block of another processor, then the MSI (or Coherence States) changes the states of these cache blocks to Shared.

The first 3-multiple rows in Table 5.10 is state 0 of the cache controller. In the second column of the table, *Pid*, the first three rows represent the three processors identification numbers *Pids*. The *Pid*'s value has two digits, one digit outside the parentheses, and the other inside the parentheses. The digit outside the parentheses represents the requester *Pid*, while the digits



inside the parentheses represent the idle processors. The requester *Pid* also includes itself as a *Pid* inside the parentheses, and it always comes in the first row of each state run. For instance, in *Pid*'s column, in the second row at state 0, the value 0(1) represents the requester's *Pid* which is 0 and the idle *Pid* which is 1 and so on. It is very important to mention that columns 6, 12 and 13 in Table 5.10 use square brackets. They are not numbered referencing styles.

**STATE 0:**  $Pid_0$  creates a read request of address 14 in the memory as shown in table 5.12. The address  $14_{10}$ , in binary format  $0001110_2$ , gets assigned to the index  $6_{10}$  or alternatively  $110_2$  in binary format. Binary format is used in the case study. Therefore, Memory address 14 gets assigned to Cache[110]. The next column, VBit, is Valid Bit, and it is set to 0 as initial values. As the block cache[110] is empty, the previous value of it was 0. However, after the request is missed and the data of the correspondent address is fetched from the memory, this Valid Bit has now changed its value to 1. The initial values in the Dirty Bit column, DBit, are 0 as well, and as the data has just recently been fetched from the memory to the cache, this DBit stays 0. This means that the cache and the memory are consistent, while the other processors still hold their initial values although these values might mislead the reader and give a false impression about them. It is believed that the initial value of DBit is supposed to be -1 instead of 0 because 0 means that the cache block and the memory are consistent. However, as we can see in their correspondent Data column, these idle processors still have the initial values of the Data column, -8, and they obviously seem inconsistent with memory. The next column is the Tag column where the upper portion of the binary address is assigned to be tag value. The Tag value of address  $0001110_2$  is the four upper portions:  $0001_2$  or  $1_{10}$ . The tag value can be determined using Equation 5.3. The tag value is used with the VBit value as a conditional conjunction to meet any hit requests, otherwise it is a miss regardless of the kind of operation it is. As the initial value of Tag is -1, the idle Pids holds -1. The Hit-Miss column is a result of a request created by an active processor of an address in the memory either to read from or write to. In this state, state 0, the request to read address 14 is missed because the private cache memory of  $Pid_0$  has

not got that address stored in it which leads the memory to fetch the requested data of address 14 to the cache memory as seen in Table 5.12 and to the  $Pid_0$  as seen in Table 5.12 to continue its computation. As a result of this behaviour, the next column, Data column, has -16 after it has been fetched from the memory. MSI column (or Coherence States) has set the state of  $Pid_0$  to Shared[0] as it is consistent with the memory while the idle processors are still invalid. The Memory[Addr] column shows the data of the requested address created by the active processors.

**STATE 1:**  $Pid_2$  is a requester processor in this state. It requests to read the memory address 10, binary  $1010_2$ . This address is assigned to the cache block Cache[010]. The VBit was 0, and this request changed it to 1. The DBit stays 0 as the cache[010] and Memory[0001010] are consistent after the requested data of address 10 is fetched from the memory. The tag field of the Cache[010] of address 10 is 1. As the private cache block of  $Pid_2$  has not got the requested address stored in it, the request then is Read Miss and the data of that address gets fetched from the memory as it is unavailable in other  $Pid$ 's cache blocks. Therefore, the coherence state of Cache[010] of  $Pid_2$  is set to shared as it is consistent with the memory. The idle processors stay in invalid state as they still have initial values in their cache blocks, which means they are inconsistent with the memory.

**STATE 2:**  $Pid_0$  requests to write data 13 to address 6. The cache block Cache[110] stores this data instead of the memory. The point of creating a cache memory reveals in this case where a write operation does not need to be done to the memory as writing to the cache is faster than writing to the memory. VBit and DBit have changed their values to 1. The most interesting change in this case is the DBit, where the new value 1 indicates that the cache block is dirty bit because the write operation occurs locally which means the memory has not been involved in this operation yet. Cache[110] and Memory[0000110] are inconsistent and this is why the Coherence State of Cache[110] is set to Modified[0]. Once this cache block Cache[110], the dirty case only, gets a future write to it by another address which shares the same cache index 110, the old data gets replaced and moved to its correspondent memory address, while

the new data takes over index 110. For instance, address 6 shares index 110 with addresses 14, 22, 30 or any address that has 6 as a result of modulo operation of that address over the length of the index which is in this case eight indexes. If address 22 writes a new value to Cache[110] of  $Pid_0$ , then the old data which is 13 gets replaced and moved to Memory[0000110], and the new data gets written to Cache[110] and sets DBit to 1 to indicate that Cache[110] and Memory[0010110] are inconsistent. This mechanism is called Write-back. At state 0, address 14 was read and moved to Cache[110]; its value in the memory is -16 and has set DBit to 0 because it was consistent with the memory. However, at this state, state 2, address 6 has written data 13 to Cache[110] after the replacement of the old data which is -16. The write-back operation is not witnessed because DBit of Cache[110] was 0 before the replacement which means that cache[110] and Memory[0001110] were consistent. Now we go back to the case study where the value of Cache[110] is 13, while the value of its correspondent main memory Memory[0000110] is -16, which is the initial value. The cache blocks of  $Pid_1$  and  $Pid_2$  stay invalid.

**STATE 3**  $Pid_2$  requests to read address 4. The cache block, Cache[100], has not got the requested address stored in it and, therefore, VBit is set to 1 after the request gets Read Missed. The data of the correspondent address gets fetched from the memory to Cache[100] and, consequently, DBit has been set to 0 due to the consistency between the cache and the memory of the correspondent address. The Coherence State has changed the state of  $Pid_2$ 's cache block Cache[100] to Shared[2]. Address 4 has 0 as the tag value.

**STATE 4:**  $Pid_1$  requests to write data 14 to address 1. VBit and DBit change their values to 1 after the request gets Write Missed. Write-back operation is interesting mechanism, no write operation occurs to the memory and, due to this, DBit's value of cache block Cache[001] is 1. Consequently, the Coherence State changes the state of Cache[001] of  $Pid_1$  to Modified[1]. Memory[0000001] is inconsistent with Cache[001] of  $Pid_1$ .

**STATE 5:**  $Pid_0$  requests to write data 19 to address 15. Cache block Cache[111] stores the new data and sets VBit and DBit to 1 to indicate that the cache block is valid and dirty at the

same time which eventually implies a write-back to the memory. As the requested address is 15, the tag value is 1. The request gets Write missed. The Coherence State is Modified[0]. The data of the correspondent cache block is 19, while in the memory still holds the initial value -16.

**STATE 6:**  $Pid_2$  requests to write data 14 to address 3. Cache block Cache[011] stores the data of address 3 and sets VBit to 1. DBit changes its value to 1 to indicate that it is a dirty cache block and a write-back is eventually needed. The Tag value is 0. The request gets write missed as the cache block was invalid. The Coherence State is Modified[2] due to the inconsistency between the cache and the memory.

**STATE 7:**  $Pid_0$  requests to write data 3 to address 9. Address 9 shares the same cache block Cache[001] with address 1. As the cache block Cache[001] has been written data 14 to it via  $Pid_1$  at state 4,  $Pid_0$  writes to its private cache block Cache[001] new data which is 3. Now there are two caches holding different data but sharing the same cache block. The most recent request by  $Pid_0$ , at this state, sets its DBit to 1 to indicate that it contains dirty data and at the same time,  $Pid_0$  sets DBit of the cache block cache[001], which belongs to  $Pid_1$ , to 0 after the old data, data 14, gets written back to the memory. VBit is set to 1 as this cache block of the  $Pid_0$  was invalid. As the address is 9, the tag value is 1. The request is a write miss because the VBit was invalid. The data in the cache block Cache[001] which belonging to  $Pid_0$  is 3, while the one belongs to  $Pid_1$  is 14. The Coherence State of Cache[001] that belongs to  $Pid_0$  is Modified[0] because it is inconsistent with memory address 9. The Coherence State of Cache[001] that belongs to  $Pid_1$  is set to Invalid[1].

**STATE 8:**  $Pid_2$  requests to read address 4 again after it requested reading the same address at state 3. A read hit is encountered. The data is already fetched from the last read miss at state 3 to cache block Cache[100] which is -16. VBit and DBit stabilise their values, 1 for the former and 0 for the latter. The Coherence State stays Shared[2] as the cache block Cache[100] is consistent with the memory address Memory[0000100].

To check all the above analysis, I refer the reader to Tables 5.12 and 5.12, and Figure 5.6. In addition to these tables and this figure, Appendix A has screen-shots of the implementation of the case study.

[illegible]

Index	V	D	Tag	Data	Index	V	D	Tag	Data	Index	V	D	Tag	Data
000	1	0	00000000000000000000000000000001	−16	000		0		−8	000		0		−8
001	1	1	00000000000000000000000000000001	3	001	1	0	00000000000000000000000000000000	14	001		0		−8
010		0		−8	010		0		−8	010	1	0	00000000000000000000000000000001	−16
011		0		−8	011		0		−8	011	1	1	00000000000000000000000000000000	14
100		0		−8	100		0		−8	100	1	0	00000000000000000000000000000000	−16
101				−8	101				−8	101				−8
110	1	1	00000000000000000000000000000000	13	110		0		−8	110		0		−8
111	1	1	00000000000000000000000000000001	19	111		0		−8	111		0		−8




Figure 5.6: States & Intervals ( $\sigma_m^n$ , where  $m$  is state number,  $n$  is Processor id) of Cache Controller and Memory values

### 5.3.1.4 Properties Check of The Cache Controller

In this section, set of properties of interest are checked against the behaviour of the Cache Controller such as memory consistency and cache coherence. Memory consistency property guarantees that the data of a cache block and its correspondent copy within a memory address are consistent. While the cache coherence property guarantees that the cache blocks within multi-core processor are subjected to MSI protocol to ensure the validity of these caches and their data. Table 5.13 illustrates the check of the correctness properties over all the states and for all cache memories and the main memory.

Table 5.13: PROPERTIES CHECK OF CACHES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1 &amp; 2

State	Pid	Invalid State Prop.		Shared State Prop.		Consistency Prop.		MSI Protocol		Global State	
		Expected	Actual	Expected	Actual	Expected	Actual	Expected	Actual	Expected	Actual
0	0	NA	NA	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	1	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
	2	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
1	2	NA	NA	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	0	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
	1	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
2	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	Fail	NA	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	1	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
	2	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
3	2	NA	NA	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	0	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
	1	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
4	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	Fail	NA	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	2	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
	0	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
5	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	Fail	NA	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	1	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
	2	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
6	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	Fail	NA	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	0	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
	1	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
7	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	Fail	NA	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	1	Pass	Fail	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
	2	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
8	2	NA	NA	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	0	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
	1	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
9	0	NA	NA	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	1	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass
	2	Pass	Pass	NA	NA	NA	NA			Pass	Pass

### 5.4 Summary

In this chapter, a benchmark case study, Cache Controller, has been run. The results demonstrated that the proposed model can handle parallel/distributed systems significantly. The specification of a cache controller system is given in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL), while the runtime verification is given in Tempura language and implemented using AnaTempura. The set of properties of interest such as memory consistency and cache coherence are met, proved, and satisfied.



## Chapter 6

# Evaluation of Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF)

### *Objectives:*

---

- To introduce MATLAB
  - To link AnaTempura to MATLAB
  - To produce Correctness Properties of the Cache Controller System
  - To evaluate Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF)
  - To present Discussion and Related Work
-

## 6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, Chapter 5, the case study of private L2 Cache Memory was designed, modelled, and implemented using the runtime verifier AnaTempura. The implementation has successfully met the expected behaviour of the system and fulfilled correctness properties set earlier. However, in this chapter I will run random and independent evaluation techniques using MATLAB as external tools in order to exclude any bias judgement upon the proposed model, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), with regards to its reliability, efficiency, performance, robustness etc..

In order to be able to use MATLAB for this purpose, a set of practical steps have to be applied to integrate AnaTempura, which is the primary tool for the implementation of the case study, with MATLAB. The integration step plays a primary role in order to completely allow AnaTempura to communicate natively with MATLAB. This communication between these two powerful tools will complement the process towards comprehensive evaluation techniques.

In this chapter, MATLAB and a brief description are given. Afterwards, I will explain in details how to integrate AnaTempura with MATLAB. An illustration of such integration using simple Tempura, Tcl, and shell scripts will serve as a basic understanding of the whole process of the evaluation techniques.

Once AnaTempura and MATLAB are integrated, I will import assertion data from AnaTempura during the runtime verification and pass these data to MATLAB in order to conduct evaluation techniques. After that, MATLAB produces a comprehensive evaluation based on the received data via the assertion data which were generated within AnaTempura. Then the evaluation outcomes and judgements of both tools, AnaTempura against MATLAB, are compared. If both evaluation outcomes and judgements are identical, the proposed model is reliable, efficient, performing and robust. If otherwise, vice versa, and a reconsideration of the proposed model is essential.

## 6.2 MATLAB

MATLAB is the acronym for MATrix LABoratory which was developed by MathWorks to serve as a multi-paradigm numerical computing environment and proprietary programming language. MATLAB supports the data to be represented as matrix in order to allow matrix manipulations, representing function and data in plots, algorithms implementation, interface creation, interacting and interfacing with other programming languages such as Java, C, C++, C#, Fortran and Python [164]. The advantage of supporting these common programming languages allows the users of other programming languages via shell scripts written in C, for instance, to integrate models built in programming languages not supported by MATLAB directly.

MATLAB has a package called Simulink which plays a primary role in graphical multi-domain simulation and model-based design for dynamic and embedded systems. In 2018, the number of users MATLAB exceeded three million worldwide from multiple disciplines [165].

Besides being a high-performance language, MATLAB has powerful features including modelling, analysing, and prototyping technical computation. MATLAB enables the computation to be natively expressed in mathematical notation which enhances the delivered solutions. Mainly, MATLAB is used for the following purposes: [7]

- Mathematics and Computation
- Algorithm Development
- Modelling, Simulation, and Prototyping
- Data Analysis, Exploration, and Visualization
- Scientific and Engineering Graphics
- Application Development, including Graphical User Interface building

## 6.3 Integrating MATLAB and AnaTempura

AnaTempura is a runtime verifier of systems using Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) and its executable subset Tempura. For more information about AnaTempura refer to Section 4.2, Chapter 4 as it is completely covered in this chapter. Tempura interpreter is programmed in C language. This makes it advantageous so an integration of MATLAB and AnaTempura can be done via Bourne shell scripts [39]. I prefix the shell by the author's name Stephen Bourne, in order to distinguish it from other shell languages. However, in the next sections, I use only "shell" instead of "Bourne shell". Shell scripts have the file extension ".sh" in which they are computer programs designed to be run by the Unix shell, a command-line interpreter. The various dialects of shell scripts are considered to be scripting languages. Typical operations performed by shell scripts include file manipulation, program execution, and printing text[135].

### 6.3.1 Running MATLAB

MATLAB can be run using Microsoft Disk Operating System MS-DOS or Linux/macOS Terminals by typing the short command:

```
1 matlab
```

This simple command runs MATLAB in the machine either as a desktop version or internally within the DOS or Terminal. The desktop version is the default option, alternatively, simply just add the flag "-desktop" to the previous command as follows:

```
1 matlab -desktop
```

Otherwise, "-nodisplay -nodesktop" flags force MATLAB to run without the desktop GUI and run it internally whether within the MS-DOS, Terminal, or within other tools such as AnaTempura:

```
1 matlab -nodisplay -nodesktop
```

Once MATLAB is run within external systems as Figure 6.1 illustrates, it offers all of its powerful features via loading MATLAB scripts, and executing MATLAB commands natively as they were being executed in MATLAB environment.

```
Nayefs-MacBook-Pro:~ nayef.h.alshammari$ matlab -nodisplay -nodesktop

      < M A T L A B (R) >
      Copyright 1984-2019 The MathWorks, Inc.
      R2019a Update 1 (9.6.0.1099231) 64-bit (maci64)
      April 12, 2019

To get started, type doc.
For product information, visit www.mathworks.com.

>>
```

Figure 6.1: Running MATLAB

A matrix  $C$  of 1 row, 3 columns ( $1 \times 3$  matrix), which has these values  $C = [1, 2, 3]$  can be created and retrieved by typing the following script:

### Listing 6.1: Creating & Retrieving Matrix in MATLAB

```
1 M=[1,2,3];
2 M % Display M
3 A=M(:,:); % Colon mark displays all rows, columns.
4 A
5 B=M(1,2); % Display the cell at row 1, column 2.
6 B
```

```
>> M=[1,2,3];
>> M % Display M

M =

     1     2     3

>> A=M(:,:); % Colon mark displays all rows, columns.
>> A

A =

     1     2     3

>> B=M(1,2); % Display the cell at row 1, column 2.
[>> B

B =

     2
```

Figure 6.2: MATLAB Script

The percentage mark “%” is used to comment. Figure 6.2 illustrates the outputs after the execution of this short script using macOS Terminal.

MATLAB can be run as well via a shell script. For instance, the shell script in Listing 6.2 runs MATLAB first then runs a MATLAB script as Listing 6.3 illustrates:

### Listing 6.2: Shell Runs MATLAB & “Arithmetic.m”


```
7 #!/bin/sh
8 matlab -nosplash -nodesktop -r "run('Arithmetic.m');"
```

The above shell script first runs MATLAB in non-desktop GUI mode, while MATLAB script “Arithmetic.m” presents how arithmetic operations can be done in MATLAB language as follows:

### Listing 6.3: MATLAB Code “Arithmetic.m”

```
1 X=10;Y = 2;
2 fprintf('%d * %d = %d\n',X,Y,X*Y);
3 fprintf('%d / %d = %d\n',X,Y,X/Y);
4 fprintf('%d + %d = %d\n',X,Y,X+Y);
5 fprintf('%d - %d = %d\n',X,Y,X-Y);
6 fprintf('%d mod %d = %d\n',X,Y,mod(X,Y));
```

Figure 6.3 illustrates the output for the execution of MATLAB script in Listing 6.3 after being called via the shell script in Listing 6.2:



```
Nayefs-MacBook-Pro:Example 1 nayef.h.alshammari$ matlab -nosplash -nodesktop
-r "run('Arithmetic.m');"

< M A T L A B (R) >
Copyright 1984-2019 The MathWorks, Inc.
R2019a Update 1 (9.6.0.1099231) 64-bit (maci64)
April 12, 2019

To get started, type doc.
For product information, visit www.mathworks.com.

10 * 2 = 20
10 / 2 = 5
10 + 2 = 12
10 - 2 = 8
10 mod 2 = 0
>>
```

Figure 6.3: MATLAB Arithmetic Script Output

This short tutorial of how MATLAB is run and how to run scripts written in MATLAB is for demonstration sake. For more information and tutorials visit MATLAB website [164].

### 6.3.2 AnaTempura Runs MATLAB

AnaTempura can run external programs or systems by annotating the name of these programs or systems written in different languages. This annotation then executes whatever is written inside these programs or shell scripts. Every annotation is assigned to a unique process identification *Pid*, so they do not clash or delay the execution time. For instance, the annotation within a Tempura program in Listing 6.4, run by AnaTempura, calls Tcl, Java, C programs and shell script as external programs:

Listing 6.4: Annotation within Tempura Program

```
1 Tempura code . . .
2 /* tcl Cache 0 */
3 /* java Hello 1 */
4 /* prog Fac 2 */
5 /* prog Script.sh 3 */
6 Tempura code . . .
```

These markers “/\*” and “\*/” are used respectively to open and close comments . However, the texts between these markers are sometimes executable in case they are prefixed by keywords such as tcl, java, prog; in these cases, they call external programs independently. Processes  $Pid_0$ ,  $Pid_1$ ,  $Pid_2$  and  $Pid_3$  are assigned to Tcl, Java, C programs and Shell script respectively. Process  $Pid_3$  calls the shell script to be executed. The shell script runs MATLAB as explained above, and it also runs the MATLAB script which is already created to do some specific computations. The execution of these various programming languages and shell scripts enriches AnaTempura and empowers it to be used widely.

The integration procedures are going to be thoroughly explained and demonstrated in this section. First of all, a Tempura program has to be created as Listing 6.5 illustrates:

Listing 6.5: Tempura Program “Hello.t”

```

1 load "../../../library/conversion".
2 load "../../../library/exprog".
3 load "../../../library/tcl".
4 /* tcl Hello 0 */
5 /* prog Hello.sh 1 */
6 set print_states = false.
7 define Send_To_MATLAB(C) = {
8   tcl("init", [C]) and
9     always tclbreak()
10 }.
11 /* run */ define Test() = exists C: {
12   input C and output C and len(0) and Send_To_MATLAB(C)
13 }.

```

Annotations are made in line 4 and 5. Annotation in line 4 calls a Tcl program “Hello.tcl” as Listing 6.6 illustrates, and the process assigned to executed it is  $Pid_0$ , while the annotation in line 5 calls the shell script “Hello.sh”, as Listing 6.7 illustrates, and the execution of the shell script is assigned to process  $Pid_1$ . The Tempura program in Listing 6.5 initialises a state variable called “C”. The value of this state variable is entered via AnaTempura monitor at runtime, and it has to be suffixed by a dot mark “.” in order to carry on the execution and receive the input of “C”. Without the dot mark, AnaTempura monitor waits until doing so.

Line 12 in Listing 6.5 prompts the input to be entered and assigned to “C”, then outputs the entered values. Afterwards, it passes the entered values to function **Send\_To\_MATLAB(C)**. This function is declared in line 7 of the same Listing. The function carries the input values of “C” and a connection with an external program written in Tcl is initialised as line 8 illustrates. The command **tcl(“init”, [C])** passes the input values received via AnaTempura monitor to a procedure **init** within a Tcl external program, in Listing 6.6, which has been already called via annotation command in line 4 of the same Listing. The inputs that were entered as Figure 6.4 illustrates are “36.”, “37.” and “38.”.






Figure 6.4: AnaTempura inputs numbers to file “input.txt”

The following Listing 6.6 is a Tcl program “Hello.tcl”; it receives the input values entered within AnaTempura monitor. The procedure **proc init {nl}** in line 2 is the mediator as it was called within the previous Listing 6.5. The command in line 3 sets a list of index 0 in order to assign the received inputs to “C”. Lines 4 to 6 create a text file “input.txt” then write to and read from this file.

### Listing 6.6: Tcl Program “Hello.tcl”

```

1 namespace eval ::out {}
2 proc init {nl} {
3   set C [lindex $nl 0]
4   set fp [open "input.txt" a+]
5   puts $fp "$C"
6   close $fp
7 }

```

Once the writing process is done, the text file stores the input values entered to it via the AnaTempura monitor as Figure 6.5 illustrates:




Figure 6.5: File Content for “input.txt”

At this point, the integration step is reached. The annotation in Listing 6.5, line 5 is entitled to execute the shell script in Listing 6.7. The script runs MATLAB in a non-desktop GUI mode, which means MATLAB will be loaded into AnaTempura monitor windows as external program of  $Pid_1$  because this process has been assigned within the annotation in line 5. The flag “-r” in Listing 6.7, line 2 indicates that the following text enclosed in double quotations is a MATLAB code and has to be executed. Alternatively, a MATLAB script with the same code could be loaded instead of writing a MATLAB code within the shell script, but this short MATLAB code is meant to load the input text file “input.txt” which is already created by AnaTempura external program; it then retrieves that inputs entered in the text file. Listing 6.7 illustrates shell script “Hello.sh”:

### Listing 6.7: Shell Runs MATLAB & Load Data from “input.txt”

```
1 #!/bin/sh
2 matlab -nosplash -nodesktop -r "load('input.txt'); C=input(:,1)"
```

Figure 6.6 illustrates that MATLAB has been run externally within AnaTempura, and the inputs values entered into AnaTempura are delivered successfully to MATLAB, and they can be manipulated, analysed, simulated, etc.




Figure 6.6: MATLAB Reads from input file “input.txt”

The work of integrating AnaTempura with MATLAB is crucially important and original. Such an integration bridges the gap between runtime verification tools and MATLAB which offers a variety of toolboxes such as Model-Based Design Simulink, Fuzzy Logic, Robotics System, Aircraft Intuitive Design (AID), Statistics and Machine Learning and much more. MATLAB is trusted by millions of engineers, scientists, companies, industrials, institutions, universities, etc.. This diversity of applications is promising in the way that AnaTempura and MATLAB can play a great role together. The benefits are mutual for either systems, and they push each other’s limitations.

By now, AnaTempura and MATLAB are integrated and can communicate natively. The next section sheds light on correctness properties of interest such as Memory Consistency and Cache Coherence State of MSI protocol. At runtime, these correctness properties have to be verified that they are met, proved, and satisfied. In order to perform this task the integration between AnaTempura and MATLAB have to be done to be able to compare the outcomes of AnaTempura and MATLAB.

## 6.4 Correctness Properties

According to Berkovich et al. [29], in computing systems, *Correctness* refers to the assertion that a system satisfies its specification. The system I used for the case study in Chapter 5 is a Private L2 Cache Memory of multi-core processor architecture. The proposed model, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), has implemented the case study successfully. However, random and independent evaluation techniques are intended to be applied using MATLAB in order to exclude any bias judgement upon the proposed model using only AnaTempura. MATLAB is going to be used to produce another version of the judgement, and if both judgements are identical, the proposed model is then reliable, efficient, performing and robust.

Memory Consistency and Cache Coherence State of MSI Protocol properties are the correctness properties I intended to investigate. Each correctness property will be defined at first and then expressed formally in formal-based framework, Interval Temporal Logic (ITL). After that, AnaTempura will run the case study using the proposed model, PRVF, in order to monitor the behaviour of the system under scrutiny. Once AnaTempura runs the check of the system, MATLAB will be run by AnaTempura, and they will communicate with each other and exchange assertion data. AnaTempura makes its judgement, and simultaneously MATLAB makes its judgement too. The judgements checks are then compared and analysed using MATLAB toolboxes.

### 6.4.1 Revisiting The Case Study of Cache Controller

The case study was described and implemented thoroughly in the previous chapter, Chapter 5. In this section I will only run the case study using AnaTempura following the same steps applied earlier in the previous chapter; however, this time MATLAB is fully integrated with AnaTempura and will produce plotted charts representing the assertion data exchanged between AnaTempura and MATLAB. Screen shots of the case study being run are illustrated in Figures 6.7 & 6.8. Figure 6.7 displays the outcomes of the implementation of the case study using AnaTempura. The outcomes are formatted in a table where they are explained and analysed in Chapter 5.

## CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF PARALLEL RUNTIME VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK (PRVF)

AnaTempura: Cache

OPEN

RELOAD

RE-RUN

SAVE

CLEAR

RESET

BREAK

RUN

CHECK

EDIT

Tempura

Help

About

External 0

External 1

External 2

External 4

External 5

```
tempura %$
run L2_Cache_P0_P1_P2_v0().
Using random_seed = 190037
```

Global State	Pid	Operation	Addr	Binary Addr	Cache[Index]	Valid Bit	Dirty Bit	Tag	Hit-Miss	Data	Coherence State	Memory[..Addr..]	----> Data
0	1(1)	1	14	0001110	Cache[110]	1	1	1	Write Miss	25	Modified[1]	Memory[0001110]	----> -16
	1(2)	1	14	0001110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0001110]	----> -16
	1(0)	1	14	0001110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0001110]	----> -16
1	1(1)	1	6	0000110	Cache[110]	1	1	0	Write Miss	0	Modified[1]	Memory[0000110]	----> -16
	1(2)	1	6	0000110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0000110]	----> -16
	1(0)	1	6	0000110	Cache[110]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000110]	----> -16
2	2(2)	0	2	0000010	Cache[010]	1	0	0	Read Miss	-16	Shared[2]	Memory[0000010]	----> -16
	2(0)	0	2	0000010	Cache[010]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000010]	----> -16
	2(1)	0	2	0000010	Cache[010]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0000010]	----> -16
3	2(2)	1	0	0000000	Cache[000]	1	1	0	Write Miss	0	Modified[2]	Memory[0000000]	----> -16
	2(0)	1	0	0000000	Cache[000]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000000]	----> -16
	2(1)	1	0	0000000	Cache[000]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0000000]	----> -16
4	0(0)	0	15	0001111	Cache[111]	1	0	1	Read Miss	-16	Shared[0]	Memory[0001111]	----> -16
	0(1)	0	15	0001111	Cache[111]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0001111]	----> -16
	0(2)	0	15	0001111	Cache[111]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0001111]	----> -16
5	2(2)	0	0	0000000	Cache[000]	1	1	0	Read Hit	0	Modified[2]	Memory[0000000]	----> -16
	2(0)	0	0	0000000	Cache[000]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000000]	----> -16
	2(1)	0	0	0000000	Cache[000]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0000000]	----> -16
6	1(1)	0	4	0000100	Cache[100]	1	0	0	Read Miss	-16	Shared[1]	Memory[0000100]	----> -16
	1(2)	0	4	0000100	Cache[100]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0000100]	----> -16
	1(0)	0	4	0000100	Cache[100]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000100]	----> -16
7	2(2)	1	4	0000100	Cache[100]	1	1	0	Write Miss	23	Modified[2]	Memory[0000100]	----> -16
	2(0)	1	4	0000100	Cache[100]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000100]	----> -16
	2(1)	1	4	0000100	Cache[100]	0	0	0		-16	Invalid[1]	Memory[0000100]	----> -16
8	2(2)	0	5	0000101	Cache[101]	1	0	0	Read Miss	-16	Shared[2]	Memory[0000101]	----> -16
	2(0)	0	5	0000101	Cache[101]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0000101]	----> -16
	2(1)	0	5	0000101	Cache[101]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[1]	Memory[0000101]	----> -16
9	1(1)	0	9	0001001	Cache[001]	1	0	1	Read Miss	-16	Shared[1]	Memory[0001001]	----> -16
	1(2)	0	9	0001001	Cache[001]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[2]	Memory[0001001]	----> -16
	1(0)	0	9	0001001	Cache[001]	0	0	-1		-8	Invalid[0]	Memory[0001001]	----> -16

Done! Computation length: 12. Total Passes: 54.

Total reductions: 740773 (719358 successful). Maximum reduction depth: 97.

Time elapsed: 42.137665

Tempura %\$

Figure 6.7: AnaTempura Run of L2 Cache Memory of Processors 0, 1 & 2

Figures 6.8 demonstrates the outcomes generated in the table of Figure 6.7 in order to visualise the outcomes and increase the understanding of the case study in addition to monitoring purposes.







comes of the MATLAB scripts executed during runtime of AnaTempura, they are displayed in the next sections, Section 6.4.2 & 6.4.3.

### 6.4.2 Memory Consistency Property

A memory of a particular address is consistent if it holds the same value of at least one cache memory of the correspondent index. Otherwise, a memory is inconsistent. In the later case, a verdict of either true or false of a marker called dirty bit within cache memory architecture is switched accordingly. The dirty bit of the cache memory is true when cache memory and main memory of a correspondent address are inconsistent, otherwise, it is false. The correctness property of Memory Consistency can be formalised in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) as follows:

$$\vdash \mathbf{Memory}[\mathbf{Addr}] = \mathit{Cache}[X][\mathit{Index}] \vee \mathit{Cache}[Y][\mathit{Index}] \vee \mathit{Cache}[Z][\mathit{Index}]$$

A memory of address **Addr** has to be equivalent with at least one of cache memory indexes, **Index** of processor **X**, **Y** or **Z**. If the above formula is met, then a memory is consistent.

Now I will show the outcomes of the execution of MATLAB scripts that have been run within AnaTempura. A shell script has been annotated within a Tempura program; this shell script “CheckProperty1.sh” is responsible for running the MATLAB and then executing MATLAB script “Property1.m”. The MATLAB script gathers and assigns the assertion data being created during the runtime of AnaTempura, and then plots these data in graphs for each state of the execution of the case study.

The number of states is 10, from state 0 until 9. Each single state is individually captured by this MATLAB script and representing data of every single state of the related rows and columns of the assertion data is in the text file as Figure 6.10 illustrates. For referencing the addresses of



main memory and the indexes of the cache memory, I use this format:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Memory}[\text{Addr}] &= \text{Data} \\ \text{Cache}[\text{Pid}][\text{Index}] &= \text{Data} \end{aligned}$$

Where,

**Addr**: indicates the requested address

**Pid**: indicates the processor identification

**Index**: indicates the entry within the cache of **Pid**

**Value**: indicates the data integer values

Noticed that, all the cache indexes is -8, while the main memory addresses data values is -16. Holding data -8 for the cache indexes means that cache indexes are empty and have no data yet. In contrast, a main memory holding data -16, means that the main memory is occupied and has data.

STATE 0: By referring to Figures 6.7 & 6.8, it can be found that the active processor is  $Pid_1$  and always comes as the first graph of the plot, at top-left corner, while  $Pid_2, Pid_0$  are considered idles. In this state, the  $Pid_1$  is the processor which requests to access address 14,  $Addr : 14$ . The requested address fetches its data to the correspondent cache index of  $Pid_1$  in case the access is for reading  $RW = 0$  (refer to Figure 6.7).

When the access is for writing,  $RW = 1$ , then the processor writes directly to the correspondent cache index,  $Index[6]$ , without updating the main memory. As the data of the main memory of the requested address is not updated yet and is different from the data of the correspondent cache index, the memory at state 0 is inconsistent. Once another processor requests the same address, this particular cache of  $Pid_1$  fetches data 25 to that processor. When this particular cache index of  $Pid_1$  is replaced by another request, the old data gets copied into the correspondent main memory and becomes consistent. See Figure 6.11.




Figure 6.11: Memory Consistency Check at State 0

STATE 1: Processor  $Pid_1$  writes to index 6 the data 0,  $Cache[1][6] = 0$ . The correspondent address of this cache index,  $Memory[6]$ , is inconsistent as it has the data -16. Interestingly, at the previous state the old data of  $Cache[1][6]$  was 25 and because it is replaced by a new data 0 in this state, the old data gets moved to its correspondent memory address  $Memory[14]$ . The main memory of address 6  $Memory[6]$  is inconsistent. See Figure 6.12.




Figure 6.12: Memory Consistency Check at State 1

STATE 2: Process  $Pid_2$  requests to read address 2 and because address 2 is not available in the cache index of all the three processors, the main memory fetches the data of address 2 to the requester processor. The main memory of address 2,  $Memory[2]$ , and the cache index of processor  $Pid_2$ , index 2,  $Cache[2][2]$ , have the same data, therefore, the main memory is consistent. See Figure 6.13.




Figure 6.13: Memory Consistency Check at State 2

STATE 3: Processor  $Pid_2$  writes a new data 0 to index 0 which is the correspondent entry of the requested address 0. The cache index of  $Pid_2$  is index 0,  $Cache[2][0] = 0$ , while the main memory of address 0 has different data  $Memory[0] = -16$ . Therefore, the main memory is inconsistent because it has not been updated yet. See Figure 6.14.




Figure 6.14: Memory Consistency Check at State 3

STATE 4: Address 15 is requested to be read by processor  $Pid_0$ . Because the cache index of the correspondent address is empty, the main memory of the requested address 15 fetches its data,  $Memory[15] = -16$ , to cache index 7 of  $Pid_0$  as follows  $Cache[0][7] = -16$ . The main memory of address 15 is consistent because it has at least one cache holding the same data. See Figure 6.15.




Figure 6.15: Memory Consistency Check at State 4

STATE 5: Processor  $Pid_2$  requests to read address 0 which is recently modified and written to at state 3 by the same processor,  $Pid_2$ . The data written to this cache index 0 is 0, therefore, cache index 0 of  $Pid_2$  is  $Cache[2][0] = 0$ . The main memory of the requested address 0 is still not updated  $Memory[0] = -16$ , therefore, the main memory is inconsistent. See Figure 6.16.




Figure 6.16: Memory Consistency Check at State 5

STATE 6: The read request is initialised by processor  $Pid_1$  to read address 4. As cache index 4 is empty, the main memory fetches data -16 to this cache index. Cache index 4 of processor  $Pid_1$  is  $Cache[1][4] = -16$ , and the main memory of address 4 is  $Memory[4] = -16$ . Consequently, the main memory is consistent. See Figure 6.17.




Figure 6.17: Memory Consistency Check at State 6



STATE 7: Processor  $Pid_2$  requests to write to address 4 a new data 23. Index 4 of  $Pid_1$  from the previous state has got data -16 fetched by the main memory. At this state, index 4 writes new data by  $Pid_2$ . Now there are two different data  $Cache[1][4] = -16$  and  $Cache[2][4] = 23$ . Processor  $Pid_2$  is the most updated, while  $Pid_1$  is outdated at this state. Therefore, the main memory of address 4  $Memory[4] = -16$ , is outdated, and it is inconsistent. See Figure 6.18.




Figure 6.18: Memory Consistency Check at State 7

STATE 8: Processor  $Pid_2$  requests to read address 5. Because cache index 5 of processor 2  $Cache[2][5]$  is empty, the main memory of address 5,  $Memory[5] = -16$ , fetches its data to the cache index, so it becomes  $Cache[2][5] = -16$ . As the cache memory of processor  $Pid_2$  and the main memory have the same data, the main memory is consistent. See Figure 6.19.




Figure 6.19: Memory Consistency Check at State 8

STATE 9: Processor  $Pid_1$  requests to read address 9. Cache index 1,  $Cache[1][1]$ , of this correspondent address is empty, therefore, the main memory of address 9 fetches it data  $Memory[9] = -16$  to this cache index, so it becomes  $Cache[1][1] = -16$  which means that the main memory is consistent. See Figure 6.20.




Figure 6.20: Memory Consistency Check at State 9

### 6.4.3 Cache Coherence Property

The cache memory is coherent if it maintains one of the cache coherence protocols such as MSI, MESI, MOESI and many others [213]. The MSI Protocol is chosen because it is simple, and it serves the purpose. In section 5.2.2 I have covered the protocol and explained the meaning of the states the protocol indicates such as Modified, Shared and Invalid. Each state is shortened to one capital letter “M” for Modified, “S” for Shared, and “I” for Invalid. The following table, Table ??, describes the allowed and forbidden occurrences of these MSI states of the cache memory in multi-core architecture:

Table 6.1: MSI Protocol

	Modified	Shared	Invalid
Modified	✗	✗	✓
Shared	✗	✓	✓
Invalid	✓	✓	✓

This criteria is applicable on at least two entities or more. The Modified state “M” is highly restricted, and it does not accept any other states but Invalid “I”. The Shared state “S” is less restricted; it accepts another cache block to be either Shared “S” or Invalid “I”. The Invalid state “I” is tolerating, and it accepts all three states Modified “M”, Shared “S” or Invalid “I”.

Cache coherence can be achieved by maintaining MSI Protocol. This correctness property can be expressed formally in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \vdash \mathbf{MSI\_Protocol}[X,Y] = & (State[X][Index] = Modified \wedge State[Y][Index] = Invalid) \vee \\ & (State[X][Index] = Shared \wedge (State[Y][Index] = Shared \vee State[Y][Index] = Invalid)) \vee \\ & (State[X][Index] = Invalid \wedge (State[Y][Index] = Modified \vee State[Y][Index] = Shared \vee \\ & State[Y][Index] = Invalid)) \end{aligned}$$

The formula expresses the allowed the MSI Protocol of two cache blocks for processors  $X$  and  $Y$ . When the MSI Protocol states meet this formula, then the correctness property of the cache coherence is satisfied.

The acronym of MSI Protocol states “M”, “S” and “I” are replaced by “1”, “2” and “3” respectively in MATLAB graphs in order to be able to plot them as integer values of y-axis, while x-axis represents the processors identification  $Pid_{0,1,2}$ .

STATE 0: By referring to Figures 6.7 & 6.8, it can be seen that processor  $Pid_1$  modifies cache block 6 by writing data 25 to it, so it becomes Modified  $Cache[1][6] = 25$  because the main memory is not updated yet and no other cache blocks share this new data. The same cache blocks of processors  $Pid_0$  &  $Pid_2$  are still empty, and are, therefore, Invalid. See Figure 6.21




Figure 6.21: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 0

STATE 1: Processor  $Pid_1$  writes a new data to the same cache index 6 which is written to in the previous state. The data is 0,  $Cache[1][6] = 0$ , MSI state of this cache index is Modified as neither the main memory nor the other cache blocks hold the new written data. The other processors  $Pid_0$  &  $Pid_2$  are still Invalid. See Figure 6.22




Figure 6.22: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 1

STATE 2: Processor  $Pid_2$  requests to read the main memory address 2. Cache index 2 of processor 2  $Cache[2][2] = -16$  and the main memory of address 2  $Memory[2] = -16$  share the same data. Therefore, the MSI protocol of  $Cache[2][2]$  is Shared, while the other processors are still empty, which means that their MSI states are Invalid. See Figure 6.23




Figure 6.23: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 2

STATE 3: Cache index 0 of processor 2  $Cache[2][0]$  is Modified because a write request is made. The data in main memory of the correspondent address is different from this cache index. The other processors  $Pid_0$  &  $Pid_1$  are empty, therefore, their MSI state are Invalid. See Figure 6.24




Figure 6.24: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 3



STATE 4: Processor  $Pid_0$  requests to read a correspondent cache index 7 of the requested address 15,  $Cache[0][7]$ . The main memory  $Memory = -16$  fetches its data to this cache index. Therefore, the MSI state of this cache block is Shared as it is consistent with the main memory data. The other processors are empty, and their MSI states are Invalid. See Figure 6.25




Figure 6.25: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 4

STATE 5: Processor  $Pid_2$  requests to read address 0, because this address has recently been in state 3 and received a write request of data 0 to it. Therefore, at this state the requested read address returns 0,  $Cache[2][0] = 0$ . The MSI state is still Modified because the correspondent address in the main memory holds different data. The other processors,  $Pid_0$  &  $Pid_1$ , are Invalid.




Figure 6.26: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 5

STATE 6: Cache block 4 of processor 1 holds data -16 after it is fetched by the main memory of address 4 as a consequent of the read request initialised by  $Pid_1$ . Therefore,  $Cache[1][4] = -16$  which means that the MSI state of this cache block is Shared. Because the other processors  $Pid_2$  &  $Pid_0$  are still empty, their MSI states are Invalid. See Figure 6.27




Figure 6.27: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 6

STATE 7: Processor  $Pid_2$  requests to write data 23 to cache index 4, so it becomes  $Cache[2][4] = 23$ . This cache block of  $Pid_2$  was Invalid in the previous state because it was empty. At this state, it becomes Modified as it has just received a new data while the main memory of the correspondent address is still not updated. Processor  $Pid_1$  changes its cache block from being Shared at the previous state to Invalid at this state. Processor  $Pid_0$  is still empty, therefore, it is Invalid too.




Figure 6.28: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 7

STATE 8: Processor  $Pid_2$  requests to read cache index 5 and because this cache block is empty, the main memory of address 5 fetches its data,  $Memory[5] = -16$  to it. The cache memory of processor 2 becomes  $Cache[2][5] = -16$ , which means it is in the Shared MSI state. Processors  $Pid_0$  &  $Pid_1$  are still empty, which means that their MSI states are Invalid.




Figure 6.29: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 8

STATE 9: Processor  $Pid_1$  requests to read cache index 1, and because this cache block is empty, the main memory of address 9 fetches its data,  $Memory[9] = -16$  to this cache block, so it becomes  $Cache[1][1] = -16$ . Therefore, this cache block has Shared MSI state while the other processors,  $Pid_0$  &  $Pid_2$ , have Invalid MSI states. See Figure 6.30




Figure 6.30: Cache Coherence & MSI Protocol Check at State 9

## 6.5 Discussion

The implementation of the case study of Cache Controller is deployed in order to measure the suitability and generality of the proposed model, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF). As the proposed model is built and modelled using Tempura language, the subset execution version of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) specification notation language, AnaTempura is used to run the case study in order to judge the model. I have illustrated the implementation of the case study and consequently the judgement of the used model in the previous chapter, Chapter 5.

In this chapter, I have deployed MATLAB to measure and judge the proposed model using AnaTempura. The integration steps have been covered thoroughly and illustrated visually in multiple figures. MATLAB gives the same judgement as the AnaTempura tool has gives of the implementation of the case study using the proposed model PRVF.

The data analysis of ten states of two correctness properties is given in addition to twenty figures, Figures 6.11 to 6.30. These data analysis and illustrations figures produced by MATLAB prove that the proposed model is reliable, efficient, performing and robust.

The proposed model, PRVF, offers four mechanisms of implementation based on communication, concurrency and execution preferences. These four different mechanisms were introduced in Chapter 3. Although two of these mechanisms are implemented in this PhD thesis, which are Shared-Variable Interleaving Concurrency and Shared-Variable True Concurrency, the implementation of the other mechanisms will lead to success and the same judgement of this mechanism.

The other mechanisms are Shared-Variable True Concurrency, Message-Passing Synchronous Execution and Message-Passing Asynchronous Execution. These mechanisms are formally expressed in algorithms and are also modelled in flowchart figures. For algorithms refer to Algorithms 3, 4, 5 respectively and for the flowcharts refer to Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 respectively.

For instance, Shared-Variable True Concurrency mechanism varies from the one implemented in this PhD thesis. It runs multiple systems simultaneously, and it has to maintain the shared variable value and apply an explicit synchronisation and control mechanisms such as monitors [120], semaphores [79], atomic operations and mutual exclusion (*mutex*) in order to provide a consistent shared variable value. Message-Passing (A)synchronous Execution are uses Message-Passing for communication. The only difference between these two latter mechanisms is the execution preferences. Asynchronous Execution allows parallel systems to have different timing clocks; for instance, one system could start and finish its execution differently compared to another parallel system running at the same time. Synchronous Execution restricts the timing clocks for systems run in parallel and force these systems to start and finish their executions at the same moment. In other words, Asynchronous Execution has different timing clocks, while Synchronous Execution has identical timing clocks.

### 6.6 Related Work

Although the proposed model, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), is dedicated to handle parallel computing systems at runtime, it is suitable to be a generic model for parallel computing regardless of being deployed at runtime. This is due to the fact that it considers the fundamental aspects of parallelism at software and hardware levels.

There are several models for parallel computing such as Parallel Random Access Machine (PRAM), Parallel Memory Hierarchy (PMH), Bulk Synchronous Parallel (BSP) and LogP. Each of these models has pros and cons, and then an explanation of the reason I favour in the proposed model, PRVF, over the other parallel computing models follows.

In 1978, Fortune and Wyllie [94] proposed the Parallel Random Access Machine (PRAM) as a natural evolution of the classic Random Access Machine (RAM) model. Ever since, PRAM model is considered to be one of the most used models for parallel computing in general and for parallel algorithms and analysis specifically.



In the 1990s, the PRAM model was considered an unrealistic model for parallel algorithm design and analysis due to the fact that at time that simultaneous operations could not offer constant memory access times by computers. The implementation of PRAM model was not complex as its design algorithms were suggesting. However, the General Purpose Graphics Processing Unit (GPGPU) computing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) was introduced in 2006 and consequently the model, PRAM, became relevant.

PRAM model has different four variations in order to make modelling parallel algorithms more realistic. These variations are a  $2 \times 2$  matrix of two sets:  $\{\text{Exclusive, Concurrent}\}$  and  $\{\text{Read, Write}\}$ . These variations, therefore, are Exclusive Read Exclusive Write (EREW), Concurrent Read Exclusive Write (CREW), Exclusive Read Concurrent Write (ERCW) and Concurrent Read Concurrent Write (CRCW). These four variants are thoroughly explained in [205]. Concurrent writes have to meet one of the following protocols: *i) Common*, where all processors write the same value, *ii) Arbitrary*, where only one write is successful, the others are not applied, *iii) Priority*, where priority values are given to each processor (e.g., rank value), and the processor with the highest priority will be the one to write, *iv) Reduction*, where all writes are reduced by an operator (add, multiply, OR, AND, XOR). PRAM uses the shared memory model.

Alpern et al. [9] proposed Parallel Memory Hierarchy (PMH) model in 1993. The model was proposed to overcome the drawback of the PRAM model with regards to the constant time memory operations. Central Processing Units (CPUs) have memory hierarchies of registers, L1, L2 and L3 caches such as Intel Xeon E5 series and AMDs Opteron 6000 series. GPUs as well have registers, L1, L2 caches and global memory as a memory hierarchy such as Nvidia GTX 680 or AMDs Radeon HD 7850. Such memory hierarchies should be considered in the process of designing parallel algorithms.

A hierarchical tree of memory modules is used to define the PMH model. The processors are represented using the leaves while memory modules are represented using internal nodes. The more memory modules get closer to the processors, the faster, yet smaller, they become. On the

other hand, the more memory modules get far from the processors, the slower, yet larger, they become.

Uniform Parallel Memory Hierarchy (UPMH) is a simplified version of PMH model, and it is easier to model an algorithm than use PMH itself. UPMH model complements other models such as PRAM and Bulk Synchronous Parallel (BSP). (U)PMH uses the shared memory model.

Leslie Valiant [277] introduced in 1990 a parallel computing model, the Bulk Synchronisation Parallel (BSP), with primary consideration of communication aspects. The model highly considers synchronisation and communication where a number of processors with fast local memory are connected via a network. The processors can communicate easily and send or receive messages between each other. The algorithm which is used to build BSP model is called super-step, where it consists of three steps as a parallel block of computation: *i*) local computation, where  $p$  is processors perform up to  $L$  local computations, *ii*) global communication, where processors can send and receive data among them, *iii*) barrier synchronization waits for all other processors to reach the barrier. BSP uses the message passing model.

Culler et al [67] proposed the LogP model in 1993. LogP and BSP both consider the communication aspects by focusing on modelling the cost of communication a set of distributed processors. The cost of local operations in LogP is one unit of time, while the network considers latency ( $L$ ), overhead ( $o$ ), gap ( $g$ ), and processors ( $P$ ). The latency for communicating a message contains a word from the source to the target processor. Overhead can be measured by the amount of time a processor needs to send or receive. Gap can be measured by the minimum amount of time between successive messages in a given processor, while processors are the number of processors.

Latency, overhead and gap are measured in cycles. LogP is synchronised by pairs of processors, while BSP uses global barriers of synchronisation. LogP considers a message overhead, while BSP does not. Therefore, the determination of which model to use depends on the need for local or global synchronisation and whether the communication is overhead. LogP uses the

message passing model.

Comparing these parallel computing models to the proposed model in this PhD thesis, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), shows that PRVF considers both communication aspects such as the shared memory and message passing models unlike PRAM and PMH where they only use shared memory model. On the other hand, BSP and LogP use the message passing model in their algorithm designing and analysis. All models take into account two forms of concurrency, true and interleaving concurrency. In regards to (a)synchronous execution manners, PRAM and (U)PMH use asynchronous execution manner, while BSP and LogP both use (a)synchronous execution manner.

Table 6.2: Parallel Computational Models

	PRAM	(U)PMH	BSP	LogP	PRVF
True Concurrency	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Interleaving Concurrency	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Shared Memory	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓
Message Passing	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Synchronous Execution	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
Asynchronous Execution	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table 6.2 illustrates a comparison between parallel computing models and the proposed model which is Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF). The comparison shows that PRVF fulfils all the aspects in the above table, while PRAM and (U)PMH models do not fulfil message passing communication programming model and synchronous execution manner. On the other hand, BSP and LogP models fulfil all aspects except the communication programming model of the shared memory. The comparison in this table shows the comprehensiveness of Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) compared to the other parallel computing models.

## 6.7 Summary

MATLAB has been introduced in order to be used for evaluation purposes. MATLAB and AnaTempura have been linked and successfully communicated via exchanging assertion data. A demonstration has been given of how AnaTempura can run MATLAB natively. Correctness properties have been modelled formally and described in order to fulfil them. The behaviour of the cache controller case study has been detected and checked at runtime. MATLAB has captured the behaviour of cache controller by collecting the assertion data being generated by the model. The judgement upon the proposed model is made and a discussion and related work have been done as well. A comparison between parallel computing models and the proposed model is presented.

## Chapter 7

# Conclusion

### *Objectives:*

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- To present Thesis Summary
  - To provide Comparison with Related Work
  - To demonstrate Original Contribution
  - To revisit Success Criteria
  - To determine Limitations
  - To predict Future Work
  - To foresee Future Academic & Industrial Impact
-

### 7.1 Thesis Summary

In this PhD thesis, a formal and compositional framework for the development of monitoring system for parallel computer systems is introduced. The proposed approach uses a single formalism, namely, Interval Temporal Logic (ITL), for specifications of and reasoning about correctness properties. This approach uses an executable subset of ITL, namely, Tempura, to monitor system behaviour at runtime and build correctness properties in order to deliver a property check against system behaviour via the runtime verifier AnaTempura.

The proposed approach, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), is intended to monitor parallel system architectures to ensure correctness properties. I consider in this approach concurrency forms, communication models, and execution modes of parallel systems under scrutiny. Additionally, this approach considers models for the management of resource allocation, delay and timeout agents to increase the robustness and reliability of the proposed framework in such cases.

The implementation of the proposed framework shows its comprehensibility and ability to model generic parallel systems architectures. The models of concurrency, communication, execution models enable it to deal realistically with varieties of parallel system architectures such as multi-core processor architecture, and Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI). The proposed framework allows systems to run either true concurrency or interleaving concurrency forms. Also, it allows systems to communicate via either shared-variable or message-passing models. The framework takes into consideration different execution modes such as Synchronous and Asynchronous. Assertion points mechanism allows systems to run globally or locally to exchange assertion data in order to check the desired properties at runtime to satisfy correctness criteria of the whole system. It also models resource allocation to manage the process of acquisition of shared resources and make them accessible systematically. Delay in the execution of a certain global resource within a given time causes a termination of the system holding the global

resource without updating it in order to deliver consistent resources.

A benchmark case study of cache controller was implemented to demonstrate robustness of the proposed framework. The cache controller is composed of three cores (processors), each core is intended to execute read/write operations to/from memory addresses which are requested to be made upon private L2 cache memory. The design of the cache controller system considers a realistic hardware design as modelled in hardware description language SystemVerilog [213]. The coherence protocol, namely, MSI is modelled and implemented to deliver consistency property of the cache memory and main memory. For simplification sake, I did not use a bus in the cache controller system. Alternatively, the snoopy cache coherence protocol is implemented to ensure that two processors that attempt to write to the same block at the same time are strictly ordered serially and atomically. This situation is called data race where only one processor wins the write operation. The concurrency form used for the cache controller case study is true concurrency which implies the application of mutual exclusion and subsequently lock-based solution to enforce the synchronisation property of the cache memory. However, the lock-based solution was not used because the coherence protocol MSI was used instead. In other words, such a protocol avoids the use of locks, which leads to delay and sometimes concurrency bugs such as deadlock and then termination of the execution. The MSI protocol has a mechanism to mark the modified shared resource, for instance, the cache block, as dirty cache block in case it has been modified and is inconsistent with other cache blocks or the corresponding main memory address. This mechanism allows the processor to continue its computation and avoid waiting until the shared resource gets unlocked which saves time and delivers consistency property.

The proposed model was randomly and independently evaluated using an external tool for this purpose in order to make the judgement upon the model unbiased. The external tool is MATLAB and for this sake, AnaTempura has been fully integrated with MATLAB. AnaTempura and MATLAB make a strongly homogeneous pair because they complements each other. Discussion, related work, and comparative analysis were presented in this PhD thesis.

## 7.2 Comparison with Related Work

A memory model of the proposed approach using a well-defined formalism Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) plays a major role in runtime verification of parallel programs because parallel programs need to systematically manage their access and use of shared resources in order to deliver consistent memory model and consequently global correctness properties satisfaction. In the related work in Chapter 2, Framing Variable and Transactional Memory (TM) approaches have been discussed. These approaches tackle a drawback of the formalism framework of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) which is the absence of memory model. Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) has two kinds of variables which are static variable and state variable. The static variable does not change over time, whereas the state variable gets changed over time. The state variable has the flexibility to get updated in different states or over intervals, but the problem is that the state variable's value does not get inherited to the next states or over intervals; it becomes undefined.

Framing Variable is initiated by Hale [107] to overcome this shortcoming of the design of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) formalism framework [190]. Also, Duan [295, 78] investigated Framing Variable and subsequently Projection Temporal Logic (PTL) is introduced as an ITL extension. Moreover, Duan introduced a new executable subset of PTL, namely, Framed Tempura. Framed Tempura has new operators such as projection *prj*, synchronous communication *await*, and framing operator *frame*. However, framing variable has what is called framing problem where an explicit statement has to be made if a variable does not change, bearing in mind that the memory cell update is a very costly operation.

Alternatively, a *stable* operator is used to model a memory which is intended to stabilise a list at different states or over intervals. A list construction is more powerful than a state variable construction intended to be framed to model benchmarks memory model such as the case study, cache controller.

On the other hand, El-kustaban [82, 80] formalised Transactional Memory (TM) in Interval



Temporal Logic (ITL). However, there are still aspects that need to be imported to the provable abstract TM such as nested transactions and mechanisms of updating memory. The application of TM is limited and the debugging is difficult to place a breakpoint within the transaction. Transactional Memory (TM) has two major drawbacks which are space overhead and latency [68]. TM requires significant amounts of global and per-thread meta-data. Also, TM has high single-thread latency, usually two times compared to the lock-based technique.

The proposed approach adopts the lock-based technique although it is not been demonstrated in the case study of cache controller due to the involvement of cache coherence MSI Protocol. MSI protocol leaves a marker on modified shared cache block to indicate its state of coherence, to show whether it is consistent or inconsistent. Mutual Exclusion (Mutex) uses the lock-based technique; although it limits concurrency, it offers single-thread latency. Whereas, Transactional Memory (TM) has higher latency, it scales well [68].

### 7.3 Original Contribution

This PhD thesis develops a unified formal framework for the specification, verification, and implementation of Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF) using a single well-defined formalism, namely, Interval Temporal Logic (ITL). The proposed framework achieves:

- A general computational model for parallel computing architectures such as Multi-core, Java RMI. The framework fits any parallel computing architectures due to its comprehensibility and flexibility. It can be tailored according to the architecture design patterns.
- An executable version of the abstraction level of systems being implemented using Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF). A high-level (abstract) specification of a case study of cache controller is implemented using the framework PRVF in ITL. A low-level (concrete) design and implementation of the cache controller in Tempura/AnaTempura are delivered.

- A formal executable specification of the cache controller system associated with the cache coherence protocol (MSI) is delivered in addition to snoopy protocol. A formal specification and verification of complete realistic behaviour of processor, cache memory, main memory. A formal modelling and concrete implementation of correctness properties for the cache controller system.
- A general computational model for handling different concurrency forms, communication models, and execution modes of parallel computing systems. In addition to a formal model of resource allocation, delay and timeout agents.
- A general algorithmic description of (PRVF) in terms of handling all perspectives of parallelism mentioned above in addition to the delivery of local/global properties verification at local/global levels of the framework.

### 7.4 Success Criteria Revisited

In the introduction chapter, number of success criteria is set as a measurement for this research. These success criteria are revised at this stage of this research to make a judgement according to what has been met of these success criteria which are:

1. **Compositional requirements from several sources to handle local and global systems correctness:**

This criterion allows to specify and reason about global systems correctness of several parallel programs. The development of our framework considers the composition of high-level abstract specifications of parallel programs in order to deliver the correctness properties of global systems. This new feature is the basis of performing further verification of low-level concrete design and implementation of such programs (see Chapters 4, 5, 6).

2. **Compositional collection of assertion data from several sources to handle True/Interleaving Concurrency associated with Shared-Variable approach:**

Parallel programs run in either True/Interleaving concurrency associated with Shared-Variable communication model which have the ability to send and receive assertion data from several sources to verify local/global correctness properties (see Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6).

**3. Compositional collection of assertion data from several sources to handle Synchronous/Asynchronous Communication links Channels/Shunts associated with Message-Passing approach:**

Parallel programs running in either Synchronous/Asynchronous execution modes associated with Message-Passing communication model have the ability to send and receive assertion data from several sources to verify local/global correctness properties. Synchronous communication links use a construct, namely, *Channels*, while Asynchronous communication links use the construct, namely, *Shunts* (see Chapter 3).

**4. The ability to execute agents concurrently and the introduction of resource allocation agents, and Delay and Timeout agents to model delay and timeout behaviour:**

The management of resource allocation, delay and timeout agents play a major role in increasing the robustness and reliability of the framework in such cases. Agents running in parallel need to be coordinated when they access shared resources. Moreover, timing is modelled to increase performance of such monitoring systems and to avoid deadlock situation in case agents do not respond timely (see Chapter 3).

**5. The use of lock-based technique to enforce Mutual Exclusion to deliver synchronisation:**

The Shared-Variable based approach needs the synchronisation mechanism to deliver consistent and reliable resources which are shared by many parallel programs. Mutual Exclusion is applied via the use of lock-based solution upon such cases. The lock-based solution affects the performance of such programs but endorses the correctness of global properties

of parallel programs (see Chapters 3, 4).

**6. Checking correctness property of local systems at local/global levels. The inference of the correctness of global property from the correctness of a set of local properties of global systems:**

Local systems can check their correctness properties locally at the local level (local verification & assertion phase) concurrently. The Framework allows such systems to perform this kind of correctness properties locally. Once local verification are made, the global verification phase at the global level collects all local correctness properties to form a global correctness property out of the local ones (see Chapters 3, 5, 6).

### 7.5 Limitations

The proposed computational model, Parallel Runtime Verification Framework (PRVF), has the following limitations:

- The decomposition paradigm allows breaking down the complex large systems into small groups accordingly in order to manage and coordinate their computation. The application of decomposition paradigm in this approach helps to model the correctness property of global properties. Guidelines for the mechanism of the decomposition of global properties would be helpful to a systematic understanding of the construction of such correctness properties.
- The proposed framework can not deal with the verification of parallel programs that run on several hosts. Multiple hosts have different environments which might infer the correctness of such programs and consequently harden the verification task. Programs being run in different hosts are subjected to different assumptions and commitments about the environments of those hosts.

- As a consequent of the previous limitation, the proposed model of the monitoring system in this research can only deal with programs that run on the same host. The assumptions and commitments about the environment of that host are identical; therefore, the verification task of the delivery of correctness properties is conveniently performed.

## 7.6 Future Work

Bob Floyd [93] and Tony Hoare [118] introduced *pre*- and *post*-conditions, what is so called Hoare triple or logic, to verify systems at this level of abstraction. System  $S$  satisfies a specification formulated as predicate pair of *precondition*  $P$  and *postcondition*  $R$ . Precondition  $P$  states the assumptions made of system  $S$  before the system gets executed, whereas, Postcondition  $R$  states the commitment which should be met after the execution of the system.

$$\{ P \} S \{ R \}$$

As a consequence of Hoare's Logic [118], the Assumption/Commitment style is developed to verify a set of properties of interest such as Cau and Collette in [45], Moszkowski in [195], and Zedan et al in [297]. Moszkowski [195] is the first to introduce Hoare's logic to Interval Temporal Logic (ITL). Hoare's logic's clause can be expressed in ITL as follows:

$$\vdash \omega \wedge Sys \supset fin \omega'$$

where  $\omega$  and  $\omega'$  are state formulas have no temporal operators,  $Sys$  is some arbitrary temporal formula, and  $fin \omega'$  is true on an interval iff  $\omega'$  is true in the interval's final state. Moszkowski [195] addressed a drawback of *pre*- and *post*-condition approach which is the unsuitability for the specification and verification of continuous and parallel systems. Moszkowski claims the remedy of *pre*- and *post*-condition approach via the introduction of the Assumption/Commitment approach. According to Moszkowski [195], the first consideration of the latter approach is credited to Francez and Pnueli [95]. The expression of Assumption/Commitment in ITL is as follows:

$$\vdash \omega \wedge As \wedge Sys \supset Co \wedge fin \omega'$$

where:

$\omega$ : state formula about initial state,

$As$ : assumption about overall interval,

$Sys$ : the system under consideration,

$Co$ : commitment about overall interval,

$\omega'$ : state formula about final state.

According to Zhou [299], when compositional reasoning about systems run in parallel  $Sys_1$  and  $Sys_2$ , the composition can be modelled in Assumption/Commitment style as follows:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \vdash \omega_1 \wedge As_1 \wedge & Sys_1 & \supset Co_1 \wedge fin \omega'_1 \\ \vdash \omega_2 \wedge As_2 \wedge & Sys_2 & \supset Co_2 \wedge fin \omega'_2 \\ \hline \vdash \omega \wedge As \wedge (Sys_1 \parallel Sys_2) \supset Co \wedge fin \omega' \end{array}$$

where:

$$\vdash \omega \subset \omega_1 \wedge \omega_2$$

$$\vdash As \vee Co_1 \subset As_2$$

$$\vdash As \vee Co_2 \subset As_1$$

$$\vdash Co_1 \vee Co_2 \subset Co$$

$$\vdash fin \omega'_1 \wedge fin \omega'_2 \subset fin \omega'$$

This kind of compositional reasoning about correctness properties enables monitoring system at a high-level (abstraction), such as PRVF, to deal with parallel programs running on several hosts. To transform these specifications expressed in Assumption/Commitment style into a low-level (implementation), an executable version is needed. Transforming these specifications into an executable version is intended in the future.

The transformation of Assumption/Commitment from a high-level into a low-level shifts the proposed framework towards monitoring programs running in different hosts because the availability of modelling and execution of different environments might exist.

### **7.7 Future Impact**

#### **7.7.1 Academic**

The development of runtime verification benchmarks that include parallel systems is a promising research topic due to the evolutionary shift in manufacturing multi-core architectures and the wide adoption of such architectures. Modern computers use multi-core processor architectures at the hardware/software levels in their design. Therefore, the performance and correctness of such applications are vital for daily life. The continuity of such research topic is commercially profitable and academically promising.

#### **7.7.2 Industrial**

The emergence of simulation based verification and validation techniques such as virtual commissioning is a sudden shift solution for testing automation systems even in the absence of the process that is subjected to control. The Distributed Control Systems (DCS) which are intended to control industrial processes might involve thousands of instruments, actuators and controllers running in parallel to boost performance and save time. These giant control systems are complex and rely on actuators and sensors. The probability of failures is high in harsh industrial environments due to the possibility of malfunctions and defects in actuators, sensors, or process equipment. According to OREDA, 92% of automated control and safety malfunctions of 10 international petroleum groups encountered are due to sensor or actuator malfunctions. This kind of defects of sensors and actuators implies the introduction of a failure-tolerant design to overcome this vulnerability of control systems. The shut down of any process in the field due to sensors or actuators failures might cause significant waste of materials and work hours which

lead to profitability reduction. The lost in annual revenue in the United States caused by sensors and actuators malfunctions alone is tens of billion dollars [230].

The development of runtime verification benchmarks that include parallel control systems consider failure-tolerant design to avoid shutting down processes in the field due to sensors or actuators failures which cause catastrophic losses in annual revenues of industrials. Savolainen et al. [230] propose a runtime verification framework using plant simulation models created during the plant design process. The verification technique used in [230] is able to cover control software errors, sensors and actuators errors. However, I believe the development of parallel runtime verification framework is vital due to concurrency forms, communication models, and execution modes perspectives. Their importance to deliver correctness properties for such control systems which involve thousands of instruments, sensors, actuators which eventually run in parallel, access shared resources, and executes differently.

Another industrial impact of the development of parallel runtime verification is the correctness property of hardware and software writing of parallel processing programs. As the number of cores is doubled every two years, programmers who are interested in increasing performance have to be parallel programmers. Manufacturing hardware and software for multi-core processor architectures that make the writing of correct parallel processing programs leads to efficiency in performance and power as the number of cores per chip scales geometrically. The development of parallel runtime verification framework for such industrial fields of multi-core systems is a sudden shift towards correctness and performance [213].



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## **Appendix A**

### **Appendix A: Simulations & Animation**



## APPENDIX A. APPENDIX A: SIMULATIONS & ANIMATION




Figure A.1: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECUTION IN TEMPURA AT STATE 0




Figure A.2: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULATION IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 0




Figure A.3: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 0

## APPENDIX A. APPENDIX A: SIMULATIONS & ANIMATION





Figure A.4: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECUTION IN TEMPURA AT STATE 1

Figure A.5: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULATION IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 1




Figure A.6: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 1

## APPENDIX A. APPENDIX A: SIMULATIONS & ANIMATION




Figure A.7: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECUTION IN TEMPURA AT STATE 2




Figure A.8: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULATION IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 2




Figure A.9: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 2

## APPENDIX A. APPENDIX A: SIMULATIONS & ANIMATION




Figure A.10: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECUTION IN TEMPURA AT STATE 3



Figure A.11: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULATION IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 3




Figure A.12: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 3

## APPENDIX A. APPENDIX A: SIMULATIONS & ANIMATION




Figure A.13: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECUTION IN TEMPURA AT STATE 4



Figure A.14: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULATION IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 4




Figure A.15: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 4




Figure A.17: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULATION  
IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 5





## APPENDIX A. APPENDIX A: SIMULATIONS & ANIMATION




Figure A.19: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECUTION IN TEMPURA AT STATE 6




Figure A.20: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULATION IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 6




Figure A.21: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 6





## APPENDIX A. APPENDIX A: SIMULATIONS & ANIMATION




Figure A.25: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECUTION IN TEMPURA AT STATE 8




Figure A.26: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULATION IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 8




Figure A.27: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 8

## APPENDIX A. APPENDIX A: SIMULATIONS & ANIMATION




Figure A.28: CACHE CONTROLLER EXECUTION IN TEMPURA AT STATE 9

Figure A.29: CACHE CONTROLLER SIMULATION IN ANATEMPURA AT STATE 9




Figure A.30: LOCAL STATES & PROPERTIES OF PROCESSORS 0, 1, 2 AT STATE 9

## **Appendix B**

### **Appendix B: Tempura Code for Cache Controller**

## Listing B.1: Tempura Code of Cache Controller

```
1  /* -*- Mode: C -*-
2  *
3  * L2_Cache_MSI_V1_5.t
4  *
5  * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
6  *
7  * Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Nayef H. Alshammari, Antonio Cau
8  *
9  * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with Tempura. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
21 *
22 */
23
24 define nprocessors = 3.
25 define nmemorylocations = 16.
26 define ncachelocations = 8.
27 define nlocations = 8. /* for Tag and Index */
28 define initial_value = -8.
29 define initial_value2 = -16.
30 define modified = 0.
31 define shared = 1.
32 define invalid = 2.
33
34
35
36 load "../library/conversion".
37 load "../library/expprog".
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
38 load "../library/tcl".
39
40 /* anatempura 0 */
41 /* anatempura 1 */
42 /* anatempura 2 */
43
44 /* tcl L2_Cache_MSI_v3 3*/
45
46
47
48 set print_states=true.
49 set break_is_abort=false.
50
51 define avar1(X,a) = {
52     X[a]
53 }.
54
55 define avail1(X,b) = {
56     X[b]
57 }.
58
59 define atime1(X,c) = {
60     strint(X[c])
61 }.
62
63 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {
64     strint(X[d])
65 }.
66
67 define prog_send2(A,X) = {
68     format("!E: prog%s %s\n",ctype(A),parstr([X]))
69 }.
70
71 define prog_send_nel(A,X) = {
72     empty and format("!E: prog%s %s\n",ctype(A),parstr([X]))
73 }.
74
75 /* 2^0 to 2^127 */
76 define bits=[1,2,4,8,16,32,64,128,256,512,1024,2048,
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
77 4096,8192,16384,32768,65536,131072,262144,
78 524288,1048576,2097152,4194304,8388608,
79 16777216,33554432,67108864,134217728,
80 268435456,536870912,1073741824,2147483648].
81
82 define bit (Bitno, Number)= {( (Number div bits[Bitno]) mod 2 = 1)}.
83
84
85
86 define inttobitslist_msb(X) = {
87   [bit(31,X),bit(30,X),bit(29,X),bit(28,X),
88    bit(27,X),bit(26,X),bit(25,X),bit(24,X),
89    bit(23,X),bit(22,X),bit(21,X),bit(20,X),
90    bit(19,X),bit(18,X),bit(17,X),bit(16,X),
91    bit(15,X),bit(14,X),bit(13,X),bit(12,X),
92    bit(11,X),bit(10,X),bit(9,X),bit(8,X),
93    bit(7,X),bit(6,X),bit(5,X),bit(4,X),
94    bit(3,X),bit(2,X),bit(1,X),bit(0,X)]
95 }.
96 define single_bit(X) = {
97   exists i: {
98     skip and for (i<32) do {
99       (if bit(i,X) then "1" else "0")
100    }
101  }
102 }.
103
104 define msb32_2(Y,X) = {
105   (if bit(Y,X) then "1" else "0")
106 }.
107
108 define msb_16_index(X) = {
109   (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
110   (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
111   (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
112   (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
113 }.
114
115 define msb_8_index(X) = {
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
116 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
117 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
118 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
119 }.
120 define msb_14_index(X) = {
121 (if bit(13,X) then "1" else "0") +
122 (if bit(12,X) then "1" else "0") +
123 (if bit(11,X) then "1" else "0") +
124 (if bit(10,X) then "1" else "0") +
125 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
126 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
127 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
128 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
129 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
130 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
131 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
132 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
133 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
134 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
135 }.
136 define msb_7bits_addr(X) = {
137 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
138 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
139 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
140 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
141 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
142 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
143 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
144 }.
145 define msb(X) = {
146 (if bit(31,X) then "1" else "0") +
147 (if bit(30,X) then "1" else "0") +
148 (if bit(29,X) then "1" else "0") +
149 (if bit(28,X) then "1" else "0") +
150 (if bit(27,X) then "1" else "0") +
151 (if bit(26,X) then "1" else "0") +
152 (if bit(25,X) then "1" else "0") +
153 (if bit(24,X) then "1" else "0") +
154 (if bit(23,X) then "1" else "0") +
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
155 (if bit(22,X) then "1" else "0") +
156 (if bit(21,X) then "1" else "0") +
157 (if bit(20,X) then "1" else "0") +
158 (if bit(19,X) then "1" else "0") +
159 (if bit(18,X) then "1" else "0") +
160 (if bit(17,X) then "1" else "0") +
161 (if bit(16,X) then "1" else "0") +
162 (if bit(15,X) then "1" else "0") +
163 (if bit(14,X) then "1" else "0") +
164 (if bit(13,X) then "1" else "0") +
165 (if bit(12,X) then "1" else "0") +
166 (if bit(11,X) then "1" else "0") +
167 (if bit(10,X) then "1" else "0") +
168 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
169 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
170 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
171 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
172 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
173 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
174 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
175 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
176 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
177 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
178 }.
179
180 define tag_field_cache(X) = {
181 (if bit(31,X) then "1" else "0") +
182 (if bit(30,X) then "1" else "0") +
183 (if bit(29,X) then "1" else "0") +
184 (if bit(28,X) then "1" else "0") +
185 (if bit(27,X) then "1" else "0") +
186 (if bit(26,X) then "1" else "0") +
187 (if bit(25,X) then "1" else "0") +
188 (if bit(24,X) then "1" else "0") +
189 (if bit(23,X) then "1" else "0") +
190 (if bit(22,X) then "1" else "0") +
191 (if bit(21,X) then "1" else "0") +
192 (if bit(20,X) then "1" else "0") +
193 (if bit(19,X) then "1" else "0") +
```



## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
194 (if bit(18,X) then "1" else "0") +
195 (if bit(17,X) then "1" else "0") +
196 (if bit(16,X) then "1" else "0") +
197 (if bit(15,X) then "1" else "0") +
198 (if bit(14,X) then "1" else "0") +
199 (if bit(13,X) then "1" else "0") +
200 (if bit(12,X) then "1" else "0") +
201 (if bit(11,X) then "1" else "0") +
202 (if bit(10,X) then "1" else "0") +
203 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
204 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
205 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
206 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
207 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
208 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
209 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0")
210 }.
211
212 define index_field_cache_8(X) = {
213 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
214 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
215 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
216 }.
217
218 define index_field_cache(X) = {
219 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
220 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
221 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
222 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
223 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
224 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
225 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
226 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
227 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
228 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
229 }.
230
231 define tag_field_memory(X) = {
232 (if bit(31,X) then "1" else "0") +
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
233 (if bit(30,X) then "1" else "0") +
234 (if bit(29,X) then "1" else "0") +
235 (if bit(28,X) then "1" else "0") +
236 (if bit(27,X) then "1" else "0") +
237 (if bit(26,X) then "1" else "0") +
238 (if bit(25,X) then "1" else "0") +
239 (if bit(24,X) then "1" else "0") +
240 (if bit(23,X) then "1" else "0") +
241 (if bit(22,X) then "1" else "0") +
242 (if bit(21,X) then "1" else "0") +
243 (if bit(20,X) then "1" else "0") +
244 (if bit(19,X) then "1" else "0") +
245 (if bit(18,X) then "1" else "0") +
246 (if bit(17,X) then "1" else "0") +
247 (if bit(16,X) then "1" else "0") +
248 (if bit(15,X) then "1" else "0") +
249 (if bit(14,X) then "1" else "0") +
250 (if bit(13,X) then "1" else "0") +
251 (if bit(12,X) then "1" else "0") +
252 (if bit(11,X) then "1" else "0")
253
254 }.
255
256 define index_field_memory_16(X) = {
257 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
258 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
259 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
260 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
261 }.
262
263 define index_field_memory(X) = {
264 (if bit(10,X) then "1" else "0") +
265 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
266 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
267 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
268 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
269 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
270 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
271 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
272 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
273 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
274 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
275 }.
276
277 define data_field(X) = {
278 (if bit(31,X) then "1" else "0") +
279 (if bit(30,X) then "1" else "0") +
280 (if bit(29,X) then "1" else "0") +
281 (if bit(28,X) then "1" else "0") +
282 (if bit(27,X) then "1" else "0") +
283 (if bit(26,X) then "1" else "0") +
284 (if bit(25,X) then "1" else "0") +
285 (if bit(24,X) then "1" else "0") +
286 (if bit(23,X) then "1" else "0") +
287 (if bit(22,X) then "1" else "0") +
288 (if bit(21,X) then "1" else "0") +
289 (if bit(20,X) then "1" else "0") +
290 (if bit(19,X) then "1" else "0") +
291 (if bit(18,X) then "1" else "0") +
292 (if bit(17,X) then "1" else "0") +
293 (if bit(16,X) then "1" else "0") +
294 (if bit(15,X) then "1" else "0") +
295 (if bit(14,X) then "1" else "0") +
296 (if bit(13,X) then "1" else "0") +
297 (if bit(12,X) then "1" else "0") +
298 (if bit(11,X) then "1" else "0") +
299 (if bit(10,X) then "1" else "0") +
300 (if bit(9,X) then "1" else "0") +
301 (if bit(8,X) then "1" else "0") +
302 (if bit(7,X) then "1" else "0") +
303 (if bit(6,X) then "1" else "0") +
304 (if bit(5,X) then "1" else "0") +
305 (if bit(4,X) then "1" else "0") +
306 (if bit(3,X) then "1" else "0") +
307 (if bit(2,X) then "1" else "0") +
308 (if bit(1,X) then "1" else "0") +
309 (if bit(0,X) then "1" else "0")
310 }.
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
311
312 define update_msi(i,B,L2CacheState,v) =
313 {
314   (forall j<ncachelocations :
315     if j=B then { L2CacheState[i][j]:=v }
316     else { stable(L2CacheState[i][j]) }
317   )
318 }.
319
320 define cs_text(V) = {
321   if V=modified then "Modified"
322   else if V=shared then "Shared"
323   else if V=invalid then "Invalid"
324   else "Error"
325 }.
326
327 define cpu_request(MainMemory,L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,L2CacheState,
328 Vbit,Dbit,x,RW,ADDR,DATA,j,Tick) = {
329   exists y,z,indexc, indexm, tag, datam, csx, csy, csz, tagx, tagy, tagz, datax, datay, dataz,
330   stringx, stringy, stringz,tmpwb, vbitx,vbity,vbitz, nvbitx,nvbity,nvbitz, ncsx, ncsy, ncsz,
331   dbitx,dbity,dbitz,ndbitx,ndbity,ndbitz,ntagx,ntagy,ntagz,Sx,Sy,Sz,S,
332   cmx, cmy, cmz, ncmx, ncmy, ncmz, mm, nmm : {
333     y = (x+1) mod nprocessors and
334     z = (x+2) mod nprocessors and
335     indexc = ADDR mod ncachelocations and
336     indexm = ADDR mod nmemorylocations and
337     tag = ADDR div ncachelocations and
338     csx = L2CacheState[x][indexc] and
339     csy = L2CacheState[y][indexc] and
340     csz = L2CacheState[z][indexc] and
341     ncsx = next(L2CacheState[x][indexc]) and
342     ncsy = next(L2CacheState[y][indexc]) and
343     ncsz = next(L2CacheState[z][indexc]) and
344     tagx = L2CacheTag[x][indexc] and
345     tagy = L2CacheTag[y][indexc] and
346     tagz = L2CacheTag[z][indexc] and
347     ntagx = next(L2CacheTag[x][indexc]) and
348     ntagy = next(L2CacheTag[y][indexc]) and
349     ntagz = next(L2CacheTag[z][indexc]) and
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
350
351
352 skip and
353
354 /*stringy = " " and
355 stringz = " " and*/
356 /*format("Processor %t, Cache is %t \n",x,cs_text(csx)) and
357 format("Processor %t, Cache is %t \n",z,cs_text(csz)) and
358 format("Processor %t, Cache is %t \n",y,cs_text(csy)) and*/
359 vbitx = {if csx = shared or csx = modified then 1 else 0} and
360 vbity = {if csy = shared or csy = modified then 1 else 0} and
361 vbitz = {if csz = shared or csz = modified then 1 else 0} and
362 nvbitx = {if ncsx = shared or ncsx = modified then 1 else 0} and
363 nvbity = {if ncsy = shared or ncsy = modified then 1 else 0} and
364 nvbitz = {if ncsz = shared or ncsz = modified then 1 else 0} and
365
366 dbitx = {if csx = modified then 1 else 0} and
367 dbity = {if csy = modified then 1 else 0} and
368 dbitz = {if csz = modified then 1 else 0} and
369 ndbitx = {if ncsx = modified then 1 else 0} and
370 ndbity = {if ncsy = modified then 1 else 0} and
371 ndbitz = {if ncsz = modified then 1 else 0} and
372
373
374 if RW = 0 then { /* read */
375 stringx = {if tag = tagx and (csx = shared or csx = modified) then "Read Hit" else "Read ...
Miss"} and
376 stringy = {if tag = tagy and (csy = shared or csy = modified) then "Read Hit" else "Read ...
Miss"} and
377 stringz = {if tag = tagz and (csz = shared or csz = modified) then "Read Hit" else "Read ...
Miss"} and
378 if tag = tagx then {
379 /* read hit cache x */
380 if csx = shared or csx = modified then {
381 /* normal hit */
382 /*stringx = "Read hit" and*/
383 format("State %d: Processor %t getting data from Cache[%t]\n", j, x, indexc) and
384 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
385 DATA = L2CacheMemory[x][indexc] and
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
386 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x) and
387 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
388 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
389 /*stringy = " " and*/
390 /*stringz = " " and*/
391 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, csx) and
392 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, csy) and
393 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, csz)
394 } else { /* cache line x invalid */
395 /*stringx = "Read miss" and*/
396 if csy = invalid and csz = invalid then {
397 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
398 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
399 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
400 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
401 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
402 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
403 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
404 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
405 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
406 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
407 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
408 } else if csy = invalid and csz = modified then {
409 if tag = tagz then { /* read hit in cache z */
410 /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
411 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
412 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and
413 DATA = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
414 write_to_memory(MainMemory, x, indexm, DATA, Tick) and
415 format("State %d: Coherence step for processor %t\n", j, z) and
416 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
417 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
418 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
419 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
420 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
421 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
422 } else { /* read miss in cache z */
423 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
424 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
425 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
426 tmpwb = 8*tagz+indexc and
427 dataz = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
428 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
429 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, z, indexc, tagz, dataz, tmpwb) and
430 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
431 write_to_memory(MainMemory,z, tmpwb, dataz, Tick) and
432 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
433 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
434 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
435 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
436 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
437 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
438 }
439 } else if csy = modified and csz = invalid then {
440 if tag = tagy then { /* read hit in cache y */
441 /*stringy = "Read hit" and*/
442 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
443 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and
444 DATA = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
445 write_to_memory(MainMemory,x,indexm,DATA,Tick) and
446 format("State %d: Coherence step for processor %t\n", j, y) and
447 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
448 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
449 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
450 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
451 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
452 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
453 } else { /* read miss in cache y */
454 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
455 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
456 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
457 tmpwb = 8*tagy+indexc and
458 datay = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
459 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and data %t
460 to memory[%t] \n", j, y, indexc, tagy, datay, tmpwb) and
461 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
462 write_to_memory(MainMemory,y, tmpwb, datay, Tick) and
463 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
464 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
465 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
466 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
467 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
468 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
469 }
470 } else if csy = shared then {
471   if tag = tagy then { /* read hit in cache y */
472     /*stringy = "Read hit" and*/
473     /*stringz = " " and*/
474     format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and
475     DATA = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
476     memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
477     write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
478     cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
479     cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
480     update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
481     update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, csz) and
482     update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
483   } else { /* read miss in cache y */
484     /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
485     if csz = shared then {
486       if tag = tagz then { /* read hit in cache z */
487         /*stringz = "Read hit " and*/
488         format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and
489         DATA = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
490         memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
491         write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
492         cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
493         cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
494         update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
495         update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
496         update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
497       } else { /* read miss in cache z */
498         /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
499         format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
500         DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
501         write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
502         cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
```



## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
503 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
504 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
505 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
506 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
507 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
508 }
509 } else {
510 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
511 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
512 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
513 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
514 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
515 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
516 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
517 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
518 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
519 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
520 }
521 }
522 } else {
523 if csz = shared then {
524 if tag = tagz then { /* read hit in cache z */
525 /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
526 /*stringy = " " and*/
527 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and
528 DATA = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
529 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
530 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
531 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
532 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
533 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
534 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
535 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
536 } else { /* read miss in cache z */
537 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
538 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
539 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
540 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
541 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
542 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
543 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
544 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
545 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
546 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
547 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
548 }
549 } else {
550 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
551 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
552 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
553 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
554 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
555 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
556 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
557 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
558 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
559 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
560 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
561 }
562 }
563 }
564 } else { /* read miss tag ≠ tagx */
565 /*stringx = "Read miss" and*/
566 if csx = invalid then { /* cache line x is invalid */
567 if csy = invalid and csz = invalid then {
568 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
569 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
570 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
571 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
572 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
573 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
574 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
575 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
576 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
577 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
578 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
579 } else if csy = invalid and csz = modified then {
580 if tag = tagz then { /* read Hit in cache z */
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
581  /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
582  /*stringy = " " and*/
583  format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and
584  DATA = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
585  write_to_memory(MainMemory,x,indexm,DATA,Tick) and
586  format("State %d: Coherence step for processor %t\n", j, z) and
587  write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,x,indexc,DATA,tag,j) and
588  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,y) and
589  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,z) and
590  update_msi(x,indexc,L2CacheState,shared) and
591  update_msi(y,indexc,L2CacheState,invalid) and
592  update_msi(z,indexc,L2CacheState,shared)
593  } else { /* read miss in cache z */
594  /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
595  /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
596  format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
597  tmpwb = 8*tagz+indexc and
598  dataz = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
599  format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
600  data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, z, indexc, tagz, dataz, tmpwb) and
601  DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
602  write_to_memory(MainMemory,z, tmpwb, dataz,Tick) and
603  write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,x,indexc,DATA,tag,j) and
604  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,y) and
605  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,z) and
606  update_msi(x,indexc,L2CacheState,shared) and
607  update_msi(y,indexc,L2CacheState,invalid) and
608  update_msi(z,indexc,L2CacheState,invalid)
609  }
610  } else if csy = modified and csz = invalid then {
611  if tag = tagy then { /* read Hit in cache y */
612  /*stringy = "Read hit" and*/
613  /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
614  format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and
615  DATA = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
616  format("State %d: Coherence step for processor %t\n", j, y) and
617  write_to_memory(MainMemory,x,indexm,DATA,Tick) and
618  write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,x,indexc,DATA,tag,j) and
619  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,y) and
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
620 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
621 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
622 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
623 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
624 } else { /* read Miss in cache y */
625 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
626 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
627 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
628 tmpwb = 8*tagy+indexc and
629 datay = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
630 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
631 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, y, indexc, tagy, datay, tmpwb) and
632 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
633 write_to_memory(MainMemory, y, tmpwb, datay, Tick) and
634 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
635 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
636 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
637 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
638 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
639 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
640 }
641 } else if csy = shared then {
642 if tag = tagy then { /* read hit in cache y */
643 /*stringy = " Read hit" and*/
644 /*stringz = " " and*/
645 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and
646 DATA = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
647 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
648 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
649 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
650 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
651 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
652 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, csz) and
653 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
654 } else { /* read miss in cache y */
655 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
656 if csz = shared then {
657 if tag = tagz then { /* read hit in cache z */
658 /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
659 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and
660 DATA = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
661 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
662 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
663 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
664 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
665 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
666 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
667 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
668 } else { /* read miss in cache z */
669 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
670 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
671 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
672 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
673 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
674 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
675 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
676 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
677 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
678 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
679 }
680 } else {
681 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
682 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
683 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
684 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
685 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
686 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
687 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
688 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
689 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
690 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
691 }
692 }
693 } else {
694 if csz = shared then {
695 if tag = tagz then { /* read hit in cache z */
696 /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
697 /*stringy = " " and*/
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
698 format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and
699 DATA = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
700 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
701 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
702 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
703 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
704 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
705 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
706 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
707 } else { /* read miss in cache z */
708 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
709 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
710 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
711 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
712 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
713 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
714 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
715 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
716 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
717 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
718 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
719 }
720 } else {
721 /*stringy = "Read miss" and*/
722 /*stringz = "Read miss" and*/
723 format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
724 DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
725 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
726 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
727 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
728 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
729 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
730 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
731 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid)
732 }
733 }
734 } else if csx = shared then { /* cache line x is shared */
735 if csz = shared and tagz = tag then { /* cache line z is shared and
736 a read hit on cache line z */
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
737  /*stringz = "Read hit" and*/
738  /*stringy = " " and*/
739  format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, z) and
740  DATA = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
741  memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
742  write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
743  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
744  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
745  update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
746  update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, csy) and
747  update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
748  } else { /* cache line z is not shared or a read miss on cache line z */
749  /*if tagz ≠ tag then { stringz = "Read miss" } else { stringz = " " } and*/
750  if csy = shared and tagy = tag then { /* cache line y is shared and
751  a read hit on cache line y */
752  /*stringy = "Read hit" and*/
753  format("State %d: Getting data from Cache of processor %t \n", j, y) and
754  DATA = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
755  memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
756  write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
757  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
758  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
759  update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
760  update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, csz) and
761  update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, shared)
762  } else { /* cache line y is not shared or a read miss on cache line y */
763  /*if tagy ≠ tag then { stringy = "Read miss" } else { stringy = " " } and*/
764  format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
765  DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
766  write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
767  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
768  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
769  memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
770  update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
771  update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, csy) and
772  update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, csz)
773  }
774  }
775  } else { /* cache line x is modified, write-back */
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
776  /*stringy = " " and*/
777  /*stringz = " " and*/
778  format("State %d: Getting data from global memory\n", j) and
779  DATA = MainMemory[indexm] and
780  tmpwb = 8*tagx+indexc and
781  datax = L2CacheMemory[x][indexc] and
782  format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t
783  and data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, x, indexc, tagx, datax, tmpwb) and
784  write_to_memory(MainMemory,x, tmpwb, datax, Tick) and
785  write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
786  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
787  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
788  update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, shared) and
789  update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, csy) and
790  update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, csz)
791  }
792  }
793  } else { /* write */
794  stringx = {if tag = tagx then "Write Hit" else "Write Miss"} and
795  stringy = {if tag = tagy then "Write Hit" else "Write Miss"} and
796  stringz = {if tag = tagz then "Write Hit" else "Write Miss"} and
797  if tag = tagx then { /* write hit cache x */
798  /*stringx = "Write hit" and */
799  if csx = modified then {
800  /*stringy = " " and*/
801  /*stringz = " " and*/
802  write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
803  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
804  cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
805  memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
806  update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, csy) and
807  update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, csz) and
808  update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, modified)
809  } else if csx = invalid then {
810  write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
811  update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, modified) and
812  if csy = modified and tagy  $\neq$  tag then {
813  /*stringy = "Write miss" and*/
814  /*stringz = " " and*/
```



## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
815 datay = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
816 tmpwb = 8*tagy+indexc and
817 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
818 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, y, indexc, tagy, datay, tmpwb) and
819 write_to_memory(MainMemory,y, tmpwb, datay, Tick)
820 } else {
821 stringy = " " and
822 if csz = modified and tagz ≠ tag then {
823 /*stringz = "Write miss" and*/
824 dataz = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
825 tmpwb = 8*tagz+indexc and
826 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
827 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, z, indexc, tagz, dataz, tmpwb) and
828 write_to_memory(MainMemory,z, tmpwb, dataz, Tick)
829 } else {
830 /*stringz = " " and*/
831 memory_unchanged(MainMemory)
832 }
833 } and
834 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
835 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
836 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
837 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z)
838 } else {
839 /*stringy = " " and*/
840 /*stringz = " " and*/
841 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
842 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, modified) and
843 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
844 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
845 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
846 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
847 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z)
848 }
849 } else { /* write miss cache x */
850 /*stringx = "write miss" and*/
851 if csx = modified then {
852 /*stringy = " " and*/
853 /*stringz = " " and*/
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
854 datax = L2CacheMemory[x][indexc] and
855 tmpwb = 8*tagx+indexc and
856 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
857 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, x, indexc, tagx, datax, tmpwb) and
858 write_to_memory(MainMemory,x, tmpwb, datax, Tick) and
859 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
860 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
861 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z) and
862 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, csy) and
863 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, csz) and
864 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, modified)
865 } else if csx = invalid then {
866 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
867 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, modified) and
868 if csy = modified and tagy ≠ tag then {
869 /*stringy = "Write miss" and*/
870 /*stringz = " " and*/
871 datay = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc] and
872 tmpwb = 8*tagy+indexc and
873 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
874 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, y, indexc, tagy, datay, tmpwb) and
875 write_to_memory(MainMemory,y, tmpwb, datay, Tick)
876
877 } else {
878 /*stringy = " " and*/
879 if csz = modified and tagz ≠ tag then {
880 /*stringz = "Write miss" and*/
881 dataz = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc] and
882 tmpwb = 8*tagz+indexc and
883 format("State %d: Processor %t, write-back cache[%t] with tag %t and
884 data %t to memory[%t] \n", j, z, indexc, tagz, dataz, tmpwb) and
885 write_to_memory(MainMemory,z, tmpwb, dataz, Tick)
886
887 } else {
888 /*stringz = " " and*/
889 memory_unchanged(MainMemory)
890 }
891 } and
892 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
893 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
894 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
895 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z)
896 } else {
897 /*stringy = " " and*/
898 /*stringz = " " and*/
899 write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, x, indexc, DATA, tag, j) and
900 update_msi(x, indexc, L2CacheState, modified) and
901 memory_unchanged(MainMemory) and
902 update_msi(y, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
903 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, y) and
904 update_msi(z, indexc, L2CacheState, invalid) and
905 cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, Vbit, z)
906 }
907 }
908 }
909 and
910 if RW = 0 then {
911 format("State %d: Global is receiving from Processor %d: a read request for Address: %d with
912 Data %d, Global State: %d\n", j, x, ADDR, DATA, Tick)
913 } else {
914 format("State %d: Global is receiving from Processor %d: a write request for Address: %d with
915 Data: %d, Global State: %d\n", j, x, ADDR, DATA, Tick)
916 }
917
918 and cmx = L2CacheMemory[x][indexc]
919 and cmy = L2CacheMemory[y][indexc]
920 and cmz = L2CacheMemory[z][indexc]
921 and ncmx = next(L2CacheMemory[x][indexc])
922 and ncmy = next(L2CacheMemory[y][indexc])
923 and ncmz = next(L2CacheMemory[z][indexc])
924 and mm = MainMemory[indexm]
925 and nmm = next(MainMemory[indexm])
926 and header_out() and
927
928 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] |
929 Memory[%7s] --->%4t | \n", x, x, RW, ADDR, msb_7bits_addr(ADDR), index_field_cache_8(indexc),
930 vbitx, dbitx, tagx, stringx, cmx, cs_text(csx), x, msb_7bits_addr(indexm), mm) and
931 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] |
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

```

932 Memory[%7s] --->%4t |\n",x,y,RW,ADDR,msb_7bits_addr(ADDR),index_field_cache_8(indexc),
933 vbity,dbity,tagy,stringy,cmx,cs_text(csy),y,msb_7bits_addr(indexm),mm) and
934 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] |
935 Memory[%7s] --->%4t |\n",x,z,RW,ADDR,msb_7bits_addr(ADDR),index_field_cache_8(indexc),
936 vbitz,dbitz,tagz,stringz,cmz,cs_text(csz),
937 z,msb_7bits_addr(indexm),mm) and
938
939 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | | %3t | %10s[%1d] |
940 Memory[%7s] ---> %4t |\n",x,x,RW,ADDR,msb_7bits_addr(ADDR),index_field_cache_8(indexc),
941 nvbitx,ndbitx,ntagx,ncmx,cs_text(ncsx),x,msb_7bits_addr(indexm),nmm) and
942 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | | %3t | %10s[%1d] |
943 Memory[%7s] ---> %4t |\n",x,y,RW,ADDR,msb_7bits_addr(ADDR),index_field_cache_8(indexc),
944 nvbity,ndbity,ntagy,ncmy,cs_text(ncsy),y,msb_7bits_addr(indexm),nmm) and
945 format("| %2d(%1d) | %d | %4t| %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | | %3t | %10s[%1d] |
946 Memory[%7s] ---> %4t |\n",x,z,RW,ADDR,msb_7bits_addr(ADDR),index_field_cache_8(indexc),
947 nvbitz,ndbitz,ntagz,ncmz,cs_text(ncsz),z,msb_7bits_addr(indexm),nmm) and
948
949 tcl("HM", [x,y,z,stringx,stringy,stringz,indexc,j,nvbitx,ndbitx,ndbity,ndbitz,
950 DATA,Tick,nmm,ADDR,ADDR mod 16])
951 and Sx = "["+str(x)+","+str(RW)+","+str(ADDR)+","+
952 "\""+msb_7bits_addr(ADDR)+"\""+","+str("\n")+
953 index_field_cache_8(indexc)+"\""+","+str(vbitx)+","+str(nvbitx)+","+str(dbity)+
954 "+str(ndbitx)+","+str(tag)+","+str(tagx)+","+str(ntagx)+
955 "+str(stringx)+"\""+","+str(cmz)+","+str(ncmx)+","+str("\n")+
956 cs_text(csx)+"\""+","+str("\n")+cs_text(ncsx)+"\""+","+str("\n")+
957 msb_7bits_addr(indexm)+"\""+","+str(mm)+","+str(nmm)+"]" and /*output(Sx) and*/
958
959 Sy = "["+str(y)+","+str(RW)+","+str(ADDR)+","+
960 "\""+msb_7bits_addr(ADDR)+"\""+","+str("\n")+
961 index_field_cache_8(indexc)+"\""+","+str(vbity)+","+str(nvbity)+","+str(dbity)+
962 "+str(ndbity)+","+str(tag)+","+str(tagy)+","+str(ntagy)+
963 "+str(stringy)+"\""+","+str(cmy)+","+str(ncmy)+","+str("\n")+
964 cs_text(csy)+"\""+","+str("\n")+cs_text(ncsy)+"\""+","+str("\n")+
965 msb_7bits_addr(indexm)+"\""+","+str(mm)+","+str(nmm)+"]" and /*output(Sy) and*/
966
967 Sz = "["+str(z)+","+str(RW)+","+str(ADDR)+","+
968 "\""+msb_7bits_addr(ADDR)+"\""+","+str("\n")+
969 index_field_cache_8(indexc)+"\""+","+str(vbitz)+","+str(nvbitz)+","+str(dbitz)+
970 "+str(ndbitz)+","+str(tag)+","+str(tagz)+","+str(ntagz)+

```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
971 ", "+"\""+stringz+"\""+", "+str(cmz)+", "+str(ncmz)+", "+"\""+
972 cs_text(csz)+"\""+", "+"\""+cs_text(ncsz)+"\""+", "+"\""+
973 msb_7bits_addr(indexm)+"\""+", "+str(mm)+", "+str(nmm)+"]" and /*output(Sz) and*/
974
975 prog_send2(x, Sx+".") and prog_send2(y, Sy+".") and prog_send2(z, Sz+".") and
976 footer_out(ncsx) and if j<9 then {next(always break)} else skip and
977
978 header_property(ncsx) and
979 Invalid_State(cmx, ncmx, cmy, ncmy, cmz, ncmz, mm, nmm, x, y, z, ncsx, ncsy, ncsz) and
980 Shared_State(cmx, ncmx, cmy, ncmy, cmz, ncmz, mm, nmm, x, y, z, ncsx, ncsy, ncsz) and
981 Consistency_Property(ncmx, ncmy, ncmz, nmm, x, y, z, ncsx, ncsy, ncsz) and
982 MSI_Protocol(ncsx, ncsy, ncsz, x, y, z) and
983 Global_State_Consistency(x, y, z, j, Tick, ncsx, ncsy, ncsz) and
984 Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW, x, y, z, ADDR, tag, tagx, tagy, tagz, csx, csy, csz, stringx, stringy, stringz, ncsx)
985
986 }
987 }.
988 define Global_State_Consistency(x, y, z, j, Tick, ncsx, ncsy, ncsz) ={
989 skip and
990 if ncsx=shared or ncsx=modified or ncsx=invalid then {
991 if j=Tick then {
992 /*PID=strint(aval1(T,0)) and
993 RW = strint(aval1(T,1)) and
994 addr=strint(aval1(T,2)) and
995 datato = strint(aval1(T,3)) and
996 Tick=strint(aval1(T,4)) and */
997 footer_property_1(ncsx) and
998 format("| Global State Check | Global = %2d | Pass |\n", j) and
999 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n", x, Tick) and
1000 format("| Local State Check | Idle[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n", y, Tick) and
1001 format("| Local State Check | Idle[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n", z, Tick)
1002 } else {
1003 footer_property_1(ncsx) and
1004 format("| Global State Check | Global = %2d | Fail |\n", j) and
1005 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Fail |\n", x, Tick) and
1006 format("| Local State Check | Idle[%d] = %2d | Fail |\n", y, Tick) and
1007 format("| Local State Check | Idle[%d] = %2d | Fail |\n", z, Tick)
1008 }
1009 }
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1010 }.
1011 define Invalid_State(cmx,ncmx,cmy,ncmy,cmz,ncmz,mm,mmm,x,y,z,ncsx,ncsy,ncsz) = {
1012   skip and
1013   if ncsx=invalid then {
1014     if ncmx = -8 or (ncmx = nmm and ncsx ≠ shared and (ncmx ≠ ncmy or ncmx ≠ ncmz)) then {
1015       format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1016     } else {
1017       format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1018     }
1019   } else {
1020     format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1021   } and
1022   if ncsy=invalid then {
1023     if ncmy = -8 or (ncmy = nmm and ncsy ≠ shared and (ncmy ≠ ncmx or ncmy ≠ ncmz)) then {
1024       format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1025     } else {
1026       format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1027     }
1028   } else {
1029     format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n", cs_text(ncsy),y)
1030   } and
1031   if ncsz=invalid then {
1032     if ncmz = -8 or (ncmz = nmm and ncsz ≠ shared and (ncmz ≠ ncmy or ncmz ≠ ncmx)) then {
1033       format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z)
1034     } else {
1035       format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z)
1036     }
1037   } else {
1038     format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n", cs_text(ncsz),z)
1039   }
1040 }.
1041
1042 define Shared_State(cmx,ncmx,cmy,ncmy,cmz,ncmz,mm,mmm,x,y,z,ncsx,ncsy,ncsz) = {
1043   skip and
1044
1045   if ncsx=shared then {
1046     if ncmx = nmm or ncmx = ncmy and ncmx = ncmz and ncmx ≠ -8 then {
1047       format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1048     } else {
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1049 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1050 }
1051 } else {
1052 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n", cs_text(ncsx),x)
1053 } and
1054 if ncsy=shared then {
1055 if ncmx = nmm or ncmx = ncmx and ncmx = ncmz and ncmx ≠ -8 then {
1056 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1057 } else {
1058 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y)
1059 }
1060 } else {
1061 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n", cs_text(ncsy),y)
1062 } and
1063 if ncsz=shared then {
1064 if ncmz = nmm or ncmz = ncmx and ncmz = ncmx and ncmz ≠ -8 then {
1065 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z)
1066 } else {
1067 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z)
1068 }
1069 } else {
1070 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n", cs_text(ncsz),z)
1071 }
1072 }.
1073
1074 define Consistency_Property(ncmx,ncmy,ncmz,nmm,x,y,z,ncsx,ncsy,ncsz) = {
1075 skip and
1076 /* If the cache consistent with the main memory */
1077 if ncsx=shared then {
1078 if ncmx = nmm then {
1079 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1080 } else {
1081 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1082 }
1083 } else {
1084 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x)
1085 }
1086 and
1087 if ncsy= shared then {
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1088 if ncmy = nmm then {
1089   format(" | Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n", cs_text(ncsy), y)
1090 } else {
1091   format(" | Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n", cs_text(ncsy), y)
1092 }
1093 } else {
1094   format(" | Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n", cs_text(ncsy), y)
1095 }
1096 and
1097 if ncsz=shared then {
1098   if ncmz = nmm then {
1099     format(" | Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n", cs_text(ncsz), z)
1100   } else {
1101     format(" | Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n", cs_text(ncsz), z)
1102   }
1103 } else {
1104   format(" | Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n", cs_text(ncsz), z)
1105 }
1106 }.
1107
1108 define header_property(ncsx) = {
1109   if ncsx = shared or ncsx = modified or ncsx = invalid then {
1110     format("-----\n") and
1111     format(" | Property | PID | Result |\n") and
1112     format("-----\n")
1113   }
1114 }.
1115
1116 define footer_property_1(ncsx) = {
1117   if ncsx = shared or ncsx = modified or ncsx = invalid then {
1118     format("-----\n")
1119   }
1120 }.
1121
1122 define footer_property() = {
1123   format("-----\n")
1124 }.
1125
1126 define MSI_Protocol(ncsx, ncsy, ncsz, x, y, z) = {
```



## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```

1127 skip and
1128 /* Allowed MSI States */
1129 if (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = invalid) or
1130 (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = modified) or
1131 (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = shared) or
1132 (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = modified and ncsz = invalid) or
1133 (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = shared and ncsz = invalid) or
1134 (ncsx = invalid and ncsy = shared and ncsz = shared) or
1135 (ncsx = modified and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = invalid) or
1136 (ncsx = shared and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = invalid) or
1137 (ncsx = shared and ncsy = invalid and ncsz = shared) or
1138 (ncsx = shared and ncsy = shared and ncsz = invalid) or
1139 (ncsx = shared and ncsy = shared and ncsz = shared) then {
1140 footer_property() and
1141 format("| | %10s[%1d] | |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x) and
1142 format("| MSI Protocol Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y) and
1143 format("| | %10s[%1d] | |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z) /*and
1144 footer_property()*/
1145 } else {
1146 footer_property() and
1147 format("| | %10s[%1d] | |\n",cs_text(ncsx),x) and
1148 format("| MSI Protocol Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",cs_text(ncsy),y) and
1149 format("| | %10s[%1d] | |\n",cs_text(ncsz),z) /*and
1150 footer_property()*/
1151 }
1152 }.
1153 define Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW,x,y,z,ADDR,tag,tagx,tagy,tagz,
1154 csx,csy,csz,stringx,stringy,stringz,ncsx) =
1155 { exists Estring00,Estring01,Estring10,Estring11 : {
1156 skip and
1157 Estring00="Read Miss" and Estring01="Read Hit" and
1158 Estring10="Write Miss" and Estring11="Write Hit" and
1159 if ncsx=shared or ncsx=modified or ncsx=invalid then {
1160 if RW=0 then { /* RW=0 Read Check */
1161
1162 if tag ≠ tagx and (csx ≠ shared or csx ≠ modified) and
1163 tag ≠ tagy and (csy ≠ shared or csy ≠ modified) and
1164 tag ≠ tagz and (csz ≠ shared or csz ≠ modified) then {
1165 if stringx=Estring00 and stringy=Estring00 and stringz=Estring00 then {

```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1166 footer_property() and
1167 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1168 format(" | Read Miss Check | %12t[%d] | Pass |\n",stringy,y) and
1169 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1170 footer_property()
1171 } else {
1172 footer_property() and
1173 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1174 format(" | Read Miss Check | %12t[%d] | Fail |\n",stringy,y) and
1175 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1176 footer_property()
1177 }
1178 } else {
1179 if stringx=Estring01 or stringy=Estring01 or stringz=Estring01 then {
1180 footer_property() and
1181 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1182 format(" | Read Hit Check | %12t[%d] | Pass |\n",stringy,y) and
1183 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1184 footer_property()
1185 } else {
1186 footer_property() and
1187 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1188 format(" | Read Hit Check | %12t[%d] | Fail |\n",stringy,y) and
1189 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1190 footer_property()
1191 }
1192 }
1193 } else { /* RW=1 Write Check */
1194 if tag ≠ tagx and tag ≠ tagy and tag ≠ tagz then {
1195 if stringx=Estring10 and stringy=Estring10 and stringz=Estring10 then {
1196 footer_property() and
1197 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1198 format(" | Write Miss Check | %12t[%d] | Pass |\n",stringy,y) and
1199 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,y) and
1200 footer_property()
1201 } else {
1202 footer_property() and
1203 format(" | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1204 format(" | Write Miss Check | %12t[%d] | Fail |\n",stringy,y) and
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1205  format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1206  footer_property()
1207  }
1208  } else {
1209  if stringx=Estringl1 or stringy=Estringl1 or stringz=Estringl1 then {
1210  footer_property() and
1211  format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1212  format("| Write Hit Check | %12t[%d] | Pass |\n",stringy,y) and
1213  format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1214  footer_property()
1215  } else {
1216  footer_property() and
1217  format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringx,x) and
1218  format("| Write Hit Check | %12t[%d] | Fail |\n",stringy,y) and
1219  format("| | %12t[%d] | |\n",stringz,z) and
1220  footer_property()
1221  }
1222  }
1223  }
1224  }
1225  }
1226  }.
```

```
1227
1228  define write_to_cache(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,X,M,V,tag,j) = {
1229  skip and
1230  format("State %d: Processor %t writing to Cache[%t] value %t and tag %t\n",j,X,M,V,tag) and
1231  (forall i<nprocessors :
1232  (forall j<ncachelocations:
1233  if i=X and j=M then {
1234  if Vbit[i][j] = 1 then {stable(Vbit[i][j])}
1235  else {Vbit[i][j] := 1} and
1236  L2CacheTag[i][j] := tag and
1237  L2CacheMemory[i][j]:=V
1238  } else {
1239  stable(Vbit[i][j]) and
1240  stable(L2CacheTag[i][j]) and
1241  stable(L2CacheMemory[i][j])
1242  }
1243  )
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1244 )
1245 } .
1246
1247 define write_to_memory(MainMemory,X,M,V,Tick) = {
1248   skip and tcl("MM",[V,msb(M),M,M mod 8,Tick]) and
1249   format("State %d: Processor %t writing to global memory[%t] value %t\n",Tick,X,M,V) and
1250   (forall j<nmemorylocations: {
1251     if j=M then {MainMemory[j]:=V}
1252     else { stable(MainMemory[j]) }
1253   }
1254 )
1255 } .
1256
1257 define memory_unchanged(MainMemory) = {
1258   skip and
1259   (forall j<nmemorylocations: {
1260     stable(MainMemory[j])
1261   }
1262 )
1263 } .
1264
1265 define cache_unchanged(L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,Vbit,x) = {
1266   skip and
1267   (forall j<ncachelocations: {
1268     stable(Vbit[x][j]) and
1269     stable(L2CacheTag[x][j]) and
1270     stable(L2CacheMemory[x][j])
1271   }
1272 )
1273 } .
1274
1275 define header_out() = {
1276
1277   format("-----\n") and
1278   format("| Pid | Operation | Addr | Binary Addr | Cache[Index] | Valid Bit | Dirty Bit | ...
1279           Tag | Hit-Miss |
1280           Data | Coherence State | Memory[..Addr..] ---> Data |\n") and
1281   format("-----\n")
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1282 -----\n")
1283 }.
1284
1285 define footer_out(ncsx) = {
1286   if ncsx=shared or ncsx=modified or ncsx=invalid then {
1287     format("-----\n")
1288     -----\n")
1289   }
1290 }.
1291
1292 define get_var3(MainMemory, L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, L2CacheState, Vbit, Dbit, j) = {
1293   exists T, PID, addr, tag, index8, B, v, z, Tick, RW, datato, datafrom : {
1294
1295     get2(T) and
1296     PID=strint(aval1(T,0)) and
1297     RW = strint(aval1(T,1)) and
1298     addr=strint(aval1(T,2)) and
1299     datato = strint(aval1(T,3)) and
1300     Tick=strint(aval1(T,4)) and
1301     format("\n\n") and
1302     if RW = 0 then {
1303       cpu_request(MainMemory, L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, L2CacheState, Vbit, Dbit, PID, RW, addr, datafrom, j, Tick)
1304
1305     } else {
1306       cpu_request(MainMemory, L2CacheMemory, L2CacheTag, L2CacheState, Vbit, Dbit, PID, RW, addr, datato, j, Tick)
1307     } and
1308
1309     tcl("tmr", [Tick]) and
1310     tcl("CPUREQ", [PID, Tick, msb(addr), RW, datato, j]) and
1311     forall i<32 : {tcl("ABCD", [i, msb32_2(i, addr)])} and
1312
1313
1314     if PID=0 then {
1315       tcl("CM", [0, Tick, datato, tag_field_cache(addr), index_field_cache_8(addr mod 8),
1316         addr mod 8, msb_14_index(addr mod 16), addr mod 16, RW])
1317     } else if PID=1 then {
1318       tcl("CM", [1, Tick, datato, tag_field_cache(addr), index_field_cache_8(addr mod 8),
1319         addr mod 8, msb_14_index(addr mod 16), addr mod 16, RW])
1320     } else if PID=2 then {
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1321 tcl("CM",[2,Tick,datato,tag_field_cache(addr),index_field_cache_8(addr mod 8),
1322 addr mod 8,msb_14_index(addr mod 16),addr mod 16,RW])
1323 }
1324
1325 }
1326 }.
```

```
1327
1328 set print_states=false.
1329 /* run */ define L2_Cache_P0_P1_v0() = {
1330 exists PID,B,addr,tag,index8,j,i,MainMemory, CacheMemory, L2CacheTag,
1331 L2CacheMemory, Core, Tag, Index, Timer, L2CacheState, Vbit, Dbit,Select : {
1332 list(MainMemory, nmemorylocations) and stable(struct(MainMemory)) and
1333 list(CacheMemory, ncachelocations) and stable(struct(CacheMemory)) and
1334 list(Core, nprocessors) and stable(struct(Core)) and
1335 list(L2CacheMemory,nprocessors) and stable(struct(L2CacheMemory)) and
1336 list(L2CacheTag,nprocessors) and stable(struct(L2CacheTag)) and
1337 list(L2CacheState,nprocessors) and stable(struct(L2CacheState)) and
1338 list(Vbit,nprocessors) and stable(struct(Vbit)) and
1339 list(Dbit,nprocessors) and stable(struct(Dbit)) and
1340 (forall i<nprocessors: (
1341 list(L2CacheMemory[i], ncachelocations) and stable(struct(L2CacheMemory[i])) and
1342 list(L2CacheTag[i], ncachelocations) and stable(struct(L2CacheTag[i])) and
1343 list(L2CacheState[i], ncachelocations) and stable(struct(L2CacheState[i])) and
1344 list(Vbit[i], ncachelocations) and stable(struct(Vbit[i])) and
1345 list(Dbit[i], ncachelocations) and stable(struct(Dbit[i]))
1346 )
1347 ) and
1348 list(Tag, nlocations) and stable(struct(Tag)) and
1349 list(Index, nlocations) and stable(struct(Index)) and
1350
1351
1352 {{prog_send1(0,"load 'Processor_0_5'." ) and
1353 prog_send1(1,"load 'Processor_1_5'." ) and
1354 prog_send1(2,"load 'Processor_2_5'." )}};skip;
1355
1356 {prog_send1(0,"run L2_Processor_0()." ) and
1357 prog_send1(1,"run L2_Processor_1()." ) and
1358 prog_send1(2,"run L2_Processor_2()." )}};skip;
1359
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1360 { tcl("init",[2,8]) and always tclbreak() and
1361 (forall j<nmemorylocations : MainMemory[j] = initial_value2) and
1362 (forall j<ncachelocations : CacheMemory[j] = initial_value) and
1363 (forall j<nprocessors : Core[j] = initial_value) and
1364 (forall i<nprocessors :
1365 (forall j<ncachelocations : (
1366 L2CacheMemory[i][j] = initial_value and
1367 L2CacheTag[i][j] = -1 and
1368 L2CacheState[i][j] = invalid and
1369 Vbit[i][j] = 0 and
1370 Dbit[i][j] = 0
1371 )
1372 )
1373 ) and
1374 (forall j<nlocations : Tag[j] = initial_value) and
1375 (forall j<nlocations : Index[j] = initial_value) and
1376
1377 Timer = 0 and
1378
1379 (forall j<ncachelocations : tcl("INDEX",[j,index_field_cache_8(j)]) and
1380
1381 for j<10 do {
1382 (forall i<nmemorylocations : tcl("IM",[MainMemory[i],msb(i),i mod 16])) and
1383
1384 {Select = Random mod 3 and
1385 prog_send_nel(0,["+str(Select)+","+str(j)+"]"+".") and
1386 prog_send_nel(1,["+str(Select)+","+str(j)+"]"+".") and
1387 prog_send_nel(2,["+str(Select)+","+str(j)+"]"+".")
1388 };
1389 {skip and get_var3(MainMemory,L2CacheMemory,L2CacheTag,L2CacheState,Vbit,Dbit,j)}
1390 }
1391 };
1392 {prog_send1(0,"exit.") and
1393 prog_send1(1,"exit.") and
1394 prog_send1(2,"exit.") }
1395 }
1396 }
1397 }.
```

## Listing B.2: Tempura Code for Processor 0

```
1  /* -*- Mode: C -*-
2   *
3   * Processor_0_5.t
4   *
5   * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
6   *
7   * Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Nayef Alshammari, Antonio Cau
8   *
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10  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11  * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
12  * (at your option) any later version.
13  *
14  * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17  * GNU General Public License for more details.
18  *
19  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20  * along with Tempura. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
21  *
22  */
23
24
25  load "../library/conversion".
26  load "../library/tcl".
27  load "../library/explog".
28
29  define avar1(X,a) =
30  {
31    X[a]
32  }.
33
34  define avall(X,b) =
35  {
36    X[b]
37  }.
```



## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
38
39 define atime1(X,c) =
40 {
41   strint(X[c])
42 }.
43
44 define atime_micro1(X,d) =
45 {
46   strint(X[d])
47 }.
48
49 define get_var(PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAG,TAGX,NVBITX,
50 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,State) = {
51
52   header_out() and
53   format("| %2d | %d | %4t | %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...
        Memory[%7s] ---> %4t ...
        |\n",PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAGX,STRINGX,CMX,CSX,PID,INDEXM,MM) and
54   format("| %2d | %d | %4t | %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...
        Memory[%7s] ---> %4t ...
        |\n",PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,NVBITX,NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,NCMX,NCSX,PID,INDEXM,NMM) and
55   footer_out() and
56
57   header_property() and
58   Consistency_Property(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) and
59   Invalid_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) and
60   Shared_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) and
61   /*Local_State_Consistency(PID,State) and*/
62   Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW,PID,TAG,TAGX,CSX,STRINGX) and
63   footer_property()
64 }.
65
66 define Local_State_Consistency(PID,State) ={
67   if State = 0 then {
68
69     format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
70
71   } else{
72     if prev(State) = State-1 then {
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
73
74  format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
75
76  } else {
77
78  format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Fail |\n",PID,State)
79  }
80  }
81  }.
82
83
84
85  define Consistency_Property(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
86  /* If the cache consistent with the main memory */
87  if NCSX="Shared" then {
88  if NCMX = NMM then {
89  format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
90  } else {format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)
91  }
92  } else {
93  format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",NCSX,PID)
94  }
95
96  }.
97
98  define Invalid_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
99  if NCSX="Invalid" then {
100  if NCMX = -8 or
101  NCMX = NMM and NCSX ≠ "Shared" then {
102  format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
103  } else {format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
104  } else {
105  format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",NCSX,PID)
106  }
107  }.
108
109  define Shared_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
110  if NCSX="Shared" then {
111  if NCMX = NMM or NCMX ≠ -8 then {
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
112  format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
113  } else {format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
114  } else {
115  format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",NCSX,PID)
116  }
117
118  }.
```

```
119
120  define Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW,PID,TAG,TAGX,CSX,STRINGX) = {
121  exists Estring00,Estring01,Estring10,Estring11 : {
122  Estring00="Read Miss" and Estring01="Read Hit" and
123  Estring10="Write Miss" and Estring11="Write Hit" and
124
125  if RW=0 then { /* RW=0 Read Check */
126
127  if TAG ≠ TAGX and (CSX ≠ "Shared" or CSX ≠ "Modified") then {
128  if STRINGX=Estring00 then {
129  format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
130  } else {
131  format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
132  }
133  } else {
134  if STRINGX=Estring01 then {
135  format("| Read Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
136  } else {
137  format("| Read Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
138  }
139  }
140
141  } else { /* RW=1 Write Check */
142
143  if TAG ≠ TAGX then {
144  if STRINGX=Estring10 then {
145  format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
146  } else {
147  format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
148  }
149  } else {
150  if STRINGX=Estring11 then {
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
151  format("| Write Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
152  } else {
153  format("| Write Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
154  }
155  }
156  }
157  }
158  }.
159
160
161  define header_out() = {
162  format("-----\n")
163  -----\n")
164  and
165  format("| Pid | Operation | Addr | Binary Addr | Cache[Index] | Valid Bit | Dirty Bit |
166  Tag | Hit-Miss | Data | Coherence State | Memory[..Addr..] ---> Data |\n") and
167  format("-----\n")
168  -----\n")
169  }.
170
171  define footer_out() = {
172  format("-----\n")
173  -----\n")
174  }.
175
176  define header_property() = {
177  format("-----\n") and
178  format("| Property | PID | Result |\n") and
179  format("-----\n")
180  }.
181
182  define footer_property() = {
183  format("-----\n")
184  }.
185
186  define assert(Pid,j,RW,addr,data,Tick) = {
187  exists Operation : {
188  if RW=0 then {Operation="Read" and
189  format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %s request from Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
Global State: %d\n", Tick, Pid, Operation, addr, data, Tick)
189 } else {Operation="Write" and
190 format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request to Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
Global State: %d\n", Tick, Pid, Operation, addr, data, Tick)
191 } and
192 format("!PROG: assert %d:%d:%d:%d:%d:\n", Pid, RW, addr, data, Tick)
193 }
194 }.
195
196 set print_states=false.
197 /* run */ define L2_Processor_0() = {
198 exists j, Tick, PID, RW, DADDR, BADDR, INDEXC, VBITX, DBITX, TAG, TAGX, NVBITX,
199 NDBITX, NTAGX, STRINGX, CMX, NCMX, CSX, NCSX, INDEXM, MM, NMM, Tock, State : {
200
201 for j<10 do {
202 {input Tick and skip and State=Tick[1] and
203 if Tick[0]=0 then {
204 assert(Tick[0], j, Random mod 2, Random mod 16, Random mod 30, Tick[1])
205 } else
206 format("State %d: Processor 0 is idle\n", Tick[1])
207 };
208
209 { empty and
210 input Tock and output (Tock) and
211 PID=Tock[0] and RW=Tock[1] and DADDR=Tock[2] and BADDR=Tock[3] and INDEXC=Tock[4] and
212 VBITX=Tock[5] and
213 NVBITX=Tock[6] and DBITX=Tock[7] and NDBITX=Tock[8] and TAG=Tock[9] and TAGX=Tock[10] and
214 NTAGX=Tock[11] and
215 STRINGX=Tock[12] and CMX=Tock[13] and NCMX=Tock[14] and CSX=Tock[15] and NCSX=Tock[16] and
216 INDEXM=Tock[17] and
217 MM=Tock[18] and NMM=Tock[19] and
218
219 get_var (PID, RW, DADDR, BADDR, INDEXC, VBITX, DBITX, TAG, TAGX, NVBITX,
220 NDBITX, NTAGX, STRINGX, CMX, NCMX, CSX, NCSX, INDEXM, MM, NMM, State)
221
222 }
223 }
224 }
225 }.
```

## Listing B.3: Tempura Code for Processor 1

```
1  /* -*- Mode: C -*-
2  *
3  * Processor_1_5.t
4  *
5  * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
6  *
7  * Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Nayef Alshammari, Antonio Cau
8  *
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11 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with Tempura. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
21 *
22 */
23
24
25 load "../library/conversion".
26 load "../library/tcl".
27 load "../library/explog".
28
29 define avar1(X,a) =
30 {
31   X[a]
32 }.
33
34 define avall(X,b) =
35 {
36   X[b]
37 }.
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
38
39 define atime1(X,c) =
40 {
41   strint(X[c])
42 }.
43
44 define atime_micro1(X,d) =
45 {
46   strint(X[d])
47 }.
48
49 define get_var(PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAG,TAGX,NVBITX,
50 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,State) = {
51
52   header_out() and
53   format("| %2d | %d | %4t | %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...
        Memory[%7s] ---> %4t ...
        |\n",PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAGX,STRINGX,CMX,CSX,PID,INDEXM,MM) and
54   format("| %2d | %d | %4t | %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...
        Memory[%7s] ---> %4t ...
        |\n",PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,NVBITX,NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,NCMX,NCSX,PID,INDEXM,NMM) and
55   footer_out() and
56
57   header_property() and
58   Consistency_Property(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) and
59   Invalid_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) and
60   Shared_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) and
61   /*Local_State_Consistency(PID,State) and*/
62   Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW,PID,TAG,TAGX,CSX,STRINGX) and
63   footer_property()
64 }.
65
66 define Local_State_Consistency(PID,State) ={
67   if State = 0 then {
68
69     format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
70
71   } else{
72     if prev(State) = State-1 then {
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
73
74 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
75
76 } else {
77
78 format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Fail |\n",PID,State)
79 }
80 }
81 }.
82
83 define Consistency_Property(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
84 /* If the cache consistent with the main memory */
85 if NCSX="Shared" then {
86 if NCMX = NMM then {
87 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
88 } else {format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)
89 }
90 } else {
91 format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",NCSX,PID)
92 }
93
94 }.
95
96 define Invalid_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
97 if NCSX="Invalid" then {
98 if NCMX = -8 or
99 NCMX = NMM and NCSX ≠ "Shared" then {
100 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
101 } else {format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
102 } else {
103 format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",NCSX,PID)
104 }
105 }.
106
107 define Shared_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
108 if NCSX="Shared" then {
109 if NCMX = NMM or NCMX ≠ -8 then {
110 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
111 } else {format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
```



## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
112 } else {
113   format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",NCSX,PID)
114 }
115
116 }.
117
118 define Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW,PID,TAG,TAGX,CSX,STRINGX) = {
119   exists Estring00,Estring01,Estring10,Estring11 : {
120     Estring00="Read Miss" and Estring01="Read Hit" and
121     Estring10="Write Miss" and Estring11="Write Hit" and
122
123     if RW=0 then { /* RW=0 Read Check */
124
125       if TAG ≠ TAGX and (CSX ≠ "Shared" or CSX ≠ "Modified") then {
126         if STRINGX=Estring00 then {
127           format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
128         } else {
129           format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
130         }
131       } else {
132         if STRINGX=Estring01 then {
133           format("| Read Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
134         } else {
135           format("| Read Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
136         }
137       }
138
139     } else { /* RW=1 Write Check */
140
141       if TAG ≠ TAGX then {
142         if STRINGX=Estring10 then {
143           format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
144         } else {
145           format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
146         }
147       } else {
148         if STRINGX=Estring11 then {
149           format("| Write Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
150         } else {
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
151  format("| Write Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
152  }
153  }
154  }
155  }
156  }.
157
158
159  define header_out() = {
160  format("-----
161  -----\\n")
162      and
163  format("| Pid | Operation | Addr | Binary Addr | Cache[Index] | Valid Bit | Dirty Bit |
164  Tag | Hit-Miss | Data | Coherence State | Memory[..Addr..] ---> Data |\n") and
165  format("-----
166  -----\\n")
167  }.
168
169  define footer_out() = {
170  format("-----
171  -----\\n")
172  }.
173
174  define header_property() = {
175  format("-----\\n") and
176  format("| Property | PID | Result |\n") and
177  format("-----\\n")
178  }.
179
180  define footer_property() = {
181  format("-----\\n")
182  }.
183
184  define assert(Pid,j,RW,addr,data,Tick) = {
185  exists Operation : {
186  if RW=0 then {Operation="Read" and
187  format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request from Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
188  Global State: %d\\n",Tick,Pid,Operation,addr,data,Tick)
189  } else {Operation="Write" and
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
188  format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request to Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
      Global State: %d\n",Tick,Pid,Operation,addr,data,Tick)
189  } and
190  format("!PROG: assert %d:%d:%d:%d:%d:!\n",Pid,RW,addr,data,Tick)
191  }
192  }.
193
194  set print_states=false.
195  /* run */ define L2_Processor_1() = {
196  exists j,Tick,PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAG,TAGX,NVBITX,
197  NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,Tock,State : {
198
199  for j<10 do {
200  {input Tick and skip and State=Tick[1] and
201  if Tick[0]=1 then {
202  assert(Tick[0],j,Random mod 2,Random mod 16,Random mod 30, Tick[1])
203  } else
204  format("State %d: Processor 1 is idle\n",Tick[1])
205  };
206
207  { empty and
208  input Tock and output (Tock) and
209  PID=Tock[0] and RW=Tock[1] and DADDR=Tock[2] and BADDR=Tock[3] and INDEXC=Tock[4] and
210  VBITX=Tock[5] and
211  NVBITX=Tock[6] and DBITX=Tock[7] and NDBITX=Tock[8] and TAG=Tock[9] and TAGX=Tock[10] and
212  NTAGX=Tock[11] and
213  STRINGX=Tock[12] and CMX=Tock[13] and NCMX=Tock[14] and CSX=Tock[15] and NCSX=Tock[16] and
214  INDEXM=Tock[17] and
215  MM=Tock[18] and NMM=Tock[19] and
216
217  get_var (PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAG,TAGX,NVBITX,
218  NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,State)
219
220  }
221  }
222  }
223  }.
```

## Listing B.4: Tempura Code for Processor 2

```
1  /* -*- Mode: C -*-
2  *
3  * Processor_2_5.t
4  *
5  * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
6  *
7  * Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Nayef Alshammari, Antonio Cau
8  *
9  * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with Tempura. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
21 *
22 */
23
24
25 load "../library/conversion".
26 load "../library/tcl".
27 load "../library/explog".
28
29 define avar1(X,a) =
30 {
31   X[a]
32 }.
33
34 define avall(X,b) =
35 {
36   X[b]
37 }.
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
38
39 define atime1(X,c) =
40 {
41   strint(X[c])
42 }.
43
44 define atime_micro1(X,d) =
45 {
46   strint(X[d])
47 }.
48
49 define get_var(PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAG,TAGX,NVBITX,
50 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,State) = {
51
52   header_out() and
53   format("| %2d | %d | %4t | %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...
        Memory[%7s] ---> %4t ...
        |\n",PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAGX,STRINGX,CMX,CSX,PID,INDEXM,MM) and
54   format("| %2d | %d | %4t | %7s | Cache[%3s] | %t | %t | %2t | %10s | %3t | %10s[%1d] | ...
        Memory[%7s] ---> %4t ...
        |\n",PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,NVBITX,NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,NCMX,NCSX,PID,INDEXM,NMM) and
55   footer_out() and
56
57   header_property() and
58   Consistency_Property(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) and
59   Invalid_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) and
60   Shared_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) and
61   /*Local_State_Consistency(PID,State) and*/
62   Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW,PID,TAG,TAGX,CSX,STRINGX) and
63   footer_property()
64 }.
65
66 define Local_State_Consistency(PID,State) ={
67   if State = 0 then {
68
69     format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
70
71   } else {
72     if prev(State) = State-1 then {
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
73
74  format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Pass |\n",PID,State)
75
76  } else {
77
78  format("| Local State Check | Active[%d] = %2d | Fail |\n",PID,State)
79  }
80  }
81  }.
82
83
84  define Consistency_Property(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
85  /* If the cache consistent with the main memory */
86  if NCSX="Shared" then {
87  if NCMX = NMM then {
88  format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
89  } else {format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)
90  }
91  } else {
92  format("| Consistency Property Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",NCSX,PID)
93  }
94
95  }.
96
97  define Invalid_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
98  if NCSX="Invalid" then {
99  if NCMX = -8 or
100  NCMX = NMM and NCSX ≠ "Shared" then {
101  format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
102  } else {format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
103  } else {
104  format("| Invalid State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",NCSX,PID)
105  }
106  }.
107
108  define Shared_State(PID,NCMX,NCSX,NMM) = {
109  if NCSX="Shared" then {
110  if NCMX = NMM or NCMX ≠ -8 then {
111  format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Pass |\n",NCSX,PID)
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
112 } else {format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | Fail |\n",NCSX,PID)}
113 } else {
114 format("| Shared State Check | %10s[%1d] | NA |\n",NCSX,PID)
115 }
116
117 }.
```

```
118
119 define Check_Read_Write_Miss_Hit(RW,PID,TAG,TAGX,CSX,STRINGX) = {
120 exists Estring00,Estring01,Estring10,Estring11 : {
121 Estring00="Read Miss" and Estring01="Read Hit" and
122 Estring10="Write Miss" and Estring11="Write Hit" and
123
124 if RW=0 then { /* RW=0 Read Check */
125
126 if TAG ≠ TAGX and (CSX ≠ "Shared" or CSX ≠ "Modified") then {
127 if STRINGX=Estring00 then {
128 format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
129 } else {
130 format("| Read Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
131 }
132 } else {
133 if STRINGX=Estring01 then {
134 format("| Read Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
135 } else {
136 format("| Read Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
137 }
138 }
139
140 } else { /* RW=1 Write Check */
141
142 if TAG ≠ TAGX then {
143 if STRINGX=Estring10 then {
144 format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
145 } else {
146 format("| Write Miss Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
147 }
148 } else {
149 if STRINGX=Estring11 then {
150 format("| Write Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Pass |\n",STRINGX,PID)
```

## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
151 } else {
152   format("| Write Hit Check | %10t[%d] | Fail |\n",STRINGX,PID)
153 }
154 }
155 }
156 }
157 }.
158
159
160 define header_out() = {
161   format("-----\n")
162   -----\n")
163   and
164   format("| Pid | Operation | Addr | Binary Addr | Cache[Index] | Valid Bit | Dirty Bit |
165   Tag | Hit-Miss | Data | Coherence State | Memory[..Addr..] ---> Data |\n") and
166   format("-----\n")
167   -----\n")
168 }.
169
170 define footer_out() = {
171   format("-----\n")
172   -----\n")
173 }.
174
175 define header_property() = {
176   format("-----\n") and
177   format("| Property | PID | Result |\n") and
178   format("-----\n")
179 }.
180
181 define footer_property() = {
182   format("-----\n")
183 }.
184
185 define assert(Pid,j,RW,addr,data,Tick) = {
186   exists Operation : {
187     if RW=0 then {Operation="Read" and
188     format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request from Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
189     Global State: %d\n",Tick,Pid,Operation,addr,data,Tick)
```



## APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B: TEMPURA CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
188 } else {Operation="Write" and
189 format("State %d: Processor %d is sending %6s request to Address: %d, and Data: %d, and ...
      Global State: %d\n",Tick,Pid,Operation,addr,data,Tick)
190 } and
191 format("!PROG: assert %d:%d:%d:%d:%d:!\n",Pid,RW,addr,data,Tick)
192 }
193 }.
194
195 set print_states=false.
196 /* run */ define L2_Processor_2() = {
197 exists j,Tick,PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAG,TAGX,NVBITX,
198 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,Tock,State : {
199
200 for j<10 do {
201 {input Tick and skip and State=Tick[1] and
202 if Tick[0]=2 then {
203 assert(Tick[0],j,Random mod 2,Random mod 16,Random mod 30, Tick[1])
204 } else
205 format("State %d: Processor 2 is idle\n",Tick[1])
206 };
207
208 { empty and
209 input Tock and output(Tock) and
210 PID=Tock[0] and RW=Tock[1] and DADDR=Tock[2] and BADDR=Tock[3] and INDEXC=Tock[4] and
211 VBITX=Tock[5] and
212 NVBITX=Tock[6] and DBITX=Tock[7] and NDBITX=Tock[8] and TAG=Tock[9] and TAGX=Tock[10] and
213 NTAGX=Tock[11] and
214 STRINGX=Tock[12] and CMX=Tock[13] and NCMX=Tock[14] and CSX=Tock[15] and NCSX=Tock[16] and
215 INDEXM=Tock[17] and
216 MM=Tock[18] and NMM=Tock[19] and
217
218 get_var(PID,RW,DADDR,BADDR,INDEXC,VBITX,DBITX,TAG,TAGX,NVBITX,
219 NDBITX,NTAGX,STRINGX,CMX,NCMX,CSX,NCSX,INDEXM,MM,NMM,State)
220
221 }
222 }
223 }
224 }.
```

## **Appendix C**

### **Appendix C: Tcl/tk Code for Cache Controller**

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1 # L2_Cache_MSI_v3.tcl --
2 #
3 #
4 # Copyright (C) 1998-2017 Nayef H. Alshammari, Antonio Cau
5 #
6 # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 # the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
9 # (at your option) any later version.
10 #
11 # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 # GNU General Public License for more details.
15 #
16 # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 # along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
18 #
19 #
20
21 package provide L2CacheContollerMSI 1.0
22
23 namespace eval ::out {;
24 #namespace export -clear *
25 variable canv;
26
27
28 proc init {nl} {
29     variable canv;
30
31
32     wm geometry .top23 1700x800+1+20
33     $canv delete all
34     $canv config -scrollregion "10 10 1700 1000"
35     $canv configure -background black
36
37
38     #CPU 0
39     $canv create rect \
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
40 10 10 \
41 425 455 \
42 -fill black -outline black -width 2 -tags rect0
43
44 #State
45 $canv create text 30 20\
46 -anchor c -fill red -text State
47
48 $canv create text 72 20\
49 -anchor c -fill red -text Oper.
50
51 $canv create text 240 20\
52 -anchor c -fill red -text Address
53
54 $canv create text 405 20\
55 -anchor c -fill red -text Data
56
57 #State
58 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
59 $canv create rect \
60 10 [expr 30+15*$i]\
61 50 [expr 45+15*$i]\
62 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
63 $canv create text 30 [expr 37+15*$i]\
64 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags StateP0($i)
65 }
66 #READ
67 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
68 $canv create rect \
69 50 [expr 30+15*$i]\
70 95 [expr 45+15*$i]\
71 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
72 $canv create text 72 [expr 37+15*$i]\
73 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags operationP0($i)
74 }
75
76 #ADDRESS
77 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
78 $canv create rect \
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
79 95 [expr 30+15*$i]\
80 385 [expr 45+15*$i]\
81 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
82 $canv create text 240 [expr 37+15*$i]\
83 -anchor c -text "" -tags cpuaddrtextP0($i)
84 }
85
86 #Data
87 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
88 $canv create rect \
89 385 [expr 30+15*$i]\
90 425 [expr 45+15*$i]\
91 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
92 $canv create text 405 [expr 37+15*$i]\
93 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags DataCPU0($i)
94 }
95
96 #CPU 1
97 $canv create rect \
98 430 10 \
99 845 455 \
100 -fill black -outline black -width 2 -tags rect1
101
102 #State
103 $canv create text 452 20\
104 -anchor c -fill red -text State
105
106 $canv create text 495 20\
107 -anchor c -fill red -text Oper.
108
109 $canv create text 655 20\
110 -anchor c -fill red -text Address
111
112 $canv create text 820 20\
113 -anchor c -fill red -text Data
114
115 #State
116 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
117 $canv create rect \
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
118 430 [expr 30+15*$i]\
119 470 [expr 45+15*$i]\
120 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
121 $canv create text 447 [expr 37+15*$i]\
122 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags StateP1($i)
123 }
124 #READ
125 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
126 $canv create rect \
127 470 [expr 30+15*$i]\
128 515 [expr 45+15*$i]\
129 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
130 $canv create text 495 [expr 37+15*$i]\
131 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags operationP1($i)
132 }
133
134 #ADDRESS
135 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
136 $canv create rect \
137 515 [expr 30+15*$i]\
138 805 [expr 45+15*$i]\
139 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
140 $canv create text 660 [expr 37+15*$i]\
141 -anchor c -text "" -tags cpuaddrtextP1($i)
142 }
143
144 #Data
145 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
146 $canv create rect \
147 805 [expr 30+15*$i]\
148 845 [expr 45+15*$i]\
149 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
150 $canv create text 825 [expr 37+15*$i]\
151 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags DataCPU1($i)
152 }
153
154 #CPU 2
155 $canv create rect \
156 850 10 \
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
157 1270 455 \  
158 -fill black -outline black -width 2 -tags rect2  
159  
160 #State  
161 $canv create text 870 20\  
162 -anchor c -fill red -text State  
163  
164 $canv create text 912 20\  
165 -anchor c -fill red -text Oper.  
166  
167 $canv create text 1080 20\  
168 -anchor c -fill red -text Address  
169  
170 $canv create text 1247 20\  
171 -anchor c -fill red -text Data  
172  
173 #State P2  
174 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {  
175 $canv create rect \  
176 850 [expr 30+15*$i]\  
177 890 [expr 45+15*$i]\  
178 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00  
179 $canv create text 870 [expr 37+15*$i]\  
180 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags StateP2($i)  
181 }  
182 #OPERATION P2  
183 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {  
184 $canv create rect \  
185 890 [expr 30+15*$i]\  
186 935 [expr 45+15*$i]\  
187 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00  
188 $canv create text 912 [expr 37+15*$i]\  
189 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags operationP2($i)  
190 }  
191  
192 #ADDRESS P2  
193 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {  
194 $canv create rect \  
195 935 [expr 30+15*$i]\
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
196 1225 [expr 45+15*$i]\
197 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
198 $canv create text 1080 [expr 37+15*$i]\
199 -anchor c -text "" -tags cpuaddrtextP2($i)
200 }
201
202 #Data P2
203 for {set i 0} {$i<10} {incr i} {
204 $canv create rect \
205 1225 [expr 30+15*$i]\
206 1270 [expr 45+15*$i]\
207 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
208 $canv create text 1247 [expr 37+15*$i]\
209 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags DataCPU2($i)
210 }
211
212
213
214
215
216 #Horizontal CPU_REQ_ADDRESS
217 for {set i 0} {$i<32} {incr i} {
218 $canv create text [expr 373+20*$i] 200\
219 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text [expr 31-$i] -tags cpuaddrtext($i)
220
221 if {$i<29} {$canv create text [expr 363+20*$i] 200\
222 -anchor c -fill red -text "|" -tags cpuaddrtext1($i)
223 } else {$canv create text [expr 363+20*$i] 200\
224 -anchor c -fill blue -text "|" -tags cpuaddrtext1($i)}
225 }
226 $canv create text 1003 200\
227 -anchor c -fill blue -text "|"
228
229 for {set i 0} {$i<32} {incr i} {
230 $canv create rect \
231 [expr 363+20*$i] 210\
232 [expr 383+20*$i] 230\
233 -width 1 -fill black
234 $canv create text [expr 373+20*$i] 220\
```



## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
235 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags cpuaddrtext2($i)
236 }
237 for {set i 0} {$i<32} {incr i} {
238     $canv create text [expr 363+20*$i] 220\
239     -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "|"
240 }
241
242 #Tag Bits
243 $canv create rect \
244     363 210 \
245     942 230 \
246     -outline red -width 2
247 #Index Bits
248 $canv create rect \
249     944 210 \
250     1003 230 \
251     -outline blue -width 2
252
253
254 #Tag line & Arrows P0
255 $canv create line \
256     370 230 \
257     370 250 \
258     -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP000
259 $canv create line \
260     260 250 \
261     370 250 \
262     -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP001
263
264 $canv create line 260 250 260 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P000)
265
266 #Index line & Arrows P0
267 $canv create line \
268     964 230 \
269     964 240 \
270     -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP010
271 $canv create line \
272     30 240 \
273     964 240 \
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
274 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP011
275
276 $canv create line 30 240 30 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P001)
277
278
279
280
281
282 # Cache P0
283 $canv create text 30 300\
284 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Index
285
286 $canv create text 70 300\
287 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Valid
288
289 $canv create text 110 300\
290 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Dirty
291
292 $canv create text 260 300\
293 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Tag
294
295 $canv create text 405 300\
296 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Data
297
298
299
300
301
302 #Index
303 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
304     $canv create rect \
305     10 [expr 310+15*$i]\
306     50 [expr 325+15*$i]\
307     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
308     $canv create text 30 [expr 318+15*$i]\
309     -anchor c -text "" -tags Index0($i)
310 }
311
312 #Valid bit
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
313 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
314     $canv create rect \
315     50 [expr 310+15*$i]\
316     90 [expr 325+15*$i]\
317     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
318     $canv create text 70 [expr 318+15*$i]\
319     -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags VBIT0($i)
320 }
321
322 #Dirty bit
323 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
324     $canv create rect \
325     90 [expr 310+15*$i]\
326     130 [expr 325+15*$i]\
327     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
328     $canv create text 110 [expr 318+15*$i]\
329     -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags DBIT0($i)
330 }
331
332 #Tag 1 18 bits
333 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
334     $canv create rect \
335     130 [expr 310+15*$i]\
336     390 [expr 325+15*$i]\
337     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
338     $canv create text 260 [expr 318+15*$i]\
339     -anchor c -text "" -tags Tag18bitstext0($i)
340 }
341 #Data 1 32 bits
342 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
343     $canv create rect \
344     390 [expr 310+15*$i]\
345     425 [expr 325+15*$i]\
346     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
347     $canv create text 405 [expr 317+15*$i]\
348     -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "-8" -tags DataCM0($i)
349 }
350
351
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
352 #L2 Cache text
353 $canv create text 240 440\
354 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Private_L2_Cache_Memory_(Processor(0))
355
356 #Tag line & Arrows P1
357 # $canv create line \
358 560 280 \
359 560 305 \
360 -fill blue -width 2 -tags lineP100
361 # $canv create line \
362 560 305 \
363 685 305 \
364 -fill blue -width 2 -tags lineP101
365
366 $canv create line 685 230 685 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P100)
367
368 #Index line & Arrows P1
369 $canv create line \
370 974 230 \
371 974 245 \
372 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP110
373 $canv create line \
374 455 245 \
375 974 245 \
376 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP111
377
378 $canv create line 455 245 455 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P101)
379
380 # Cache P1
381 $canv create text 455 300\
382 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Index
383
384 $canv create text 495 300\
385 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Valid
386
387 $canv create text 535 300\
388 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Dirty
389
390 $canv create text 685 300\
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
391 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Tag
392
393 $canv create text 825 300\
394 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Data
395
396
397
398
399
400 #Index
401 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
402     $canv create rect \
403         430 [expr 310+15*$i]\
404         480 [expr 325+15*$i]\
405         -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
406     $canv create text 455 [expr 318+15*$i]\
407     -anchor c -text "" -tags Index1($i)
408 }
409
410 #Valid bit
411 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
412     $canv create rect \
413         480 [expr 310+15*$i]\
414         510 [expr 325+15*$i]\
415         -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
416     $canv create text 495 [expr 318+15*$i]\
417     -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags VBIT1($i)
418 }
419
420 #Dirty bit
421 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
422     $canv create rect \
423         510 [expr 310+15*$i]\
424         550 [expr 325+15*$i]\
425         -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
426     $canv create text 530 [expr 318+15*$i]\
427     -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags DBIT1($i)
428 }
429
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
430 #Tag 1 18 bits
431 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
432     $canv create rect \
433     550 [expr 310+15*$i]\
434     810 [expr 325+15*$i]\
435     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
436     $canv create text 680 [expr 318+15*$i]\
437     -anchor c -text "" -tags Tag18bitstext1($i)
438 }
439 #Data 1 32 bits
440 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
441     $canv create rect \
442     810 [expr 310+15*$i]\
443     845 [expr 325+15*$i]\
444     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
445     $canv create text 825 [expr 317+15*$i]\
446     -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "-8" -tags DataCM1($i)
447 }
448
449
450 #L2 Cache text
451 $canv create text 665 440\
452 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Private_L2_Cache_Memory_(Processor(1))
453
454 #Tag line & Arrows P2
455 $canv create line \
456 780 230 \
457 780 255 \
458 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP200
459 $canv create line \
460 780 255 \
461 1105 255 \
462 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP201
463
464 $canv create line 1105 255 1105 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P200)
465
466 #Index line & Arrows P2
467 $canv create line \
468 984 230 \
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
469 984 265 \
470 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP210
471 $canv create line \
472 875 265 \
473 984 265 \
474 -fill black -width 2 -tags lineP211
475
476 $canv create line 875 265 875 290 -arrow last -fill black -width 2 -tags ar(P201)
477
478 # Cache P2
479 $canv create text 875 300\
480 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Index
481
482 $canv create text 915 300\
483 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Valid
484
485 $canv create text 955 300\
486 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Dirty
487
488 $canv create text 1105 300\
489 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Tag
490
491 $canv create text 1250 300\
492 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Data
493
494
495
496
497
498 #Index
499 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
500 $canv create rect \
501 850 [expr 310+15*$i]\
502 900 [expr 325+15*$i]\
503 -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
504 $canv create text 875 [expr 318+15*$i]\
505 -anchor c -text "" -tags Index2($i)
506 }
507
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
508 #Valid bit
509 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
510     $canv create rect \
511     900 [expr 310+15*$i]\
512     930 [expr 325+15*$i]\
513     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
514     $canv create text 915 [expr 318+15*$i]\
515     -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags VBIT2($i)
516 }
517
518 #Dirty bit
519 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
520     $canv create rect \
521     930 [expr 310+15*$i]\
522     970 [expr 325+15*$i]\
523     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
524     $canv create text 950 [expr 318+15*$i]\
525     -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "" -tags DBIT2($i)
526 }
527
528 #Tag 1 18 bits
529 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
530     $canv create rect \
531     970 [expr 310+15*$i]\
532     1235 [expr 325+15*$i]\
533     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
534     $canv create text 1103 [expr 318+15*$i]\
535     -anchor c -text "" -tags Tag18bitstext2($i)
536 }
537
538 #Data 1 32 bits
539 for {set i 0} {$i<8} {incr i} {
540     $canv create rect \
541     1235 [expr 310+15*$i]\
542     1270 [expr 325+15*$i]\
543     -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
544     $canv create text 1250 [expr 317+15*$i]\
545     -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text "-8" -tags DataCM2($i)
546 }
```



## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
547
548 #L2 Cache text
549 $canv create text 1085 440\
550 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Private_L2_Cache_Memory_(Processor(2))
551
552
553 #Main Memory
554 $canv create text 900 470\
555 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Address
556 $canv create text 1075 470\
557 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Data
558
559 #Index
560 for {set i 0} {$i<16} {incr i} {
561     $canv create rect \
562         750 [expr 480+15*$i]\
563         1050 [expr 495+15*$i]\
564         -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
565     $canv create text 900 [expr 488+15*$i]\
566     -anchor c -fill red -text "" -tags IndexMM($i)
567 }
568
569 #Data
570 for {set i 0} {$i<16} {incr i} {
571     $canv create rect \
572         1050 [expr 480+15*$i]\
573         1100 [expr 495+15*$i]\
574         -width 1 -fill black -outline #00FF00
575     $canv create text 1075 [expr 488+15*$i]\
576     -anchor c -fill red -text "" -tags DataMM($i)
577     $canv create text 1125 [expr 488+15*$i]\
578     -anchor c -fill red -text "" -tags DataMM2($i)
579 }
580
581 #Text Main Memory
582 $canv create text 950 730\
583 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Main_Memory
584
585
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
586 #Timer
587 #${canv} create text 80 30\
588 -anchor c -fill #00FF00 -text Global_State -tags tmr
589
590 #Bullets Timeline
591 ${canv} create text 30 480 -text {State} -anchor c -fill #00FF00
592 ${canv} create text 40 520 -text {Address} -anchor c -fill #00FF00
593 ${canv} create text 30 565 -text {P0} -anchor c -fill #00FF00
594 ${canv} create text 30 605 -text {P1} -anchor c -fill #00FF00
595 ${canv} create text 30 645 -text {P2} -anchor c -fill #00FF00
596 ${canv} create text 40 685 -text {Memory} -anchor c -fill #00FF00
597
598 ##Arc
599
600
601 #${canv} create oval 80 80 87 87 -fill white
602
603 #${canv} create arc 70 64 180 182 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
604
605 #${canv} create oval 160 80 167 87 -fill white
606
607 #${canv} create arc 150 64 260 182 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
608
609 #${canv} create oval 240 80 247 87 -fill white
610
611
612
613 #${canv} create arc 80 80 160 160 -outline white -width 2 -extent 180 -style arc
614
615 #P0
616 #${canv} create oval 80 565 87 572 -fill white
617
618 #${canv} create arc 70 549 163 667 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
619
620 #${canv} create oval 145 565 152 572 -fill white
621
622 #${canv} create arc 135 549 228 667 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
623
624 #${canv} create oval 210 565 217 572 -fill white
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
625
626 #P1
627 #$canv create oval 80 605 87 612 -fill white
628
629 #$canv create arc 70 589 163 707 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
630
631 #$canv create oval 145 605 152 612 -fill white
632
633 #$canv create arc 135 589 228 707 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
634
635 #$canv create oval 210 605 217 612 -fill white
636
637
638 #P2
639 #$canv create oval 80 640 87 647 -fill white
640
641 #$canv create arc 70 624 163 742 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
642
643 #$canv create oval 145 640 152 647 -fill white
644
645 #$canv create arc 135 624 228 742 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
646
647 #$canv create oval 210 640 217 647 -fill white
648
649
650 #Memory
651 #$canv create oval 80 680 87 687 -fill white
652
653 #$canv create arc 70 664 163 782 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
654
655 #$canv create oval 145 680 152 687 -fill white
656
657 #$canv create arc 135 664 228 782 -outline #00FF00 -width 2 -style arc -start 45
658
659 #$canv create oval 210 680 217 687 -fill white
660
661 }
662
663 proc tmr {nl} {
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
664 variable canv;
665
666
667 set State [lindex $nl 0]
668
669 # $canv itemconfigure tmr -fill #00FF00 -text Global_State:$State
670
671 if {$State<9} {
672     $canv create text\
673     [expr 83+65*$State] 480\
674     -fill #00FF00 -text $State
675     $canv create text\
676     [expr 83+65*[expr $State+1]] 480\
677     -fill #00FF00 -text [expr $State+1]
678 } else {
679     $canv create text\
680     [expr 83+65*$State] 480\
681     -fill #00FF00 -text $State
682 }
683 }
684 proc INDEX {nl} {
685     variable canv;
686
687     set IndexDecimal [lindex $nl 0]
688     set IndexBinary [lindex $nl 1]
689
690
691     $canv itemconfigure Index0($IndexDecimal) -fill #00FF00 -text $IndexBinary
692     $canv itemconfigure Index1($IndexDecimal) -fill #00FF00 -text $IndexBinary
693     $canv itemconfigure Index2($IndexDecimal) -fill #00FF00 -text $IndexBinary
694
695 }
696 proc CM {nl} {
697     variable canv;
698
699
700     set Pid [lindex $nl 0]
701     set Index [lindex $nl 1]
702     set Data [lindex $nl 2]
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
703 set Tag [lindex $nl 3]
704 set Index3 [lindex $nl 4]
705 set Index4 [lindex $nl 5]
706 set Index5 [lindex $nl 6]
707 set Index6 [lindex $nl 7]
708 set RW [lindex $nl 8]
709
710
711 if {$Pid==0} {
712
713     $canv itemconfigure lineP100 -fill black
714     $canv itemconfigure lineP101 -fill black
715     $canv itemconfigure ar(P100) -fill black
716     $canv itemconfigure lineP110 -fill black
717     $canv itemconfigure lineP111 -fill black
718     $canv itemconfigure ar(P101) -fill black
719
720     $canv itemconfigure lineP200 -fill black
721     $canv itemconfigure lineP201 -fill black
722     $canv itemconfigure ar(P200) -fill black
723     $canv itemconfigure lineP210 -fill black
724     $canv itemconfigure lineP211 -fill black
725     $canv itemconfigure ar(P201) -fill black
726
727     $canv itemconfigure lineP000 -fill red
728     $canv itemconfigure lineP001 -fill red
729     $canv itemconfigure ar(P000) -fill red
730     $canv itemconfigure lineP010 -fill blue
731     $canv itemconfigure lineP011 -fill blue
732     $canv itemconfigure ar(P001) -fill blue
733
734     $canv itemconfigure Index0($Index4) -fill white -text $Index3
735     if {$RW == 1} {
736         $canv itemconfigure DataCM0($Index4) -fill white -text $Data
737     }
738     $canv itemconfigure Tag18bitstext0($Index4) -fill white -text $Tag
739
740 } elseif {$Pid==1} {
741
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
742 $canv itemconfigure lineP000 -fill black
743 $canv itemconfigure lineP001 -fill black
744 $canv itemconfigure ar(P000) -fill black
745 $canv itemconfigure lineP010 -fill black
746 $canv itemconfigure lineP011 -fill black
747 $canv itemconfigure ar(P001) -fill black
748
749 $canv itemconfigure lineP200 -fill black
750 $canv itemconfigure lineP201 -fill black
751 $canv itemconfigure ar(P200) -fill black
752 $canv itemconfigure lineP210 -fill black
753 $canv itemconfigure lineP211 -fill black
754 $canv itemconfigure ar(P201) -fill black
755
756 $canv itemconfigure lineP100 -fill red
757 $canv itemconfigure lineP101 -fill red
758 $canv itemconfigure ar(P100) -fill red
759 $canv itemconfigure lineP110 -fill blue
760 $canv itemconfigure lineP111 -fill blue
761 $canv itemconfigure ar(P101) -fill blue
762
763 $canv itemconfigure Index1($Index4) -fill white -text $Index3
764 if {$RW == 1} {
765     $canv itemconfigure DataCM1($Index4) -fill white -text $Data
766 }
767 $canv itemconfigure Tag18bitstext1($Index4) -fill white -text $Tag
768
769 } elseif {$Pid==2} {
770
771     $canv itemconfigure lineP000 -fill black
772     $canv itemconfigure lineP001 -fill black
773     $canv itemconfigure ar(P000) -fill black
774     $canv itemconfigure lineP010 -fill black
775     $canv itemconfigure lineP011 -fill black
776     $canv itemconfigure ar(P001) -fill black
777
778     $canv itemconfigure lineP100 -fill black
779     $canv itemconfigure lineP101 -fill black
780     $canv itemconfigure ar(P100) -fill black
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
781 $canv itemconfigure lineP110 -fill black
782 $canv itemconfigure lineP111 -fill black
783 $canv itemconfigure ar(P101) -fill black
784
785 $canv itemconfigure lineP200 -fill red
786 $canv itemconfigure lineP201 -fill red
787 $canv itemconfigure ar(P200) -fill red
788 $canv itemconfigure lineP210 -fill blue
789 $canv itemconfigure lineP211 -fill blue
790 $canv itemconfigure ar(P201) -fill blue
791
792 $canv itemconfigure Index2($Index4) -fill white -text $Index3
793 if {$RW == 1} {
794     $canv itemconfigure DataCM2($Index4) -fill white -text $Data
795 }
796 $canv itemconfigure Tag18bitstext2($Index4) -fill white -text $Tag
797 }
798
799
800
801 }
802 proc IM {nl} {
803     variable canv;
804
805
806     set Data [lindex $nl 0]
807     set Addr [lindex $nl 1]
808     set IndexM [lindex $nl 2]
809
810
811
812
813     $canv itemconfigure DataMM($IndexM) -fill #00FF00 -text $Data
814     $canv itemconfigure IndexMM($IndexM) -fill #00FF00 -text $Addr
815     # $canv itemconfigure DataCM($IndexM) -fill red -text $Data
816     # $canv itemconfigure data0($Tick) -fill red -text $Data
817
818 }
819
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
820 proc MM {nl} {
821     variable canv;
822
823
824
825     set Data [lindex $nl 0]
826     set Addr [lindex $nl 1]
827     set IndexM [lindex $nl 2]
828     set IndexC [lindex $nl 3]
829     set Tick [lindex $nl 4]
830
831
832
833     $canv itemconfigure DataMM2($IndexM) -fill white -text ""
834     $canv itemconfigure DataMM2($IndexM) -fill white -text $Data
835     $canv itemconfigure IndexMM($IndexM) -fill white -text $Addr
836     # $canv itemconfigure DataCM($IndexM) -fill red -text $Data
837     # $canv itemconfigure data0($Tick) -fill red -text $Data
838
839     # $canv create oval\
840         [expr 80+65*$Tick] 680\
841         [expr 87+65*$Tick] 687\
842         -fill #00FF00
843     $canv create text\
844         [expr 83+65*$IndexC] 717\
845         -fill red -text $Data
846
847 }
848
849 proc ABCD {nl} {
850     variable canv;
851
852
853     set Loc [lindex $nl 0]
854     set Bits [lindex $nl 1]
855
856
857     $canv itemconfigure cpuaddrtext2([expr (($Loc*31+31)/($Loc+1))- $Loc]) -fill white -text $Bits
858
```



## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
859 }
860 proc CPUREQ {nl} {
861     variable canv;
862
863
864     set Pid [lindex $nl 0]
865     set Index [lindex $nl 1]
866     set Addr [lindex $nl 2]
867     set RW [lindex $nl 3]
868     set Data [lindex $nl 4]
869     set State [lindex $nl 5]
870
871     if {$Pid == 0} {
872         #canv itemconfigure rect1 -outline black
873         #canv itemconfigure rect2 -outline black
874         #canv itemconfigure rect0 -outline white
875         $canv itemconfigure StateP0($State) -fill #00FF00 -text $State
876         $canv itemconfigure StateP0($State) -fill #00FF00 -text $State
877
878         $canv itemconfigure StateP0($State) -fill #00FF00 -text $State
879
880         if {$RW==0} {
881             $canv itemconfigure operationP0($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
882         } elseif {$RW==1} {
883             $canv itemconfigure operationP0($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
884             $canv itemconfigure DataCPU0($Index) -fill white -text $Data
885         }
886
887         $canv itemconfigure cpuaddrtextP0($Index) -fill white -text $Addr
888
889
890
891     } elseif {$Pid == 1} {
892         #canv itemconfigure rect0 -outline black
893         #canv itemconfigure rect2 -outline black
894         #canv itemconfigure rect1 -outline white
895         $canv itemconfigure StateP1($State) -fill #00FF00 -text $State
896
897         if {$RW==0} {
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
898 $canv itemconfigure operationP1($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
899 } elseif {$RW==1} {
900 $canv itemconfigure operationP1($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
901 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU1($Index) -fill white -text $Data
902 }
903
904 $canv itemconfigure cpuaddrtextP1($Index) -fill white -text $Addr
905
906 } elseif {$Pid == 2} {
907 # $canv itemconfigure rect0 -outline black
908 # $canv itemconfigure rect1 -outline black
909 # $canv itemconfigure rect2 -outline white
910 $canv itemconfigure StateP2($State) -fill #00FF00 -text $State
911
912 if {$RW==0} {
913 $canv itemconfigure operationP2($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
914 } elseif {$RW==1} {
915 $canv itemconfigure operationP2($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $RW
916 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU2($Index) -fill white -text $Data
917 }
918
919 $canv itemconfigure cpuaddrtextP2($Index) -fill white -text $Addr
920
921 }
922
923 }
924 proc HM {nl} {
925     variable canv;
926
927     set PIDx [lindex $nl 0]
928     set PIDy [lindex $nl 1]
929     set PIDz [lindex $nl 2]
930     set stringx [lindex $nl 3]
931     set stringy [lindex $nl 4]
932     set stringz [lindex $nl 5]
933     set Index [lindex $nl 6]
934     set State [lindex $nl 7]
935     set VBITx [lindex $nl 8]
936     #set VBITY [lindex $nl 9]
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
937 #set VBITz [lindex $nl 10]
938 set DBITx [lindex $nl 9]
939 set DBITy [lindex $nl 10]
940 set DBITz [lindex $nl 11]
941 set Data [lindex $nl 12]
942 set Tick [lindex $nl 13]
943 set Memory [lindex $nl 14]
944 set Addr [lindex $nl 15]
945 set IndexM [lindex $nl 16]
946
947
948 #scanv itemconfigure VBIT($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $VBIT
949 #scanv itemconfigure DBIT($Index) -fill #00FF00 -text $DBIT
950
951 #scanv itemconfigure DataMM($IndexM) -fill white -text $Memory
952 #scanv itemconfigure IndexMM($IndexM) -fill white -text $Addr
953
954 if {$PIDx==0} {
955     scanv itemconfigure VBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $VBITx
956     scanv itemconfigure DBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $DBITx
957     if {$PIDy==1 && $PIDz==2} {
958         #scanv itemconfigure VBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
959         scanv itemconfigure DBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
960         #scanv itemconfigure VBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
961         scanv itemconfigure DBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
962     } elseif {$PIDy==2 && $PIDz==1} {
963         #scanv itemconfigure VBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
964         scanv itemconfigure DBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
965         #scanv itemconfigure VBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
966         scanv itemconfigure DBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
967     }
968     if {$stringx=="Write Miss"} {
969         scanv itemconfigure DataCM0($Index) -fill white -text $Data
970     } elseif {$stringx=="Write Hit"} {
971         scanv itemconfigure DataCM0($Index) -fill white -text $Data
972     } elseif {$stringx=="Read Miss"} {
973         scanv itemconfigure DataCM0($Index) -fill white -text $Data
974         scanv itemconfigure DataCPU0($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
975     } elseif {$stringx=="Read Hit"} {
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
976 $canv itemconfigure DataCM0($Index) -fill white -text $Data
977 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU0($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
978 }
979 } elseif {$PIDx==1} {
980 $canv itemconfigure VBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $VBITx
981 $canv itemconfigure DBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $DBITx
982 if {$PIDy==0 && $PIDz==2} {
983 # $canv itemconfigure VBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
984 $canv itemconfigure DBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
985 # $canv itemconfigure VBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
986 $canv itemconfigure DBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
987 } elseif {$PIDy==2 && $PIDz==0} {
988 # $canv itemconfigure VBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
989 $canv itemconfigure DBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
990 # $canv itemconfigure VBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
991 $canv itemconfigure DBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
992 }
993 if {$stringx=="Write Miss"} {
994 $canv itemconfigure DataCM1($Index) -fill white -text $Data
995 } elseif {$stringx=="Write Hit"} {
996 $canv itemconfigure DataCM1($Index) -fill white -text $Data
997 } elseif {$stringx=="Read Miss"} {
998 $canv itemconfigure DataCM1($Index) -fill white -text $Data
999 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU1($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
1000 } elseif {$stringx=="Read Hit"} {
1001 $canv itemconfigure DataCM1($Index) -fill white -text $Data
1002 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU1($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
1003 }
1004 } elseif {$PIDx==2} {
1005 $canv itemconfigure VBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $VBITx
1006 $canv itemconfigure DBIT2($Index) -fill white -text $DBITx
1007 if {$PIDy==0 && $PIDz==1} {
1008 # $canv itemconfigure VBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
1009 $canv itemconfigure DBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
1010 # $canv itemconfigure VBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
1011 $canv itemconfigure DBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
1012 } elseif {$PIDy==1 && $PIDz==0} {
1013 # $canv itemconfigure VBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $VBITy
1014 $canv itemconfigure DBIT1($Index) -fill white -text $DBITy
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1015 #$canv itemconfigure VBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $VBITz
1016 $canv itemconfigure DBIT0($Index) -fill white -text $DBITz
1017 }
1018 if {$stringx=="Write Miss"} {
1019 $canv itemconfigure DataCM2($Index) -fill white -text $Data
1020 } elseif {$stringx=="Write Hit"} {
1021 $canv itemconfigure DataCM2($Index) -fill white -text $Data
1022 } elseif {$stringx=="Read Miss"} {
1023 $canv itemconfigure DataCM2($Index) -fill white -text $Data
1024 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU2($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
1025 } elseif {$stringx=="Read Hit"} {
1026 $canv itemconfigure DataCM2($Index) -fill white -text $Data
1027 $canv itemconfigure DataCPU2($Tick) -fill white -text $Data
1028 }
1029 }
1030
1031 #Processors' addresses values bullets
1032 if {$State==0} {
1033 if {$PIDx==0} {
1034 $canv create oval\
1035 [expr 80+65*$State] 565\
1036 [expr 87+65*$State] 572\
1037 -fill white
1038 $canv create oval\
1039 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\
1040 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\
1041 -fill white
1042 $canv create text\
1043 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\
1044 -fill white -text $Data
1045 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 565-16]\
1046 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 572+95]\
1047 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45
1048
1049 $canv create oval\
1050 [expr 80+65*$State] 605\
1051 [expr 87+65*$State] 612\
1052 -fill #00FF00
1053 $canv create oval\
```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1054 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\  
1055 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\  
1056 -fill #00FF00  
1057 $canv create text\  
1058 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\  
1059 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1060 $canv create oval\  
1061 [expr 80+65*$State] 640\  
1062 [expr 87+65*$State] 647\  
1063 -fill #00FF00  
1064 $canv create oval\  
1065 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\  
1066 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\  
1067 -fill #00FF00  
1068 $canv create text\  
1069 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\  
1070 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1071 } elseif {$PIDx==1} {  
1072 $canv create oval\  
1073 [expr 80+65*$State] 565\  
1074 [expr 87+65*$State] 572\  
1075 -fill #00FF00  
1076 $canv create oval\  
1077 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\  
1078 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\  
1079 -fill #00FF00  
1080 $canv create text\  
1081 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\  
1082 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1083 $canv create oval\  
1084 [expr 80+65*$State] 605\  
1085 [expr 87+65*$State] 612\  
1086 -fill white  
1087  
1088 $canv create oval\  
1089 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\  
1090 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\  
1091 -fill white  
1092 $canv create text\  

```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1093 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\  
1094 -fill white -text $Data  
1095 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 605-16]\  
1096 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 612+95]\  
1097 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45  
1098 $canv create oval\  
1099 [expr 80+65*$State] 640\  
1100 [expr 87+65*$State] 647\  
1101 -fill #00FF00  
1102 $canv create oval\  
1103 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\  
1104 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\  
1105 -fill #00FF00  
1106 $canv create text\  
1107 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\  
1108 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1109  
1110 } elseif {$PIDx==2} {  
1111 $canv create oval\  
1112 [expr 80+65*$State] 565\  
1113 [expr 87+65*$State] 572\  
1114 -fill #00FF00  
1115 $canv create oval\  
1116 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\  
1117 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\  
1118 -fill #00FF00  
1119 $canv create text\  
1120 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\  
1121 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1122 $canv create oval\  
1123 [expr 80+65*$State] 605\  
1124 [expr 87+65*$State] 612\  
1125 -fill #00FF00  
1126 $canv create oval\  
1127 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\  
1128 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\  
1129 -fill #00FF00  
1130 $canv create text\  
1131 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\  

```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1132 -fill #00FF00 -text ""
1133 $canv create oval\
1134 [expr 80+65*$State] 640\
1135 [expr 87+65*$State] 647\
1136 -fill white
1137 $canv create oval\
1138 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\
1139 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\
1140 -fill white
1141 $canv create text\
1142 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\
1143 -fill white -text $Data
1144 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 640-16]\
1145 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 647+95]\
1146 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45
1147 }
1148
1149 } elseif {$State==9} {
1150 if {$PIDx==0} {
1151 $canv create oval\
1152 [expr 80+65*$State] 565\
1153 [expr 87+65*$State] 572\
1154 -fill white
1155 $canv create text\
1156 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\
1157 -fill white -text $Data
1158
1159 } elseif {$PIDx==1} {
1160 $canv create oval\
1161 [expr 80+65*$State] 605\
1162 [expr 87+65*$State] 612\
1163 -fill white
1164 $canv create text\
1165 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\
1166 -fill white -text $Data
1167
1168
1169 } elseif {$PIDx==2} {
1170 $canv create oval\
```



## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1171 [expr 80+65*$State] 640\  
1172 [expr 87+65*$State] 647\  
1173 -fill white  
1174 $canv create text\  
1175 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\  
1176 -fill white -text $Data  
1177 }  
1178 } else {  
1179 if {$PIDx==0} {  
1180 $canv create oval\  
1181 [expr 80+65*$State] 565\  
1182 [expr 87+65*$State] 572\  
1183 -fill white  
1184 $canv create oval\  
1185 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\  
1186 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\  
1187 -fill white  
1188 $canv create text\  
1189 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\  
1190 -fill white -text $Data  
1191 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 565-16]\  
1192 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 572+95]\  
1193 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45  
1194 $canv create oval\  
1195 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\  
1196 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\  
1197 -fill #00FF00  
1198 $canv create text\  
1199 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\  
1200 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1201 $canv create oval\  
1202 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\  
1203 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\  
1204 -fill #00FF00  
1205 $canv create text\  
1206 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\  
1207 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1208 } elseif {$PIDx==1} {  
1209 $canv create oval\  

```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1210 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\  
1211 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\  
1212 -fill #00FF00  
1213 $canv create text\  
1214 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\  
1215 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1216 $canv create oval\  
1217 [expr 80+65*$State] 605\  
1218 [expr 87+65*$State] 612\  
1219 -fill white  
1220  
1221 $canv create oval\  
1222 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\  
1223 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\  
1224 -fill white  
1225 $canv create text\  
1226 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\  
1227 -fill white -text $Data  
1228 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 605-16]\  
1229 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 612+95]\  
1230 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45  
1231 $canv create oval\  
1232 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\  
1233 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\  
1234 -fill #00FF00  
1235 $canv create text\  
1236 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\  
1237 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1238  
1239 } elseif {$PIDx==2} {  
1240 $canv create oval\  
1241 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 565\  
1242 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 572\  
1243 -fill #00FF00  
1244 $canv create text\  
1245 [expr 83+65*$State] 582\  
1246 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1247 $canv create oval\  
1248 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 605\  

```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1249 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 612\  
1250 -fill #00FF00  
1251 $canv create text\  
1252 [expr 83+65*$State] 622\  
1253 -fill #00FF00 -text ""  
1254 $canv create oval\  
1255 [expr 80+65*$State] 640\  
1256 [expr 87+65*$State] 647\  
1257 -fill white  
1258 $canv create oval\  
1259 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 640\  
1260 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 647\  
1261 -fill white  
1262 $canv create text\  
1263 [expr 83+65*$State] 657\  
1264 -fill white -text $Data  
1265 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 640-16]\  
1266 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 647+95]\  
1267 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45  
1268 }  
1269 }  
1270  
1271 #Memory's address values bullets  
1272 if {$State<9} {  
1273 $canv create oval\  
1274 [expr 80+65*$State] 680\  
1275 [expr 87+65*$State] 687\  
1276 -fill white  
1277  
1278 $canv create oval\  
1279 [expr 80+65*[expr $State+1]] 680\  
1280 [expr 87+65*[expr $State+1]] 687\  
1281 -fill white  
1282  
1283 $canv create text\  
1284 [expr 83+65*$State] 697\  
1285 -fill white -text $Memory  
1286  
1287 $canv create arc [expr 80+65*$State-10] [expr 680-16]\  

```

## APPENDIX C. APPENDIX C: TCL/TK CODE FOR CACHE CONTROLLER

---

```
1288 [expr 87+65*$State+76] [expr 687+95]\
1289 -outline white -width 2 -style arc -start 45
1290
1291 } else {
1292 $canv create oval\
1293 [expr 80+65*$State] 680\
1294 [expr 87+65*$State] 687\
1295 -fill white
1296
1297
1298 $canv create text\
1299 [expr 83+65*$State] 697\
1300 -fill white -text $Memory
1301
1302 }
1303
1304 #Addresses bullets
1305 $canv create text\
1306 [expr 83+65*$State] 520\
1307 -fill white -text $Addr
1308
1309 }
1310
1311 };
```

## **Appendix D**

# **Appendix D: Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI)**

## Listing D.1: RMI Tempura Program

```

1  /* -*- Mode: C -*-
2  * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
3  *
4  * Copyright (C) 1998-2016  Nayef H.Alshammari, Antonio Cau
5  *
6  * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
7  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8  * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
9  * (at your option) any later version.
10 *
11 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
15 *
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with Tempura.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
18 *
19 */
20 load "conversion".
21 load "exprog".
22 /* rmiregistry 0 */
23 /* rmiserver . RmiServerIntf RmiServer 1 */
24 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient1 2 */
25 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient2 3 */
26 define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
27 define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
28 define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
29 define avall(X,b) = {X[b]}.
30 define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
31 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {X[d]}.
32 set print_states = true.
33 define get_var() = {
34     exists T,Client,Data,Timestamp : {
35         get2(T) and
36         Client=strint(apidval(T)) and
37         Data=strint(avall(T,3)) and

```

## APPENDIX D. APPENDIX D: JAVA REMOTE METHOD INVOCATION (RMI)

---

```
38         Timestamp =atime_micro1(T,4) and
39         format("Server is Receiving Assertion Data: X=%12d from Client %d at timestamp %s\n",
40         Data,Client,Timestamp) and empty
41     }
42 }.
43 /* run */ define test() = {
44     exists v : {
45         for v<2 do {get_var();skip}
46     }
47 }.
```

### Listing D.2: Client 1 Tempura Program

```
1  /* --- Mode: C ---
2  * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
3  *
4  * Copyright (C) 1998-2016  Nayef H.Alshammari, Antonio Cau
5  *
6  * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
7  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8  * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
9  * (at your option) any later version.
10 *
11 * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
15 *
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with Tempura.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
18 *
19 */
20 load "conversion".
21 load "exprog".
22 /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient1 2 */
23 define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
24 define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
```

```

25 define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
26 define avall(X,b) = {X[b]}.
27 define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
28 define atime_micro1(X,d) = {strint(X[d])}.
29 set print_states = false.
30 define assert(Client,Data,Timestamp) = {
31     exists Client,Data,Timestamp : {
32         format("\n") and
33         format("Client %d is Sending %d to Interface\n",Client) and
34         format("!PROG: assert Client:%d:X:%d:s:!\n",Client,Data,Timestamp)
35     }
36 }.
37 define get_var() = {
38     exists T : {
39         get2(T) and
40         Client =strint(apidval(T)) and
41         Data =strint(avall(T,3)) and
42         Timestamp =atime_micro1(T,4) and
43         format("Client %d is Receiving Assertion Data: Client=%d from %d from External Java ...
               Program at
               Timestamp=%s\n",Client,Client,Data,Timestamp) and assert(Client,Data,Timestamp) and empty
44     }
45 }.
46 }.
47 /* run */ define test_client1() = {skip and get_var()}.

```

### Listing D.3: Client 2 Tempura Program

```

1  /* -*- Mode: C -*-
2  * This file is part Tempura: Interval Temporal Logic interpreter.
3  *
4  * Copyright (C) 1998-2016  Nayef H.Alshammari, Antonio Cau
5  *
6  * Tempura is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
7  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8  * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
9  * (at your option) any later version.
10 *

```



## APPENDIX D. APPENDIX D: JAVA REMOTE METHOD INVOCATION (RMI)

---

```
11  * Tempura is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14  * GNU General Public License for more details.
15  *
16  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17  * along with Tempura. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
18  *
19  */
20  load "conversion".
21  load "exprog".
22  /* rmiclient . RmiServerIntf RmiClient2 3 */
23  define apidvar(X) = {X[0]}.
24  define apidval(X) = {X[1]}.
25  define avar1(X,a) = {X[a]}.
26  define avall(X,b) = {X[b]}.
27  define atime1(X,c) = {strint(X[c])}.
28  define atime_micro1(X,d) = {strint(X[d])}.
29  set print_states = false.
30  define assert(Client,Data,Timestamp) = {
31      exists Client,Data,Timestamp : {
32          format("\n") and
33          format("Client %d is Sending %d to Interface\n",Client) and
34          format("!PROG: assert Client:%d:X:%d:%s:!\n",Client,Data,Timestamp)
35      }
36  }.
37  define get_var() = {
38      exists T : {
39          get2(T) and
40          Client =strint(apidval(T)) and
41          Data =strint(avar1(T,3)) and
42          Timestamp =atime_micro1(T,4) and
43          format("Client %d is Receiving Assertion Data: Client=%d from %d from External Java ...
44              Program at
45              Timestamp=%s\n",Client,Client,Data,Timestamp) and assert(Client,Data,Timestamp) and empty
46      }
47  }.
48  /* run */ define test_client2() = {skip and get_var()}.
```

## Listing D.4: Client 1 Java Program

```
1 import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;
2 import java.rmi.registry.Registry;
3 import java.text.SimpleDateFormat;
4 import java.text.DateFormat;
5 import java.util.Date;
6 import java.util.Random;
7 public class RmiClient1 {
8     private RmiClient1() {}
9     public static void main(String args[]) {
10         String host = (args.length < 1) ? null : args[0];
11         try {
12             Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry(host);
13             RmiServerIntf stub = (RmiServerIntf) registry.lookup("RmiServerIntf");
14             for(int i = 0; i < 1; i++){
15                 Thread.sleep (1000);
16                 String Time = MicroTimestamp.INSTANCE.get();
17                 int id=1;
18                 Random rand = new Random();
19                 int X = rand.nextInt();
20                 System.out.println("!PROG: assert Client:"+id+":Data:"+X+": "+Time+"!");
21                 System.out.println("External Java Program is sending Assertion Data to
22                     Tempura Client="+id+" Data="+X+" Timestamp="+Time);
23             }
24         } catch(Exception e) {
25             System.err.println("Client exception: " + e.toString());
26             e.printStackTrace();
27         }
28     }
29     public enum MicroTimestamp {
30         INSTANCE ;
31         private long          startDate ;
32         private long          startNanoseconds ;
33         private SimpleDateFormat  dateFormat ;
34         private MicroTimestamp() {
35             this.startDate = System.currentTimeMillis() ;
36             this.startNanoseconds = System.nanoTime() ;
37             this.dateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat("HH-mm-ss-SSS") ;
```

```
38         }
39     public String get() {
40         long microseconds = (System.nanoTime() - this.startNanoseconds) / 1000 ;
41         long date = this.startDate + (microseconds/1000) ;
42         return this.dateFormat.format(date) + String.format("%03d", microseconds ...
           % 1000) ;
43     }
44 }
45 }
```

#### Listing D.5: Client 2 Java Program

```
1 import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;
2 import java.rmi.registry.Registry;
3 import java.text.SimpleDateFormat;
4 import java.text.DateFormat;
5 import java.util.Date;
6 import java.util.Random;
7 public class RmiClient2 {
8     private RmiClient2() {}
9     public static void main(String args[]) {
10         String host = (args.length < 1) ? null : args[0];
11         try {
12             Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry(host);
13             RmiServerIntf stub = (RmiServerIntf) registry.lookup("RmiServerIntf");
14             for(int i = 0; i < 1; i++){
15                 Thread.sleep (1000);
16                 String Time = MicroTimestamp.INSTANCE.get();
17                 int id=2;
18                 Random rand = new Random();
19                 int X = rand.nextInt();
20                 System.out.println("!PROG: assert Client:"+id+":Data:"+X+": "+Time+":!");
21                 System.out.println("External Java Program is sending Assertion Data to
22                     Tempura Client="+id+" Data="+X+" Timestamp="+Time);
23             }
24         } catch(Exception e) {
25             System.err.println("Client exception: " + e.toString());
```

```
26         e.printStackTrace();
27     }
28 }
29 public enum MicroTimestamp {
30     INSTANCE ;
31     private long          startDate ;
32     private long          startNanoseconds ;
33     private SimpleDateFormat dateFormat ;
34     private MicroTimestamp() {
35         this.startDate = System.currentTimeMillis() ;
36         this.startNanoseconds = System.nanoTime() ;
37         this.dateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat("HH-mm-ss-SSS") ;
38     }
39     public String get() {
40         long microseconds = (System.nanoTime() - this.startNanoseconds) / 1000 ;
41         long date = this.startDate + (microseconds/1000) ;
42         return this.dateFormat.format(date) + String.format("%03d", microseconds ...
43             % 1000) ;
44     }
45 }
```

#### Listing D.6: Server Java Program

```
1 import java.rmi.registry.Registry;
2 import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;
3 import java.rmi.RemoteException;
4 import java.rmi.server.UnicastRemoteObject;
5 import java.text.SimpleDateFormat;
6 import java.text.DateFormat;
7 import java.util.Date;
8 public class RmiServer implements RmiServerIntf {
9     static Integer x = 0;
10    public RmiServer() {}
11    public Integer getMessage() {
12        return x++;
13    }
```

```
14     public static void main(String args[]) {
15         try {
16             RmiServer obj = new RmiServer();
17             RmiServerIntf stub = (RmiServerIntf) UnicastRemoteObject.exportObject(obj, 0);
18             Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry();
19             registry.rebind("RmiServerIntf", stub);
20             System.err.println("Server ready");
21         } catch (Exception e) {
22             System.err.println("Server exception: " + e.toString());
23             e.printStackTrace();
24         }
25     }
26 }
```

#### Listing D.7: Server Interface Java Program

```
1 import java.rmi.Remote;
2 import java.rmi.RemoteException;
3 public interface RmiServerIntf extends Remote {
4     public Integer getMessage() throws RemoteException;
5 }
```

## **Appendix E**

# **Appendix E: MATLAB Code for Correctness Properties**

Listing E.1: MATLAB Code for Memory Consistency Property

```

9  for c = [1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28]
10     load AssertionData.txt
11
12     State=AssertionData(c,1);
13
14     Pid0=AssertionData(c,2);
15     Pid1=AssertionData(c+1,2);
16     Pid2=AssertionData(c+2,2);
17
18     CacheP0=AssertionData(c,12);
19     CacheP1=AssertionData(c+1,12);
20     CacheP2=AssertionData(c+2,12);
21
22     IndexP0=AssertionData(c,10);
23     IndexP1=AssertionData(c+1,10);
24     IndexP2=AssertionData(c+2,10);
25
26     AddrMem=AssertionData(c,5);
27
28     MemoryP0=AssertionData(c,13);
29     MemoryP1=AssertionData(c+1,13);
30     MemoryP2=AssertionData(c+2,13);
31
32     switch c
33     case 1
34         f = 1;
35     case 4
36         f = 2;
37     case 7
38         f = 3;
39     case 10
40         f = 4;
41     case 13
42         f = 5;
43     case 16
44         f = 6;
45     case 19

```

## APPENDIX E. APPENDIX E: MATLAB CODE FOR CORRECTNESS PROPERTIES

---

```
46     f = 7;
47     case 22
48     f = 8;
49     case 25
50     f = 9;
51     case 28
52     f = 10;
53     end
54
55 figure(f);
56     set(gcf, 'Position', [100, 100, 900, 700])
57     subplot(2,3,1);
58     plot(IndexP0,CacheP0,'b.','MarkerSize',20);
59     grid on
60     set(gca, 'XTick', 0:7)
61     xlim([-1 7])
62     ylim([-16 33])
63     xlabel('Index')
64     ylabel('Data')
65     legend(['Cache[' ,num2str(IndexP0) ']=' ,num2str(CacheP0)])
66     title("Cache of Pid "+Pid0+" at State "+State)
67
68     subplot(2,3,2);
69     plot(IndexP1,CacheP1,'g.','MarkerSize',20);
70     grid on
71     set(gca, 'XTick', 0:7)
72     xlim([-1 7])
73     ylim([-16 33])
74     xlabel('Index')
75     ylabel('Data')
76     legend(['Cache[' ,num2str(IndexP1) ']=' ,num2str(CacheP1)])
77     title("Cache of Pid "+Pid1+" at State "+State)
78
79     subplot(2,3,3);
80     plot(IndexP2,CacheP2,'r.','MarkerSize',20);
81     grid on
82     set(gca, 'XTick', 0:7)
83     xlim([-1 7])
84     ylim([-16 33])
```



## APPENDIX E. APPENDIX E: MATLAB CODE FOR CORRECTNESS PROPERTIES

```
85     xlabel('Index')
86     ylabel('Data')
87     legend(['Cache[' , num2str(IndexP2) ']=' , num2str(CacheP2)])
88     title("Cache of Pid "+Pid2+" at State "+State)
89
90     subplot(2,3,[4,6]);
91     plot(AddrMem,MemoryP0,'m.','MarkerSize',20);
92     grid on
93     set(gca, 'XTick', 0:15)
94     xlim([-0.5 15])
95     ylim([-16 33])
96     xlabel('Address')
97     ylabel('Data')
98     legend(['Memory[' , num2str(AddrMem) ']=' , num2str(MemoryP0)])
99     title("Main Memory at State "+State)
100
101
102 end
103 disp('Correctness Property 1: Memory Consistency is Done!')
```

### Listing E.2: MATLAB Code for Cache Coherence Property

```
104 for c = [1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28]
105     load AssertionData.txt
106
107     State=AssertionData(c,1);
108
109     Pid0=AssertionData(c,2);
110     Pid1=AssertionData(c+1,2);
111     Pid2=AssertionData(c+2,2);
112
113     IndexP0=AssertionData(c,10);
114     IndexP1=AssertionData(c+1,10);
115     IndexP2=AssertionData(c+2,10);
116
117     MSIP0=AssertionData(c,14);
118     MSIP1=AssertionData(c+1,14);
```

## APPENDIX E. APPENDIX E: MATLAB CODE FOR CORRECTNESS PROPERTIES

---

```
119     MSIP2=AssertionData(c+2,14);
120
121     switch c
122     case 1
123         f = 1;
124     case 4
125         f = 2;
126     case 7
127         f = 3;
128     case 10
129         f = 4;
130     case 13
131         f = 5;
132     case 16
133         f = 6;
134     case 19
135         f = 7;
136     case 22
137         f = 8;
138     case 25
139         f = 9;
140     case 28
141         f = 10;
142     end
143
144     figure(f);
145     set(gcf, 'Position', [100, 100, 900, 700])
146     subplot(3,1,1);
147     C = [0 0 0];
148     if MSIP0 == 1
149         C = [1 0 0];
150     elseif MSIP0 == 2
151         C = [0 0 1];
152     else
153         C = [0 1 0];
154     end
155
156     plot(IndexP0,MSIP0,'color',C,'marker','.', 'MarkerSize',20);
157     grid on
```

## APPENDIX E. APPENDIX E: MATLAB CODE FOR CORRECTNESS PROPERTIES

---

```
158         set(gca, 'XTick', 0:7)
159         set(gca, 'YTick', 0:4)
160     xlim([-1 7])
161     ylim([0 3.5])
162     xlabel('Index')
163     ylabel('MSI')
164     if MSIP0 == 1
165         legend('Modified');
166     elseif MSIP0 == 2
167         legend('Shared');
168     else
169         legend('Invalid');
170     end
171     title("Coherence State of Cache Blocks of Processor "+Pid0+" at State "+State)
172
173     subplot(3,1,2);
174     C = [0 0 0];
175     if MSIP1 == 1
176         C = [1 0 0];
177     elseif MSIP1 == 2
178         C = [0 0 1];
179     else
180         C = [0 1 0];
181     end
182
183     plot(IndexP1,MSIP1,'color',C,'marker','.', 'MarkerSize',20);
184     grid on
185         set(gca, 'XTick', 0:7)
186         set(gca, 'YTick', 0:4)
187     xlim([-1 7])
188     ylim([0 3.5])
189     xlabel('Index')
190     ylabel('MSI')
191     if MSIP1 == 1
192         legend('Modified');
193     elseif MSIP1 == 2
194         legend('Shared');
195     else
196         legend('Invalid');
```

## APPENDIX E. APPENDIX E: MATLAB CODE FOR CORRECTNESS PROPERTIES

---

```
197     end
198         title("Coherence State of Cache Blocks of Processor "+Pid1+" at State "+State)
199
200     subplot(3,1,3);
201     C = [0 0 0];
202     if MSIP2 == 1
203         C = [1 0 0];
204     elseif MSIP2 == 2
205         C = [0 0 1];
206     else
207         C = [0 1 0];
208     end
209
210     plot(IndexP2,MSIP2,'color',C,'marker','.', 'MarkerSize',20);
211     grid on
212         set(gca, 'XTick', 0:7)
213         set(gca, 'YTick', 0:4)
214     xlim([-1 7])
215     ylim([0 3.5])
216     xlabel('Index')
217     ylabel('MSI')
218         if MSIP2 == 1
219             legend('Modified');
220         elseif MSIP2 == 2
221             legend('Shared');
222         else
223             legend('Invalid');
224         end
225     title("Coherence State of Cache Blocks of Processor "+Pid2+" at State "+State)
226
227
228 end
229 disp('Correctness Property 2: Cache Coherence is Done!')
```